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REAR-ADMIRALS SCHLEY,
SAMPSON AND CERVERA

FRONTISPIECE

REAR-ADMIRALS SCHLEY
SAMPSON AND CERVERA

A Review of the Naval Campaign of 1898, in Pursuit

and Destruction of the Spanish Fleet

Commanded by Rear-Admiral

Pascual Cervera

By
JAMES PARKER

Formerly Lieutenant Commander U. S. Navy

With Portraits

NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY

1910.

Copyright, 1910, by
THE NEALE PUBLISHING COMPANY

CONTENTS.

Preface — A Biographical Sketch of the Author
CHAPTER
I.
II.
III.

PAGE

- 9

f

Preliminary 14

Causes of the War with Spain . . . . 15
The Destruction of the United States

Battleship "Maine" . . . . . 17

IV. Events Preliminary to the Declaration of

War 19

V. The "Flying Squadron" is formed . . . 21
VI. Commodore Winfield Scott Schley is Placed

in Command of "The Flying Squadron" 25

VII. The Naval War Board 28

"VIII. Sampson Assigned to Command with Rank

as Rear Admiral 31

IX. Commodore Winfield Scott Schley . . 36

X. Schley in an Assault on a Korean Fort . 38

XL The Greely Relief ^ Expedition of ^1884 . 41

XII. Record of Sampson's Services in Civil War 46

XIII. Sampson's Appointment Without Warrant

of Law, and Contrary Thereto ... 48

XIV. Sampson's First Day as Rear Admiral,

Commander-in-Chief 52

XV. What the Flagship New York did while
Absent from the Fleet — Alteration of

her Log-book 57

XVI. The Serrch for Cervera's Fleet ... 60
XVII. The Flying Squadron and Sampson arrive

at Key West 65

XVIII. The Flying Squadron sails for Cienfuegos

— Sailing Orders 69

XIX. Schley meets M'Calla's Division . . .71
XX. The Alleged delay in the Voyage of the
Flying Squadron from Key West to

Cienfuegos 74

XXI. The Blockade of Cienfuegos by the Flying

Squadron 76

XXII. The Signals at Cienfuegos not made known

to Schley 78

XXIII. Despatches Received by Schley at Cien

fuegos 85

XXIV. Despach No. 7 88

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

CHAPTER PAGE
XXV. The Remarkable Elusiveness from Pub
licity of Despatch No. 7 93

XXVI. The Nominations of Schley and Sampson

for Promotion 95

XXVII. The Blockade of Cienfuegos Continued . 100
XXVIII. The Character of Schley's Blockade of

Cienfuegos 109

XXIX. The Voyage of the Flying Squadron from

Cienfuegos to Santiago in

XXX. The Events of May 26, 27, and 28 . .115
XXXI. The Conference between Schley and

Sigsbee 118

XXXII. The Coaling Problem 123

XXXIII. The Events of May 26, 27, and 28 . . 126

XXXIV. The Return to Santiago de Cuba . . .132
XXXV. Schley Discovers Cervera's Fleet in Harbor

of Santiago 135

XXXVI. Schley's Plan of Battle and Blockade of

Santiago de Cuba 139

XXXVII. Sampson's Unofficial Statement About

Schley's Blockade 143

XXXVIII. The Reconnaissance of May 31, 1898 . 148
XXXIX. Admiral Sampson Arrives at Santiago de

Cuba and Assumes Command . . .153
XL. The Sinking of Colliers in the Entrance '.o

Santiago Bay 158

XLI. The Sinking of the Merrimac . . .161

XLII. Sampson's Order* of Blockade . . . .168

XLIII. Events During the Month of June . 172

XLIV. The Occupation of Guantanamo . . .174

XLV. The Bravery of Lieutenant Victor Blue,

United States Navy 176

XLVI. The Morning of July 3, 1898, Sampson,
in his Flagship New York leaves Block
ade for Siboney at 8.50 179

XLVII. The Battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898 . . 182
XLVIII. Almiral Schley's Story of the Battle . .184
XLIX. The Tragic Death of Yeoman George H.

Ellis 192

L. The Colon hauls down her Flag . . .196
LI. The Brooklyn is Sent to Fight a New Foe
While Admiral Sampson remains be
hind 198

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 7

CHAPTER PAGE

LII. Schley meets Admiral Cervera — No Cheers

Allowed 202

LIII. Captain Francis A. Cook's Story of the

Battle 204

LIV. Captain Clark's Story of the Battle . . 207
LV. Lieutenant Commander Hodgson's Story of

the Battle 212

LVI. Schley's and Sampson's Announcements of

the Victory 217

LVII. Schley's Preliminary Report of the Battle 220
LVIII. The Notes of the Battle Taken on Board

the Vixen 224

LIX. Rear Admiral Sampson's Report of the

Battle 239

LX. The Loop (so-called) made by the Brook
lyn 244

LXI. The Loop (continued) — Its Propriety

Illustrated in the Battle Between United

States Frigate United States and the

British Frigate Macedonian . . . .251

LXII. The Alleged Danger of Collision Between

the Brooklyn and Texas 260

LXIII. The Personal Conduct of Commodore

Schley during the Battle .... 268
LXIV. Under Whose Command was the Battle

of Santiago Fought and Won ? . . . 273
Admiral Dewey and Captain Clark say

"Schley," 285

LXV. The Part in the Battle Taken by the Flag
ship New York 286

LXVI. Was the Battle of Santiago a Captain's

Fight? 289

LXVI I. Paul Jones and the Battle of the Lirnan . 294

LXVIII. Schley's Generosity towards Sampson . . 297

LXIX. Sampson's Conduct towards Schley . 300

LXX. The Navigators' Chart of the Battle . . 303

LXXI. The Alleged Controversy with Lieutenant

Hodgson during the Battle .... 306

LXXII. The Court of Inquiry 317

LXXIII. Why did Schley ask for a Court of In
quiry? 324

LXXIV. Conclusion — A Contrast 327

ILLUSTRATIONS.

Captain James Parker Frontispiece

Facing Page

Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley 25

Rear- Admiral William T. Sampson 31

Diagram I 57

"It has not been possible to procure a fac
simile copy, but the appearance of that part of
the log-book of the New York for that day is,
as nearly as possible, as shown by Diagram I."

Diagram II 133

"The chart shows the whole movement of the
Flying Squadron during these three days,
May 26, 27 and 28."

Diagram III 168

"Accompanying this Order of Blockade was
a diagram showing the position each vessel
was expected to maintain."

Rear- Admiral Pascual Cervera 182

Diagram IV 187

"He replied that it was either 'a-port,' or
'hard-a-port' ; I think he said 'hard-a-port.' '

Diagram V 251

"The plan of the battle, as given by Captain
Mahan, is here reproduced."

PREFACE

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE
AUTHOR

THE feeling displayed by the Navy Department of
the United States; between the officers of the navy,
and throughout the country, that resulted from the
events of the naval campaign of 1898 in the West
Indies, in the pursuit and destruction of the Spanish
fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera,
would seem to justify a review of those events; and
some reference to the career and experience of the
author hereof may not be without interest in de
termining his fitness to undertake such review.

I was born in the town of Newark, Licking County,
Ohio, of New Jersey parentage and lineage, in the
year 1832; was appointed midshipman in the navy
of the United States November 14, 1846, and sent
to the then newly established "Naval School," as it
was then called, at Annapolis, Md., for a few months.
It is proper here to state that when the Hon. George
Bancroft, then Secretary of the Navy, established
that institution the intention was that when a lad
was appointed midshipman his first two years of ser
vice were to be passed there ; he was then to be sent
to sea for a three years' cruise; then brought back
to the Naval School for one year; and at the end of
the year be examined by a board of captains of the
navy, and, if passed, be warranted as passed mid
shipman.

The Mexican War broke out in May, 1846, and
a great need of young officers having developed, I
was soon ordered away for service on board ship,

io SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

and on March 26, 1847, sailed from Norfolk, Vir
ginia, for Vera Cruz, on board the sloop-of-war
Saratoga, under command of the late Admiral David
G. Farragut, then a commander in rank. It was his
first command.

Farragut hoped to get to Vera Cruz before the
capture of the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, and on
the way down the crew of the ship were assiduously
practiced in all sorts of apparently useless drills, such
as boarding from yard-arms, dropping hand grenades
upon the decks of imaginary ships, etc. It was long
years afterwards that we learned that his plan and
purpose were to dress the ship up as an old merchant
man, run the blockade into the harbor, tie up along
side the castle, and "board" from our yard-arms and
attempt to capture it ; but his plan was frustrated by
the fact that the castle surrendered the very day the
ship sailed from Norfolk.

Although there were no naval enemies to fight, yet
almost as soon as we arrived the dreaded "Yellow
Jack" broke out and continued its ravages until De
cember. We had 105 cases, and 26 deaths, out of
a complement of 159 officers and men. This was a
lesson of patient performance of duty in the face of
death that has not been without its effect upon my
subsequent life.

After the usual midshipman's experience of five
years, two of which were on the coast of Africa,
where I suffered shipwreck, I again came to the
Naval School — which had meanwhile been recog
nized by Congress and dignified by the title of
"Academy." After a year's study and preparation,
in June, 1852, I was graduated as passed midship
man, second of a class of which the late Rear-
Admirals Lewis A. Kimberly, Bancroft Gherardi,
Daniel L. Braine, Lieutenant George U. Morris,
who fought the Cumberland against the Merrimac;
Captain Kidder R. Breese, who was Rear Admiral

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA n

David G. Porter's fleet captain during nearly the
whole of that distinguished officer's Civil War ser
vice; Lieutenant John G. Sproston, the first regular
officer of the navy to give his life in the Union cause,
and others of like character were members.

I then served as passed midshipman for nearly
three years on the Mediterranean Station, on board
the U. S. sloop-of-war St. Louis, under command of
Commander Duncan N. Ingraham; and was an of
ficer of that vessel when Ingraham rescued Martin
Kozta (one of Kossuth's patriotic band of revolu
tionists) from the Austrian brig-of-war Huzzar,
whose officers had kidnaped him from shore at
Smyrna in 1853.

That incident has long been practically forgotten,
but it then set the world of diplomacy on fire, and
established the principle that one who comes to the
United States, renounces allegiance to the ruler of
the land of his birth, and, under our naturalization
laws declares his intention to become a citizen of the
United States, becomes, ipso facto, entitled to, and
will receive, the protection of our flag and power.

In September, 1855, I was promoted to be lieuten
ant, but having in the meanwhile become engaged to
be married, in November, 1856, I resigned my com
mission. Having read law in Cincinnati, in the office
of Hon. Salmon P. Chase,1 I graduated LL. B. from
the Cincinnati Law School.2

I was admitted to the bar of Ohio April 14, 1857,
and on June 3 married my Virginia sweetheart (Miss
Kate McLean, of Norfolk) . I practiced law until
the Civil War broke out.

On April 13, 1861 (though at that time an ardent

1 Then Governor of Ohio, subsequently Secretary of the Treas
ury under President Lincoln, and later Chief Justice of the Su
preme Court of the United States.

2 President William H. Taft was graduated from and for several
years was dean of that school.

12 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Democrat), I volunteered to resume my former place
in the navy, to aid in the maintenance of the Union,
and was the first officer who had formerly resigned
from the regular navy to be reappointed (on May
8th, 1861). I was subsequently reinstated, and
commissioned Lieutenant-commander (July 22,
1862), in my former place on the regular navy list.

I served through the Civil War with credit and
some distinction; was the executive officer of the
frigate Minnesota in the five days' bombardment of
Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and the senior officer
in the naval assault on that fortress January 15,
1865, concerning which assault Rear Admiral Porter,
in his report, said: "Nowhere in the annals
of war have officers and sailors undertaken so desper
ate a service. The work, as I said before, is really
stronger than the Malakoff tower, which defied so
long the combined power of France and England.
The courage of these officers deserves the highest
reward." . And Rear Admiral Porter recommended
the author and five others (viz: Lieutenant Com
manders K. R. Breese, Charles H. Cushman, and
Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr., and Lieutenants George
M. Bache and Roswell H. Lamson) for promotion
for personal gallantry displayed in that deadly assault.

When hostilities were entirely over I again resigned
my commission and retired to private life. Had I
remained in the navy I would now be a rear admiral
on the Retired List.

I am a counsellor-at-law of the Supreme Court of
the United States and of the highest courts of Ohio,
New Jersey, and New York.

As one of the counsel for Rear Admiral Schley
before the Court of Inquiry held in 1903, I had every
opportunity to acquire full and accurate knowledge
of all the facts and reports of the campaign.

While it will be evident to the reader of this review
that my professional, legal, naval, and personal judg-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 13

ments are favorable to Admiral Schley, I yet trust to
be believed when I say that I would not willingly do
the slightest injustice to any other officer, because I
regard them generally as still my professional breth
ren.

This book has been written without any consulta
tion with Rear Admiral Schley, who has never seen
a line of it, and does not know that is has been written ;
and it is proper to say that Schley's book, "Forty-five
Years under the Flag," was also written by him
without consultation with the writer of this book,
who never saw a line of it until after this book was
entirely written.

For all facts stated in this review proof is given.
Opinions based on, and inferences drawn from, those
facts are, of course, my own.

The author feels confident that a careful reading
of this review will dispel all misunderstanding of that
campaign, a misunderstanding which has pertina
ciously been promulgated in the effort to convey false
impressions in respect to the principal actors in it.

JAMES PARKER.

PERTH AMBOY, NEW JERSEY,
September i, 1907.

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY.

THE Admiral of the Navy, George Dewey, well says,
in his Introduction to the book "James Lawrence,"
which he most fitly styles "the admirable work of
Lieutenant Commander Albert Gleaves, U. S. N" :

"It is by the close and careful weighing of the
causes which produced the wonderful results of our
sea battles of the past, that we equip ourselves for the
warfare of the future."

The complete success and far-reaching results of
the United States naval campaign of 1898, in the
pursuit and destruction of the Spanish fleet com
manded by Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera, are with
out a parallel in the naval histories of the world; and
are fruitful of lessons for the future, of warning
against the mistakes and errors of judgment, depart
mental or individual, that may have occurred, and
of example that may serve as inspiration and guide
to the navy that is to carry on the record of excellence ;
and of brave deeds well and effectively done, in the
past, under and for the flag and honor of our country.

CHAPTER II

CAUSES OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN

IT is common to attribute that war to a particular
cause; but the truth is that the sentiment which
brought it about had been growing for centuries;
certainly since the days when the Spanish Armada
was sent against England in Queen Elizabeth's time.

There is no doubt that there has been transmitted
to us from our English ancestry a feeling of contempt
for what English-speaking sailors from that day to
this have called the "Dagoes"; and that the Span
iard has always been regarded by English-speaking
peoples as a pompous, exaggerated, rapacious, blood-
thirtsy and tyrannical type of man. The record of
the crimes of Spain against the peoples of Holland,
Peru, Chili, Mexico, and the Philippines is a black
one, truthfully told in the pages of Prescott and other
historians, and is well known and indubitable.

It may well be doubted if any other nation (not
of Spanish blood or teaching, and professing to be
Christian and civilized) can be truthfully charged
with such a deliberate murder of defenseless prisoners
as that of Captain Joseph Fry and his fellow-martyrs
at Santiago de Cuba in 1874; and it is the highest
retributive justice that the power of Spain on this
hemisphere should have been brought to an end there
by Fry's countrymen; and that the last of Spain's
naval vessels in American waters — the Cristobal
Colon, named after him who by his discoveries gave
to Spain her first power over the people of the An
tilles — lies a submerged wreck at the mouth of the
Rio Tarquino, near which Fry and his ill-fated com
panions were captured and taken to their murder at
Santiago de Cuba.

16 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Another remarkable coincidence is that the Infanta
Maria Teresa, Admiral Cervera's flagship (which
was the only vessel of his fleet saved from the beach
after the Battle of Santiago), was, while on her way
to the United States, driven ashore by a violent gale
at nearly the exact spot where Columbus landed in
1492 and planted the standard of Spain; and lies
there a wreck.

Since we became a nation every effort that has
been made by Spain's colonies in America to throw
off her tyrannical yoke has had the earnest and active
sympathy of the people of the United States. Our
adventurous young men have freely risked their lives
in that behalf. Numerous "filibustering expeditions,"
so called, have gone from our shores to aid, with arms
and men, the Cubans in their efforts for independence ;
and from the walls of all the military prisons in the
"ever faithful isle" — as the Spaniards persisted, not
withstanding, in calling Cuba — thousands of bullets
can be dug, ghastly proofs of the fate of those pa
triots or their associates who unsuccessfully had at
tempted to overthrow the Spanish domination. All
such efforts, and they were many, came to defeat until
the United States government and people took an
active part in the movement in the year 1898.

"It was in the air," at the beginning of that year,
that war between the United States and Spain was
imminent; and it needed only an incident to make
that war a reality.

CHAPTER III

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLE
SHIP "MAINE"

THAT incident came when our battle-ship Maine,
while lying peacefully moored to a buoy where she
had been placed by Spanish pilots, in what was then
the friendly harbor of Havana, was on February 17,
1898, blown up. By this disaster 270 of her officers
and men were hurled, unexpectedly and instantly, to
death.

No more dastardly act was ever perpetrated.
Those who did it waited until most of the victims
were asleep for the night — when, of course, they had
least chance of escape.

The whole world stood amazed, and our entire
nation, though blazing with indignation, waited until
a most patient and careful investigation could be
had. A naval court of inquiry, of which Captain
William T. Sampson was president, made it certain
that a submarine mine or other instrumentality had
been exploded under the ship; but how so exploded
has never yet been discovered. There are some sig
nificant facts, however, that demonstrate but too
clearly that, while privity on the part of the Spanish
authorities in the atrocity has not been shown, those
authorities must have known whether the Maine was
located over or in dangerous proximity to such instru
mentality, because they knew exactly where every such
— if there were such in that harbor — was located;
and they have never given up that knowledge to us.

If such mine was located near that buoy to which
the Maine was moored, it seems evident that it must
have been done for the purpose of exploding it under

i8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

a friendly vessel, because none others were ever
moored there; and the Maine was so moored by
direction of the Spanish port officers.

The explosion must have been caused by someone
entirely familiar with the location of the mine, be
cause it could have been effectively exploded only
when the Maine was directly over it, as the winds and
tides would change her position in respect to it. It
must therefore have been exploded by some Spanish
official who had the means of determining with pre
cision when she was over it; and who had access to
the batteries by which alone the explosion could be
effected.

The Spanish authorities could easily have located
all who had such knowledge and access ; and this they
have never done, so far as we know.

Admiral Dewey, in the Introduction to Cleaves'
book before referred to, says: "Out of the accounts
of great battles, by sea and land, we seize as watch
words the phrases of the commanders."

Thus the words "Remember the Maine!" (like
those other words, "Remember the Alamo!"; Law
rence's dying cry, "Don't give up the ship!"; Farra-
gut's, "Damn the torpedoes, go ahead!"; and Dew-
ey's quiet command, "You may fire when you're
ready, Gridley," which sounded the death-knell of
Spain's dominion over the Philippines) became an
inspiration to the country at large, and the navy in
particular.

CHAPTER IV

EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR

EVENTS moved very rapidly in the early part of
1898. Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard com
manded the North Atlantic Station at the time the
Maine was destroyed, and on March i, 1898, ap
pointed a court of inquiry to be held on board the
steamer Mangrove, at Havana. The members of the
court were Captain William T. Sampson, president;
Captain French E. Chadwick, and Lieutenant Com
mander William P. Potter, members; and Lieuten
ant Commander Adolph Marix, judge advocate.

After a most thorough investigation the court re
ported that, in its judgment, the ship had been blown
up from without; but did not, except by inference,
implicate the Spanish authorities; and that it was
"unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for
the destruction of the Maine upon any person or per

sons."

On March 5, by recommendation of President Mc-
Kinley, Congress voted fifty millions of dollars then
lying idle in the Treasury, to be used by the President,
in his discretion, for national defense. This great
mark of confidence and purpose was displayed with
out distinction of party, and almost unanimously.

Warlike preparations immediately began, and
were continued with zeal. New vessels then building
in England were purchased, examinations of vessels
suitable for auxiliary purposes were made in our va
rious ports, and warlike spirit and activity everywhere
prevailed.

On March 17 Senator Proctor, of Vermont, who
had been an officer of distinction in the Civil War,
had been Secretary of War, and had just returned
from an inspection of the "reconcentrado camps" in
the island of Cuba, made an address in the Senate of

20 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

the United States that created a profound impression,
not only in the United States, but abroad. His de
scriptions of the horrors he had seen in those camps,
of the slowly starving old men, women, and little
children, (whose only fault was that they were sus
pected of being in sympathy with their husbands,
fathers, brothers, or sons who were in the patriot
army of Cuba,) declared in clarion tones to the
country and the world, that to relieve the suffering
people of that island from the cruel domination of
Spain was not only a national, but a moral, duty on
our part. It removed all lingering doubts.

Two names will go down to history in a common
infamy: The Austrian Field Marshal Haynau,
whose atrocious treatment of the Hungarian and
Austrian patriots of 1848-9 aroused the indignation
of the world; and the Spaniard, Captain-General
Weyler, by whose orders the atrocities that Senator
Protor described were committed.

The President's call for volunteers for army and
naval service was responded to by a vast multitude of
men. North and South, East and West, vied with
each other in display of patriotic zeal. Veterans of
the Blue and veterans of the Gray stepped out with
their sons and grandsons, in patriotic emulation, to
march and suffer and, if necessary, to die under the
Old Flag, when and wherever they might be called
upon to go.

Into the navy, as parts of the naval militia, went
the yachtsmen that owned and ran expensive yachts,
who left their business to become enlisted men and,
with dainty hands that had never known labor, in
dulge in the pleasant tasks of coaling ships and
scrubbing decks.

There was only one rivalry — who should do and
dare and suffer most in the great good cause and duty
of the hour, and for the honor and glory of the
United States and the Stars and Stripes.

CHAPTER V
THE "FLYING SQUADRON" is FORMED

To form the squadron that will go down to history
as "The Flying Squadron" several ships were taken
out of the North Atlantic fleet and sent to rendezvous
at Hampton Roads. These were the armored cruiser
Brooklyn (Captain Francis A. Cook) ; battleships
Texas (Captain John W. Philip; Massachusetts
(Captain Francis J. Higginson) ; and armored
cruisers Minneapolis (Captain F. M. Wise) ; and
Columbia (Captain James H. Sands). The last two
were soon sent to the New England coasts, and some
smaller vessels and a collier (Sterling) were sent to
Hampton Roads in their stead.

On March 24 Rear Admiral Sicard broke down
under the strain of his greatly increased official labors
and anxieties and was relieved from his command.

Sicard was a distinguished officer who had served
faithfully and with distinction during the Civil War.
In command of the gunboat Seneca he took part in
the battles of Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and vol
untarily — for he was under no obligation of duty to
do so — headed the officers and men from his vessel
in the naval assault on that fort, January 15, 1865,
where he behaved with much gallantry. He had
served as chief of bureau in the Navy Department,
had commanded the monitor Miantonomoh in the
North Atlantic fleet when it was under command of
Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce, and succeeded that
able officer in command of that fleet

His detachment left Captain William T. Samp
son the senior officer of that station; and on March
27 Captain Sampson published an order in which he
announced: "By order of the Honorable Secretary

22 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

of the Navy I have assumed command of the United
States naval force on the North Atlantic Station ; and
hoisted my pennant on board the armored cruiser New
York, at 3.30 p. M. this day." And then after an
nouncing his staff as follows: Chief of staff, Captain
French E. Chadwick (who was also the captain of
the flagship New York] ; assistant chief of staff, Lieu
tenant Sydney A. Staunton ; flag lieutenant, Charles

C. Marsh; secretary ensign, E. L. Bennett; he signed
himself, "William T. Sampson, Captain, Commander-
in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station."

The above named continued to be his staff during
the Spanish War. Up to this time Sampson had been
the captain of the battle-ship Iowa. Captain Robley

D. Evans was on March 28 ordered to the command
of that ship, and thus became next in rank to Samp
son. In the opinion of the author that appointment
of Evans was a most significant move; for, that
Sampson was a frail man and therefore liable to break
down at any moment was a fact that was not unknown
(certainly should not have been) to the officials of
the Navy Department; and if he did break down,
Evans, as senior captain, would have become Samp
son's successor, just as Sampson did when Sicard
broke down. It would never have done to detach
Sampson and put Evans in his place — the whole navy
would have cried out in condemnation of that; but
if Evans could succeed to the command in the way
indicated the scheme might have gone through with
much less comment.

If this was the scheme, one very important individ
ual was "left out of the count." That was Captain
Chadwick, chief of staff, who apparently made up
his mind that Sampson should not break down.

Evans, who bears the sobriquet of "Fighting
Bob," has always been a lucky character, "reaping
where he had not sown, and gathering where he had
not strewn;" but his luck seems to have failed him

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 23

in this matter. Where he got his sobriquet of
''Fighting Bob" neither he (as he says) nor anyone
knows. He was an acting ensign in the Fort Fisher
assault, but although he was painfully wounded in the
legs, none of the official reports mentioned him for
bravery; and in fact he was not conspicuous.

Several months after che assault I learned that
he had been placed on the retired list because of
his wounds, and, for the purpose of remedying the in
justice of retiring a young officer because he had been
wounded in battle, I wrote the letter praising him
which Evans quotes on page 108 of his book, "A
Sailor's Log." If I had known what effect the letter
was later to have, it would not have been so strongly
worded.

When in 1866 selections were made to fill up the
increase in the grades authorized by Congress in that
year, Evans was advanced thirty-four numbers —
over the heads of the present rear admirals, Glass,
Sands, Sigsbee, and many others who had a much
better fighting and professional record than he.
When those over whom he had been promoted com
plained of injustice, a naval board of distinguished
officers, of which the late vice admiral Stephen C.
Rowan was president, reported that his advancement,
to the extent to which it had been made, was an in
justice to those over whom he had been promoted,
and that an advance of ten numbers was all that
Evans' conduct merited. A second board of rear
admirals recommended that Sands, Glass, and Sigsbee
should be restored to their places above him. Not
withstanding that Sands had stooped over Evans, at
his request, and bound up his wounds under the
furious fire at Fort Fisher, and had then gone further
into the fight and had been mentioned in the reports
for gallantry displayed, yet Evans in Congress had the
bills defeated that were introduced to effectuate the
recommendation of the boards of admirals.

24 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

He was a good "Fighting Bob" to prevent justice
being done to his brother officers.

After the battle of Fort Fisher Evans had no op
portunity for lighting (except with his tongue) until
the Spanish War occurred.

The foregoing incidents of his history are given
because he, in his "Sailor's Log," "points with pride"
to my praise of him in that letter from which he
quotes, and it is but just that the whole truth about
the matter should be told.

CHAPTER VI

COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY IS PLACED IN
COMMAND OF "THE FLYING SQUADRON

COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY had been
promoted to that rank in regular order, on February
6, 1898. On March 28 he was assigned to the
command of the Flying Squadron, and hoisted his
broad pennant on board the Brooklyn on that day.
It was a high compliment, and it may be presumed
that it would not have been paid him but for the con
viction that he was the man to fill the part which that
squadron was expected to play. As its name implies,
it was intended that the squadron should be in con
tinual readiness to fly to meet the Spanish ships should
they appear on our coasts. On April 6 the Navy De
partment, in a confidential circular to Captain Samp
son, commanding, etc., said: "Should the department
learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Porto Rico,
it is possible that the Flying Squadron may be sent
thither; in which case some of your vessels may b&
needed to reinforce that squadron"1 Therefore at
that date it seems to have been intended to take away
from Sampson a part of the vessels of his command
to add to Schley's command. Schley in command of
the augmented Flying Squadron was then to find and
fight the Spanish fleet, which was the important duty
of the war, while to Sampson was left the perform
ance of the other duties pertaining to his position as
"captain commanding the North Atlantic Station,"
such as blockading the Cuban ports, etc.

Commodore Schley's statement of his doings as
soon as he assumed command, made to the Court of

1 Italics are mine. — J. P.

26 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Inquiry, is so clear that it is deemed proper to give it
in detail.

He said: "During the time that we lay at Hamp
ton Roads the squadron was organized. Its com
manding officers were brought together, and the gen
eral plan of campaign was thrashed out. I put the
squadron on a war basis, established the matter of
pickets and patrols, and also the masking of lights.
During the time we were there I explained to the com
manding officers that as it would be impossible to
construct a plan of battle that would meet unforeseen
contingencies, the general plan of the squadron would
be to cruise in line of battle; and its general principle
would be to attack the head of the leading vessels,
concentrating fire upon them, in order, first, to obtain
the moral effect; and, second, to throw them into
confusion, making victory over them very much more
successful and complete.

"I did this for the reason that the older plans had
all been to attack center and rear, resulting in the
escape, usually, of a part of each squadron. I thought
that the attack on the head of a squadron, which was,
to some extent, new, would involve the destruction
of the whole, and this was to be the general plan of
action as explained on that occasion.

"These preliminaries arranged, target practice
was taken up with sub-caliber guns. It resulted in an
accuracy of fire which, I think, was fully demon
strated in the action that occurred some months later.

"There was a good deal of restlessness, naturally,
among the squadron at being held from what they
thought was the scene of action ; which was, happily,
relieved when orders were received from the Secre
tary of the Navy to proceed off Charleston, where
orders would await us."

Schley's "Squadron General Order No. 9," which
was issued at Hampton Roads April 22, 1898, elab
orately provides directions for the efficiency of the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 27

squadron in minute particulars. It will be found in
full in the Record of the Court of Inquiry, I.1 1216,
and it is commended to those who are not, and wish
to be, informed as to the commodore's preparedness
for emergencies.

In thus discussing with his captains the general
plans to be pursued in attacking and otherwise dealin
with the enemy, should he be met, Schley was but fo
lowing the plan Nelson had pursued in that memor
able chase after the French fleet after its escape from
Toulon, culminating in its destruction in the Battle
of the Nile.

Concerning this, Fitchett (an English writer of
merit) says: "Throughout that memorable cruise,
whenever the weather permitted he (Nelson) sum
moned his captains on board the flagship, where he
would fully develop to them his own ideas of the dif
ferent and best modes of attack, and such plans as he
proposed to execute upon falling in with the enemy."

1 Report of Court of Inquiry.

CHAPTER VII

THE NAVAL WAR BOARD

AN anomalous body with this pretentious title sprang,
like Minerva from the brain of Jove, into existence
at the outbreak of the war with Spain ; but who was
Jove, and how he came to give being to such a Min
erva, has not yet been explained.

"History repeats itself." So long a time had
elapsed that it had been forgotten how, during the
Civil War, the efforts of our generals in the field had
been rendered abortive by interference from Wash
ington, whose "Organizers of Victory" and "Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War" had come to be
more dangerous to our armies than all the foes that
confronted them.

There was no such body in the Navy Department
before the war with Spain. It was organized
May 21, 1898, which, fortunately for the coun
try, was one day after Dewey had destroyed or
captured all naval enemies in the Philippines;
and was composed of Rear Admiral Sicard, presi
dent (who had recovered from his disability to
command the North Atlantic fleet, and was now
able to command it and its new commander,
Commodore Dewey and his fleet, Schley and the Fly
ing Squadron, and Clark and the Oregon, as well) ;
Captain A. S. Barker, and Captain A. S. Crownin-
shield (titular rear admiral), Chief of the Bureau
of Navigation, which bureau controlled the whole
personnel of the navy.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan was then in Europe,
under summons to join the board. The nation waited
with bated breath while he was returning (it has been
said, under an assumed name and in disguise) to

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 29

make sure that in spite of Spanish spies, assassins, or
other evil agencies he might safely reach his expect
ant country, and be able to shed the light of his great
strategic wisdom and undoubted professional skill and
ability on the naval conduct of the war; and breathed
with assured confidence of success when, on May 9,
he arrived safely in Washington and took his seat
as an additional member of the board. Never since
Mr. Lincoln flitted through Maryland disguised in
Scotch cap and long cloak has so important a journey
been accomplished.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt was
for a time a member of the board; but on May 7
(probably attracted more by the "Rough Rider"
scheme, or perhaps unequal to the mysterious charac
ter of the board's methods) he "severed his connec
tion" with it.

A great air of mystery as to the proceedings of the
board at once pervaded the department. Its sessions
were held in the topmost attic, so that "far from the
madd'ing crowd's ignoble strife" its meditations
could not easily be disturbed. No one could get near
it without special permission from the Bureau of
Navigation. The elevator men, who seemed to be
very dubious as to the exact location of the board,
scanned with suspicious eye everyone who mentioned
it and asked to be let out at its floor, and a double
line of messengers or guardians carefully scrutinized
any individual, as well as his credentials, who desired
admission . . . one of the guardians then disap
peared into the room, and, if so directed, ushered the
visitor into "the presence."

A friend who once got into the board room, said
that he found Admiral Sicard writing a private letter;
Barker with his feet on the table reading a news
paper, while Mahan's polished crown looked as if
it was struggling to keep him from giving forth a
new book on the "Influence of Sea Power," which

30 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

the strategy about to be developed by the board was
soon to exert through the navy of the United States.
Cold indifference pervaded the room; but it was all
assumed, for henceforth naval strategy ruled the
hour.

Luckily Dewey had taken the precaution to cut the
cable from Manila that might otherwise have con
nected him with the board, and so his operations
could not be interfered with, and from start to finish
were conducted without error. He had used his own
method of learning the whereabout of the Spanish
fleet in those waters, and he made no mistakes from
the time he left Hong Kong, through the episode with
von Diederichs, the German admiral, down to the
time of his departure ror the United States, to be
received by his admiring countrymen in a manner
which would have caused the splendors of the Ro
man triumphs to pale into insignificance. In one re
spect Dewey had a great advantage over Schley and
Sampson. Before leaving Mirs Bay for Manila he
waited until he knew where the Spanish fleet would be
found, and was never troubled by any of the uncer
tainties which the Navy Department (inspired as the
Secretary of the Navy undoubtedly was by the wis
dom and strategic insight and foresight of the Naval
Board) succeeded in enveloping Schley and Sampson
with respect to the whereabouts of Cervera.

It was a great body, that War Board, and, whether
correctly or not, felt itself big with the fate of our
naval operations.

Captain Clark, upon his arrival at Rio de Janeiro,
on his wonderful voyage in the Oregon, no sooner
came in communication with the board than he felt
himself impelled to voice his opinion of it by his
famous despatch: "Don't hamper me with instruc
tions. I am not afraid, with this ship, of the whole
Spanish fleet."

FACING 31

CHAPTER VIII

SAMPSON ASSIGNED TO COMMAND, WITH RANK OF
REAR ADMIRAL

SAMPSON continued in command of the North At
lantic Station as captain until, at midnight of April
21, 1898, he received from the Secretary of the Navy
a telegram in the following words, viz :

"WASHINGTON, April 21, 1898.
"SAMPSON, Key West, Fla.

"You are assigned to command of the United
States naval force on the North Atlantic Station, with
the rank of rear admiral. Hoist the flag of rear ad
miral immediately.

"LONG."

This he did on the morning of the 22d.

No more remarkable act has ever occurred in the
navy of the United States than this. It was plainly
contrary to all naval precedent and rule, and it is
quite easy to show that it was not only without war
rant of custom or law, or of the Constitution of the
United States, but was also against one positive pro
hibition of statute law, and contrary to the Constitu
tion.

The only attempt at justification that the depart
ment has ever made is found in the statememnt made
by Mr. Long, in his letter addressed confidentially to
the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. p. 6.)1 that "Sampson had
been second in command of that fleet, been with it in
its evolutions and practice during the previous year,
and was familiar with its workings."

If that was a good reason, then it may be said that

1 Senate Executive Document, 1899.

32 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Rear Admiral Francis M. Bunce (to whom the eyes
of many officers of the navy turned when Sicard gave
up) had commanded that fleet for more than two
years; and Schley had been his "chief of staff" (the
same position Sampson held under Sicard) , and both
were more "familiar with its workings" than Samp
son. The fact that Bunce was to retire on Christmas
Day of that year need not have stood in the way of
his assignment to command, because a law authorized
the President to assign any officer on the Retired List
to active duty. And when that Retired List is
looked over the names of the following officers, avail
able and fully competent to discharge such duties,
could be found:

Jouett, the most conspicuous figure of the battle of
Mobile Bay, next to Farragut.

Glorious old Kimberly, the executive officer of the
Hartford, the hero of nearly all Farragut's battles,
and whose conduct in the Samoan hurricane won for
him the praise of the civilized world.

Walker, one of the most accomplished of our offi
cers, conspicuous as a fighter on the Mississippi River
during the many months of almost daily battle during
the Civil War; who had been Chief of the Bureau
of Navigation for eight years; had commanded the
"White Squadron" for three years with great ability
and success; and since his retirement for age had
been president of the Inter-oceanic Canal Commis
sion.

Self ridge (just retired for age) , than whom no bet
ter officer ever trod a deck, who had served with great
credit and ability and conspicuous bravery during the
Civil War, and was one of the lieutenants of the
Cumberland when she was sunk by the Merrimac,
standing to his guns until the water covered them as
she sank. Lieutenant George U. Morris, who was
in command of the ship, said of him: "He did all
that a noble and gallant officer could do." He was,

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 33

immediately after the sinking of the Cumberland, or
dered to the command of the victorious Monitor;
but held the command only a short time, because of
his junior rank. He had commanded one of Porter's
Mississippi fleet, in the Vicksburg campaign, took
part in the Fort Fisher battles, both afloat and in the
naval assault, and was one of the six officers before
mentioned who were recommended by Admiral Por
ter for promotion for conspicuous gallantry displayed
on the last occasion. Up to his retirement (only six
weeks before) he had commanded the European
Squadron.

There were Belknap, who had been the executive
officer of the New Ironsides off Charleston in many
fights with the formidable batteries by which that
stronghold had been defended; had commanded a
double-turreted monitor with great efficiency in the
Fort Fisher battles ; and Phythian, who was the exec
utive officer of the New Ironsides in the same battles,
both accomplished and distinguished fighters of the
Civil War.

Also Howell, Watson, Remey, and Schley, whose
records will be referred to hereinafter.

The Secretary of the Navy in his confidential letter
to the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. i) said that "when Com
modore Schley was given command of the Flying
Squadron he was informed verbally that if his com
mand and that of Sampson came together the latter
would command the whole."

The Secretary is probably in error as to this, be
cause, as has already been shown Sampson was still
only a captain ; and it was at that time contemplated
that Sampson's fleet should be further depleted by
sending more of his vessels to Schley's command.
And it is most highly improbable that the Secretary
would say to a commodore that he was to be put
under command of a captain, for, as every naval

34 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

officer knows, if at any time the commodore had come
into the presence of a captain, the commodore would
have commanded and the latter obeyed his orders.

The Secretary has also stated that when Schley
was informed as stated above, he "expressed ready
acquiescence in the proposed arrangement." It will
be remembered that Schley assumed command of the
Flying Squadron on March 28, and Sampson's ap
pointment as a rear admiral was April 21, three weeks
later.

It is not improbable that if the commodore had
been so informed, after Sampson had been appointed
rear admiral, he would have acquiesced, as in fact he
afterwards did; because apparently the only hope
any of the Sampson's illustrious seniors seems to have
had left to him of being permitted to serve his coun
try afloat in the West Indies in the war with Spain
was based upon his willingness to waive his rank and
"acquiesce in the arrangement made" to put his
junior over him.

Four commodores, viz., John A. Howell, George
C. Remey, John Crittenden Watson, and Winfield
Scott Schley — all of whom had served with much
greater distinction, ability, and experience in the Civil
War, and afterwards, than had Sampson — were
given the opportunity to serve under their junior, or
not at all. They were all men of unblemished per
sonal character, and of distinguished professional
ability and standing.

Howell had served faithfully and almost continu
ously on the blockade; took part in the Battle of
Mobile Bay, as the executive officer of the Ossippee,
and was highly commended by his captain (the late
Rear Admiral William E. Leroy) for efficient per
formance of duty in that great contest. He was re
called from command of the European Squadron at
the beginning of the Spanish War, having relieved
Selfridge, on the latter's retirement.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 35

Remey was in many fights with Confederate bat
teries at Charleston, S. C. ; was taken prisoner in the
gallant naval attempt to recapture Fort Sumter, Sep
tember 8, 1863, and suffered a long and harassing
imprisonment.

Watson had stood by Farragut's side as his flag
lieutenant in nearly all of the great admiral's battles
and many minor engagements, constituting an almost
continuous fight for many months on the Mississippi
River; and had been wounded by an exploding shell.

In Farragut's report of the battle of Mobile Bay
(wherein the best and most formidable forts, com
manded by officers who were the most skillful of our
countrymen, were fought, torpedoes run, and iron
clads encountered and rammed by wooden ships) the
great admiral said: "My flag lieutenant, J. Critten-
den Watson, has been brought to your notice in
former despatches. During the action he was on the
poop, attending to the signals, and performed his
duties, as might have been expected, thoroughly. He
is a scion worthy the stock from which he sprang, and
I commend him to your attention."

This from Farragut, who notoriously was not
prodigal with compliments to his subordinates, was
high praise.

Hardly had the sound of the Battle of Santiago
ceased, when the Department placed Watson in com
mand of the "Eastern Squadron," to be sent to the
coast of Spain to encounter and finish up what Dewey
and Schley had left of the Spanish navy; which,
under Admiral Camara, was steaming aimlessly about
in the Mediterranean or Red Sea. When Dewey
gave up his command at Manila, Watson was sent to
take and fill his place, which for about two years he
very ably did. Watson was succeeded in turn by
Remey, whose conduct of our naval operations in the
trving situations and complications of the Chinese
(Boxer) War contributed so much to give us our
leading position among the allies there.

CHAPTER IX

COMMODORE WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY

COMMODORE WINFIELD S. SCHLEY comes of eminent
Maryland stock. His family has furnished great
lawyers, a Governor of Georgia, and many men dis
tinguished in every walk of life. His maternal grand
father was captain of the crack military company of
riflemen that Maryland contributed to the defense of
the State in the War of 1812-15, ranking then as the
Fifth Maryland Regiment does at the present time.

That is the State which produced both the poet
and the occasion that called forth our anthem, "The
Star Spangled Banner," which to-day brings all
Americans who hear it to their feet with bared heads,
almost realizing for them Webster's description as
applied to England's drum-beat: "Whose morning
reveille, following the sun, circles the whole earth
with one continuous and melodious strain of the
martial airs of England." And who can tell what
patriotic impulses they may have stirred in that old
ancestor's heart, to be transmitted from him to the
grandson ?

Winfield S. Schley was born October 9, 1839, near
the city of Frederick, Md., where the family had
lived for several generations, honorable, and honored
by all their contemporaries. He was appointed mid
shipman and sent to the United States Naval Acad
emy at Annapolis in September, 1856, and was grad
uated thence in June, 1860.

When the Civil War broke out he was serving
abroad in the frigate Niagara, and when she ar
rived in the United States he promptly continued his
allegiance to the Union, in which course he had the
approval and support of his family.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 37

During the war he faithfully and zealously per
formed all his duties. As early as May 12, 1861,
when Schley was not yet twenty-two years of age, so
highly was he regarded by his captain (McKean)
that the latter appointed him prize-master of a ship
that the Niagara had captured. A few months later
he behaved with gallantry in the attack upon and
capture of a vessel attempting to run the blockade
at Mobile, and was highly commended for such gal
lantry by Commander Francis Winslow. He was in
many of the engagements on the Mississippi River,
part of the time in command of U. S. S. Monongehela
(a command far above his rank as lieutenant), in the
almost daily fights which preceded and resulted in the
fall of Port Hudson; and during the whole struggle
he merited and received the commendation of his
superior officers, notably of Admiral Farragut. Dur
ing the whole Civil War he, continuously afloat, cred
itably performed all his duties during that conflict.

CHAPTER X

SCHLEY IN AN ASSAULT ON A KOREAN FORT

IN June, 1871, Schley took part in an assault upon a
fort in Korea, one of the most dangerous and desper
ate ever made by officers and men, sailors and marines
of any navy. He was the second person to scale the
parapet and enter the fort, Lieutenant W. W. McKee
being first by a few feet. McKee was mortally
wounded, and the Korean who struck him down
sprang with the same spear upon Schley, and made a
thrust at him that ran between his arm and left side,
pinning his coat sleeve to his coat, whereupon Schley
shot him dead.

The late Rear Admiral Lewis A. Kimberly, then
a commander, commanded the whole of the forces
engaged, and of Schley's conduct on that occasion
Kimberley's report says :

uThe gallant and brave McKee, the first to enter
over the parapet, fell mortally wounded with two
wounds. He has since died, and the navy has lost
one of its bravest and noblest sons. Lieutenant Com
mander W. S. Schley was the next officer in the fort,
and killed the Korean who wounded McKee.

"To Lieutenant Commander Schley belongs the
credit of organizing the expedition and carrying out
the several details which went far to prevent confu
sion and induce success. His arrangements of the
boats, his superintendence of the various labors on
shore, in destroying the guns and forts, encouraging
the men, and setting them a brave example in being
second in the fort at its storming, and being in po
sition to render assistance where most needed, render
praise unnecessary. The facts of his labors, judg
ment, and system speak for themselves. "

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 39

Kimberly evidently did not think it any part of
his duty to withhold from his subordinate the praise
and commendation that were the due of that sub
ordinate.

Of that assault Schley (signing himself "Acting
Adjutant General") in his report said:

"The assault was made through a deep ravine, full
eighty feet deep, with 350 sailors and marines. The
approach was without any covering, and the fire of
the enemy most terrific and severe. Nothing could
withstand the men. The impetuosity of the charge
was met by brave men in the fort, who contested inch
by inch, and fought hand to hand.

uThe honor of gaining the first foothold inside
fell to Lieutenant McKee, who was at once charged
by the enemy. But a moment had elapsed until I

fained the inside, and went to his aid in his desperate
ght with the enemy. In a moment he fell, mortally
wounded by a musket ball in the groin and a spear
stab in the side.

uThe same brave one who had wounded McKee
rushed upon me, but the spear passed between my
left arm and the body; and before he could with
draw it he was shot dead and fell lifeless at my feet."

Schley does not say who shot him. That's his
usual way of telling of his own exploits.

He adds : "I should not do proper justice if I failed
to mention those men (sailors) whom I recognized
as the first to gain the inside of the fort." He then
mentions several of them by name, and continues:
"The officers of the whole battalion behaved with
great gallantry and decision. It would require a bet
ter pen to praise properly, or do justice to their dash
and courage."

Rear Admiral John Rodgers, the commander-in-
chief of the Asiatic Squadron, who was himself one
of the most gallant and efficient and distinguished
commanders of the Civil War, — who commanded

40 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

the Galena in the battle with Drewry's Bluff, on the
James River (or Fort Darling, as we called it), —
said in his report of the assault on the Korean fort:
"The fighting inside the fort was desperate; the cour
age of the Koreans was unyielding; they expected
no quarter; and probably would have given none;
they fought to the death ; and only when the last man
fell did the conflict cease. It gives me the greatest
satisfaction to say that our officers and men defeated
a determined enemy in a desperate fight, with a pa
tience and courage most admirable. A victory was
won of which the navy may well feel proud/'

Such praise and commendation from John Rod-
gers mean more than that of most other officers, for
no man ever displayed more courage in the most
dangerous and trying circumstances than he, and he
was a good judge of that characteristic which we call
bravery.

CHAPTER XI

THE GREELY RELIEF EXPEDITION OF 1884

SCHLEY'S next important service was rendered as
commander of what is known as "The Greely Relief
Expedition of 1884."

In that service all the characteristics of the fully
equipped naval officer were required — ability for or
ganization; judgment in selection of ships, officers,
and men; skill, self-reliance, and ability in execution.
Schley displayed in the highest degree the qualifica
tions necesary in fitting out, and accomplishing with
complete success and remarkable promptness, the ob
ject of the expedition, which was to seek and rescue
Lieutenant Greely and his surviving men lost in the
Arctic regions.

Two previous expeditions had failed to accom
plish that purpose.

The full nature and extent of the responsibilities
imposed upon Schley were lucidly set forth in the fol
lowing letter from the Honorable Secretary of the
Navy:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,

February 18, 1884.

"SlR. — Having been selected for the command of
the Greely Relief Expedition of 1884, you will make
immediate and full preparations for the performance
of your duties. You will investigate the circum
stances of Lieutenant Greely' s voyage to Lady Frank
lin Sound, in 1881; and of the attempts to relieve
him in 1882 and 1883; incidentally familiarizing
yourself with the whole subject of Arctic exploring
and relief expeditions.

42 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

"You will examine the Thetis and Bear, and all
other ships which may be designed for the expedition,
and co-operate with the chiefs of bureaus in strength
ening and equipping them; giving particular atten
tion to all the special articles of outfit necessary in
Arctic voyaging, including boats, sledges, dogs,
houses, clothing, navigation instruments, and the
whole material of the expedition.

"You will also consider and assist in the selection
of the subordinate officers and enlistment of the
crews; and on all points indicated, and concerning
any steps which might be taken to give success to the
expedition, you will from time to time make to the
Department all suggestions and recommendations
which may occur to you as useful or important.
"Very respectfully,

"W. E. CHANDLER,

"Secretary of the Navy.
"COMMANDER W. S. SCHLEY,
"Washington."

By the above letter Schley was clothed with full
responsibility for the fitting out and conduct of the
expedition. That responsibility was fully met. In
about two months and a half the expedition was
ready, and the first ship sailed May i, 1884.

In his final letter, dated April 21, the Secretary of
the Navy said: "No detailed instructions will be
given to you. Full confidence is felt that you have
both the capacity and courage, guided by discretion,
necessary to do all that can be required of you, by
Department or the nation, for the rescue of our im
periled countrymen."

That "full confidence" was not misplaced; but was
entirely warranted by results. Fifty-three days after
the expedition sailed from New York Lieutenant
Greely and the survivors of his party were found and
rescued.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 43

The Secretary of the Navy, when he received
Schley's despatch from St. John's, Newfoundland,
announcing the successful result of the expedition,
replied in words that found an echo in all hearts:

"COMMANDER W. S. SCHLEY:

"Receive my congratulations and thanks for your
prudence, perseverance, and courage in reaching our
dead and dying countrymen. The hearts or the
American people go out with great affection to Lieu
tenant Greely and the few survivors of his deadly
peril. Care for them unremittingly, and bid them be
cheerful and hopeful on account of what life has yet
in store for them. Preserve tenderly the heroic dead;
prepare them according to your judgment, and bring
them home.

"W. E. CHANDLER,
"Secretary of the Navy."

The living and dead were "tenderly cared for, and
brought back home," the ships arriving at Ports
mouth, N. H., August 2, 1884, where they were re
ceived by the Atlantic Fleet, commanded by Rear
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, the ships of which were
dressed out as for a joyful holiday; and with three
cheers for Schley's ships, they passed to their an
chorage.

On the 4th, through the streets of Portsmouth,
there was a grand parade of the naval brigade from
Luce's fleet. A public reception of Schley and his
officers and men, by the citizens of Portsmouth, fol
lowed, and the whole world resounded with justly
earned praise of Schley, his officers, and men. That
a new and brilliant page of our naval history had
been written by him and them was a feeling universal
in our country.

Congratulations and commendations poured in
upon him from representative bodies and distin-

44 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

guished citizens throughout the land. The legisla
ture of Maryland, by a joint resolution of thanks,
and the present of a gold chronometer-watch, marked
its appreciation of her son.

In his official report Schley gives unstinted praise
to all his subordinates, saying in a general order that
was read to the assembled officers and men of each
ship:

uGreely's relief was made possible, First, by the
promptest activity and unwearied energy of the Hon
orable Secretary of the Navy and Honorable Secre
tary of War. Secondly, by the unceasing vigilance
and readiness of officers and men; their alacrity in re
sponding to orders; their cheerfulness at all times,
day or night, in the performance of their duties,
which demanded promptness, endurance, and cour
age. My confidence grew daily, in noting that the
spirit of those who fitted this expedition had been
caught up by the officers and men who were to use it
to accomplish its purpose."

There is not a word in that order or report of
claim of credit for himself. He had not learned, ap
parently, how to exalt himself by disparaging, belit
tling or ignoring the efforts of those under him, or
by magnifying his own.

Rear Admiral George W. Melville, who had been
a most conspicuous figure in the ill-fated Jeanette ex
pedition, as chief engineer of that vessel under Lieu
tenant George W. De Long, and was also Schley's
chief engineer of his flagship Thetis, said to the
writer, concerning Schley's vigilance and work in the
expedition: "How the man found time for his meals
and sleep was a marvel to me, for it seemed to me
that every time I looked at that crow's nest he was

in it."

Inasmuch as the laws gave no promotion for such
services, the President of the United States (Mr.
Arthur), as a mark of his appreciation and approval,

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 45

personally tendered to Commander Schley the ap
pointment of Chief of the Bureau of Equipment and
Recruiting of the Navy Department, a position that
had generally been given only to captains in rank.

Schley served in this capacity for four years, intro
ducing many reforms and improvements in those de
partments of the service. He did much to perfect the
apprentice system, then in its infancy, also in estab
lishing in the navy the principle that promotion for
merit to the highest rank should be open to anyone
who deserves and is fitted for it, as it was and is in
the army. It certainly is anomalous that (as in the
case of Lieutenant General Chaff ee) one in the army
can attain the highest rank, even though enlisted as
a drummer boy or private, while in the navy one who
does not come in through the Naval Academy can
not hope for any such advance, no matter how high
his merit or attainments or distinguished his conduct.

Schley's next most conspicuous conduct was when,
in command of the cruiser Baltimore, he carried to
Sweden the body of John Ericsson, the great in
ventor, to be buried in his native land. This duty
was performed with the approbation of the people of
both countries. In the ceremonies and receptions
tendered to him and the officers and men of his ship
by the Swedish authorities and people, he exhibited
a facility of speech, and readiness and felicity of
manner, that made his visit memorable to all who took
part in those ceremonies.

CHAPTER XII

RECORD OF SAMPSON'S SERVICES

WILLLIAM T. SAMPSON entered the Naval Academy
as midshipman in September, 1857, and was gradu
ated first of his class in June, 1861.

During the Civil War nearly all of his service was
performed at the Naval Academy, then located at
Newport, R. I. Probably he chafed under his de
tention at that warlike spot, and would gladly have
been sent, sooner than he was, to the seat of war at
the front, where there were greater dangers to be en
countered than the fire of the eyes of the young ladies
who congregated in that charming New England re
sort.

But it was not until October, 1864, that he was
sent to the front, as executive officer of the monitor
Patapsco, on board of which vessel he served until
January 15, 1865, on the night of which day she
was sunk by an enemy's torpedo while on picket duty
in Charleston harbor, when his commanding officer
commended him for "coolness and intrepidity." In
that great struggle this was all the mention that was
made of him that I have been able to find by a dili
gent search through the twenty-odd volumes of re
ports which the Navy Department has published.

Subsequent to the war he had been chief of the
Bureau of Ordnance in the Navy Department for
eight years. He was undoubtedly among the leaders
in that branch of professional knowledge, but that
did not necessarily make him an officer to be chosen
over all the commodores and rear admirals of the
navy for the important position that subsequently was
assigned to him.

The foregoing records of fighting and other ser-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 47

vices have been given to show that all those commo
dores and other officers named were at least the
equals, personally and professionally, of Sampson.
And their services and experiences as fighters were
all vastly superior to his, because they had had better
opportunities than he.

As a matter of fact Sampson had never been in any
fight whatever, and he died without any such expe
rience, except "firing a few shells at one of the Span
ish torpedo boats at Santiago de Cuba," and at San
Juan, Porto Rico.

The best illustration of the impropriety of the
action of the department in placing him over his
seniors will be found in the mere statement of the
fact that if George Dewey had not, fortunately for
himself and the country, been already in command of
the Asiatic Squadron he would in all probability have
had the same opportunity given him that his brother
commodores had, of "expressing ready acquiescence
in the arrangement made."

CHAPTER XIII

SAMPSON'S APPOINTMENT WITHOUT WARRANT OF
LAW, AND CONTRARY THERETO

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY in his letter to the
Senate of the United States (Ex. Doc. D. 6.) refers
to the selection of Sampson as being in the "exercise
of discretion in the assignment of officers, which is
authorized by law"; but he failed to cite the law
which gives such authority.

It is quite correct to say that the department has
a discretion to choose, for the performance of par
ticular duties, from among its officers of the requisite
rank, those deemed best fitted for such performance.
It might have selected any of the rear admirals or
commodores of the navy to command the North At
lantic Station; and while there might have been dif
ference of opinion as to the wisdom of the particular
choice, there could have been none as to the right
of choice. Having made such choice, the department,
with entire propriety, might have detailed those four
commodores to service under the officer of its selec
tion, even though not lineally outranked by the new
appointee.

As has been already said, it is quite easy to show
that the appointment of Captain Sampson to be rear
admiral and commander-in-chief of the North At
lantic Station was not only without warrant of law or
the Constitution of the United States, but was also
a violation of one positive prohibition of law, and
against the provisions of the Constitution.

Prior to December 21, 1861, the highest rank in
the navy of the United States had been that of cap
tain. A captain might be assigned to duty as com
mander-in-chief of a squadron, and while so com
manding was — by courtesy only — styled "commo-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 49

dorc," and hoisted a commodore's broad pennant;
but it gave him no command over his seniors on the
list of captains. If any chance brought into his com
pany one of those seniors — in command of a single
ship even — down would come his broad pennant, and
he obeyed for the time being that senior's orders.

On December 21, 1861, Congress enacted: Sec.
1454, Revised Statutes: "The President may select
any officer not below the rank of commander on the
Active List of the Navy and assign him to the com
mand of a squadron with the rank and title of flag
officer " etc.

Under this section many officers were assigned to
command squadrons with that rank and title; and
this continued to be the case until July 16, 1862, when
Congress enacted "An act for the reorganization of
the navy," which for the first time established the
grades of admiral, vice admiral, rear admiral, and
commodore. These were all flag officers.

While the Act of December 21, 1861, was not, in
terms, repealed by the Act of July 22, 1862, there is
no court in the land that would not apply to it the
maxim of Lord Coke: "Leges posteriores prior es
contr arias abrogant."

No "flag officer" was ever appointed after the pas
sage of the Act of July 22, 1862. During the rest
of the war acting rear admirals were appointed, and
the practice was continued for a time subsequent. It
had been given up later, because of its illegality, and
when Dewey and Howell were assigned to command
of their respective squadrons it was in their lineal
rank as commodores. Dewey was only a commodore
when he fought the Battle of Manila.

It cannot be claimed with any show of propriety
that anyone could be assigned to command as rear
admiral under an act which authorized only the title
of "flag officer."

50 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Sampson was not assigned with the title of "flag
officer" or "acting rear admiral," but as rear admiral;
and he never signed his name as acting rear admiral.

Sec. 1366 of the Rev. Stat. (which was part of
the Act of July 22, 1862) is as follows:

"During war, rear admirals shall be selected from
those officers on the Active List not below the grade of
commander who shall have eminently distinguished
themselves for courage, skill, and genius in their pro
fession; but no officer shall be promoted under this
provision unless, upon recommendation of the Presi
dent by name, he has received the thanks of Congress
for distinguished service."^

No language could be clearer; and that section is
conclusive against the legality of Sampson's appoint
ment, because:

First. He had not "eminently distinguished himself
by courage, skill, and genius in his profession."

Second. He had not "been recommended to Con
gress by the President by name," for its thanks; and,

Third. He had not "received the thanks of Con
gress for distinguished service," or any service.

It is undoubtedly true that the President has un
restricted power, under the Constitution, to "nom
inate" all officers; but he cannot "appoint" any offi
cer without "the advice and consent of the Senate."

Sampson was not nominated to the Senate; and its
advice and consent to his appointment were never
asked for or given, as required by Art. II, Sec. 2,
par. 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

The ad interim (so-called) clause does not help
the matter out, because that applies only to "vacancies
that may happen during the recess of the Senate."
There was no vacancy in the list of rear admirals,
and the Senate was in session, when the appointment
was made.

1 The italics are, of course, mine. — J. P.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 51

It is a further fact that war had not been declared
(although it was subsequently, on the 25th, declared
as of the 2ist). And Sec. 1366 provides that "dur
ing peace, vacancies in the grade of rear admiral shall
be filled by regular promotion from the list of com
modores, subject to examination according to law."
So that by that section, Sampson, being only a cap
tain, was not eligible for promotion to the grade of
rear admiral.

This matter has been dwelt on at such length, not
from any desire to disparage Sampson, who, through
no effort of his own, was placed in that position by the
Navy Department, to the exclusion of many of his
seniors (notably the four commodores above named)
who had "distinguished themselves by courage, skill,
and genius in their profession"; but because his pro
motion was a fundamental wrong that was sure to
revenge itself, as it did, by results.

If attention shall thereby be called to the considera
tion that the fundamental rules of naval subordina
tion, precedence, and command cannot be violated
with impunity, or without evil consequences, the
author's purposes will have been accomplished.

Having been placed in such humiliating position,
it is greatly to the credit of those four commodores
who have been named that they preferred to serve
their country, under the flag that had "braved for
many years the battle and the breeze" over them,
even while they felt the humiliation of the situation,
rather than to stand for their own right and dignity
under the well established rules of the navy; and
thus deprive the country of their services. They
should be honored for preferring performance of
duty to any considerations of self or official pride;
and there has been no pretense they did not as loyally
support Sampson as they would have done had he
been their lineal superior officer.

CHAPTER XIV

SAMPSON'S FIRST DAY AS REAR ADMIRAL, COM
MANDER-IN-CHIEF

THE same despatch boat that brought to Captain
Sampson his assignment to command as rear admiral
brought him also the following telegraphic order:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, April 21, 1898.
"SAMPSON, Key West:

"Blockade immediately coast of Cuba from Car
denas to Bahia Honda. Blockade Cienfuegos, if it
is considered desirable. Issue a proclamation of
blockade, covering blockaded ports. Do not bom
bard, according to my letter of April 6.

"LONG."

Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, at page 410 of
his book, "A Sailor's Log," describes the meeting of
the captains that was held in the cabin of the flagship
New York, at which these telegrams were read ; and
most fitly states the feeling that was inspired in them
all by the situation : "Then, with serious and thought
ful faces, we said 'Good-night' to the admiral and
each other, and returned to our ships."

It was an occasion for serious thoughtfulness.

In obedience to the last order the fleet with great
promptness sailed next morning (22d) at 6.30 A. M.
for the coast of Cuba, shaping course for Havana.

At the hour for hoisting colors, Sampson broke
out his rear admiral's flag at the mast-head of his
flagship New York; and with the inspiring strains
of the "Star Spangled Banner" sounding over the
sparkling waves of the Gulf Stream, and the roaring

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 53

of the guns in salute to his flag, he began the first day
of the war with Spain.

The situation was most remarkable and anomalous.
Here was a captain in the navy of the United States,
lifted over the heads of all the distinguished veterans
of the Civil War, rear admirals and commodores
put in command of the finest fleet that ever flew
the flag of our country, and sailing at the head of
that fleet under orders from the President to inaugur
ate war with Spain.

One would think that he would have been so im
pressed by the importance and solemnity of the re
sponsibility thus laid upon him, that nothing could or
would divert or deter him from the full performance
of the duty involved.

Rear Admiral Evans, in his book already referred
to, at pages 412 et seq. has given such a graphic and
full account of the events of that day that I venture
to quote from it, and refer the reader to the whole of
it. He says :

"In the late afternoon the land about Havana was
made out in the distance, and every preparation was
made for battle in case the enemy fired at us. Shortly
after we sighted the land a vessel was seen, well in
shore, attempting to escape to the eastward, and the
New York left her place in the column, and gave
chase, at the same time flying the signal : 'Disregard
movements of commander-in-chief.'

"I, as next in rank to Sampson, hoisted the guard
flag; and, as senior officer present, held the fleet to
its course, direct for the Morro Castle at the entrance
of the harbor of Havana.

"The New York soon ran out of sight, and I saw
no more of her until about two o'clock the next morn
ing, when she rejoined, having in the meanwhile
captured the Spanish steamer Pedro, and sent her into
Key West as a prize/'

Thus that great fleet was in effect abandoned by

54 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

its newly made rear admiral commander-in-chief, and
the inauguration of the war with Spain was left, by
him, to Captain Evans. The latter, as in duty bound,
and in accordance with the regulations of the navy,
at once assumed the command, and its responsibilities,
by virtue of being "the senior officer on the spot."

Captain Evans continues the relation of the
methods he pursued, and tells how, like the man who
exclaimed, "My soul's in arms and eager for the
fray," he "hoped that the Spaniards would fire upon
our ships; how some guns were fired, but he saw no
splash of the shot, for, unfortunately, none came.
They were only signal guns to announce our arrival."
And, finally, he says: "I continued on my way and
established the blockade, and night settled down.
General Blanco and the City of Havana were in a
grip that was to make them very tired and hungry
before it relaxed."

Evans seems to have been greatly and very prop
erly impressed by the responsibility that rested upon
him. He tells of his anxieties while he was on the
bridge during the entire night; of having made up
his mind that the Spaniards would attempt some
thing in the way of a torpedo attack, and how every
breaking sea was, to his imagination, a torpedo boat.

"Shadows that night did strike more terrors
To the soul of Richard than could the substance
Of ten thousand soldiers."

He tells of the signals he made to the fleet during
the night, of its prompt maneuvering in obedience
thereto, and he winds up his interesting account, by
saying :

"Between two or three o'clock in the morning of
the 23d the New York rejoined, and the responsibili
ties of command shifted to the able shoulders where it
belonged."

That responsibility must therefore have been upon

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 55

Evans' shoulders until it shifted back to the "able
shoulders" of Sampson.

That Evans had no doubt as to who was in com
mand that day and night is shown by the number of
pronouns "I" and "my" which adorn his narrative,
there being no less than fourteen of these in a little
more than a page of his story.

An interesting question here obtrudes itself. Sup
pose that during the time that the commander-in-
chief was out of sight and signal distance a Spanish
fleet or those apprehended torpedo boats could have
emerged from Havana and made an attack upon our
fleet; suppose that, with Evans in command as "senior
line officer on the spot," a great victory — as com
plete as that secured at Santiago de Cuba on July 3,
1898 — had been secured by our fleet : would the honor
of such victory have belonged to Sampson, the com-
mander-in-chief, who in his flagship had gone off
chasing possible prizes, or would it not have been
properly given to Evans, "the senior line officer on
the spot," in actual command?

There can be no doubt as to the answer to that ques
tion; and those who know "Fighting Bob" know
that from his well-known disposition to "claim every
thing" in sight he would have been prompt and vocif
erous in claiming, and properly claiming, all the
credit and honor that belonged to the commanding
officer of the victorious fleet.

When one reads such a statement as that of Evans,
one instinctively wonders if there is not some mistake
about it.

There is no mistake, however. The story has
been carefully verified by myself as to the movements
of the New York, by examination of her log-book,
which tells of her hoisting that signal : "Disregard
movements of commander-in-chief" and what she did
after making that signal, and confirms and verifies
Evans' statement.

56 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

A disgression by way of anticipation may be par
doned at this point of the narrative. That signal,
"Disregard movements of commander-in-chief" is
the same that was made by Admiral Sampson on the
morning of July 3, 1898, when he went away to the
eastward to make an official visit to General Shafter
at his headquarters up in the country back of Siboney
(leaving Commodore Schley in command as "senior
line officer on the spot") .

XI

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CHAPTER XV

WHAT THE FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK" DID WHILE
ABSENT FROM THE FLEET

IT has not been possible to procure a fac-simile copy,
but the appearance of that part of the log-book of
the New York for that day is, as nearly as possible,
as shown by Diagram I.

As the log was originally written and signed by
Lieutenant Mulligan, it ended with the words "state
of blockade," which were at the end of the last line
above the line on which his signature was written.
The words, "None of the vessels of the fleet were
within signal distance at the time of the capture of
Spanish steamer Pedro" while they are in the same
handwriting as that of the rest of the log-book, were
evidently written in (as they appear) some time after
he signed the log-book, because the ink and pen used
were different from those used in writing the body
of the remarks. The ink is much darker, the words
are not consecutive with the other remarks relating
to the capture of the Pedro, and, inasmuch as there
was no room to write them in between the top of those
capitals and the last line above, they had to be run
through the top of those capitals as they appear in the
log.

It will be natural and proper to ask:

Why did Admiral Sampson, charged as he was
with the inauguration of the war with Spain, leave the
command of his fleet and the performance of that
duty on so important an occasion to one of his sub
ordinates, while he in his flagship went off in chase
of a peaceful merchant steamer, to make a prize of
her?

58 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

He had several light vessels that he might just as
well have sent after the Pedro.

The suggestion might arise that he was after prize
money but for the fact that it made not a cent's differ
ence to him whether the New York or some other ves
sel of his fleet made the capture, because the prize law
provided that "the commanding officer of a fleet or
squadron shall receive one-twentieth part of all prize
money awarded to any vessel or vessels under his
immediate command," and so self-interest could not
have been his motive.

But there was another officer on board the New
York who had a large pecuniary interest at stake,
and that was the fleet captain (chief of staff) and also
captain of the ship, Captain French E. Chadwick.

The prize law contained a further provision : "The
fleet captain shall receive one one-hundredth part of
all prize money awarded to any vessel or vessels of
the fleet or squadron in which he is serving." Under
this provision, if the New York had remained with
the fleet to do her duty as flagship, and some other
of the light cruisers had been sent to make the cap
ture, a beggarly one per cent, would have been all
that Chadwick would have been entitled to.

But the prize law contained two other provisions
that were of great import to Captain Chadwick. One
of these was as follows: "To the commander of a
single vessel shall be awarded two-twentieths part of
all the prize money awarded to the vessel under his
command," etc. The other provision was: "All ves
sels of the navy within signal distance of the vessel
or vessels making the capture shall share in the
prize."

Manifestly it was therefore to the interest of Cap
tain Chadwick, first, that the New York should chase
and capture that prize; and, second, that no other
vessel of the fleet should be "within signal distance"
at the time of the capture.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 59

The last consideration nicely accounts for that in
terlineation in the log-book. As a matter of fact the
proceeding made a cash difference to Captain Chad-
wick of more than ten thousand dollars, because the
Pedro was subsequently condemned and sold as a
prize, and the New York got all the prize money to
the exclusion of the rest of the fleet. They were left
to do the duty and reap the glory of inaugurating the
Spanish War. The cash profits were the New York's
alone ; and the biggest share went to Captain Chad-
wick.

Whose was probably the dominant mind on this
occasion?

Before leaving this subject, I wish to express my
admiration for that most remarkable book, UA Sail
or's Log," written by Rear Admiral Robley D.
Evans. No such entertaining work of "fiction
founded on fact" has appeared since the "Tales by the
Baron Munchausen" were given to a wondering
world. I advise everybody to read it. It will no
doubt become a nautical classic for the same reason
that the Baron's adventures are so famous, viz., be
cause of the marvelous imagination displayed by its
author.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SEARCH FOR CERVERA' S FLEET

THE Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral Pas-
cual Cervera had rendezvoused at Puerto Grande, in
the Island of St. Vincent, Cape de Verde Group, and
consisted of the cruisers Infanta Maria Teresa (flag
ship), Viscaya, Almirante Oquendo, and Cristobal
Colon, and destroyers Pluton, Furor, and Terror.

This squadron sailed from St. Vincent on April 28,
1898, but its destination not having been given out
by Admiral Cervera, the Naval Board set its wits to
work to find out where it had gone, but without much
success. All that could be learned was that it had
"gone to sea," so there was nothing to be done but
await its appearance from the udeep bosom of the

ocean."

There were several minor engagements between
our small ships and batteries on the north side of
Cuba, in one of which Ensign Worth Bagley and
three enlisted men were killed and several others
wounded — the first victims of the war. At other
points there was some cable cutting. In all these en
gagements officers and men displayed great gallantry
and skill, as was to be expected from them.

The first operation of any magnitude occurred on
May 12, when Admiral Sampson, in his flagship, to
gether with several of the fighting vessels of his fleet
under his immediate command, made an attack upon
the defenses of San Juan, Porto Rico, lasting about
three hours. Concerning this attack, Sampson's re
port (A. 368 )x says:

"Upon approaching San Juan it was seen that none
of the Spanish vessels was in the harbor. I was
therefore considerably in doubt whether they had

1 Appendix to Report of the Secretary of the Navy for 1898-9.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 61

reached San Juan and again departed for some un
known destination, or whether they had not arrived.
As their capture was the object of the expedition, and
it was essential that they should not pass to the west
ward, I determined to attack the batteries defending
the port, in order to develop their positions and
strength. Then, without waiting to reduce the city
or subject it to a regular bombardment — which would
require due notice — turn to the westward. The
attack was without result, except that one of our men
was killed and seven were wounded."

How the capture of Cervera's ships was furthered
by this attack is difficult to see because it could be
seen from Sampson's flagship that Cervera's fleet was
not in that port.

On that very day Cervera's squadron arrived off
Martinique, sent one of the destroyers ( Terror) into
port for repairs, and passed on towards Curacao,
where it arrived on the I4th, on which day Sampson,
then on his way back towards Key West, sent from
Puerto Plata, San Domingo, to the consul of the
United States at Curacao, a cablegram of inquiry as
to Cervera's whereabouts. On the i6th, at noon, he
received a reply as follows: "Maria Teresa and Vis-
cay a in harbor coaling. Oquendo, Crisobal Colon,
Furor and Pluton outside. Only two admitted at
time. Short of coal and provisions; dirty bottoms;
and leave I5th at 6 P. M. Destination unknown."

Sampson also received a cable from the department
confirming this news, and also informing him that
Schley, with the Flying Squadron, had been ordered
south. Schley at the same time received orders to
proceed to Key West, but nothing was said to him
about Cervera's arrival at either Martinique or Cura
cao.

In his article published over his own signature in
the Century Magazine for April, 1899, at page
894, Sampson says: "It now seemed probable that

62 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Cervera's objective was either Santiago or San Juan."
On same page he adds: "It is possible that he (Cer-
vera) had learned of our bombardment at San Juan
almost at the same time it was taking place, and, if
so, that he decided to give up any thought of going
to San Juan."

A very probable supposition.

Sampson further says (same page) : "This news
confirmed in me my previous determination to return
to Key West, it seeming to me to be the proper thing
to fill up our bunkers, and not to permit Cervera to
get between me and Cuba."

This last expression does not appear very lucid.
It is quite clear that Sampson could, in thirteen hours,
have placed his fleet between Cervera and Cuba, be
cause all he had to do was to run down off Santiago
de Cuba, and thence send out his scouts, who would
have found Cervera on the i8th without much doubt.
But how Cervera could come some 650 miles, pass
around the east end of Cuba and get between Sampson
and Cuba passes common understanding.

There was absolutely no reason why Sampson, im
mediately on receipt of the news that Cervera had
left Curacao two days previously, should not have
gone down off Santiago. His force, consisting of the
New York (armored cruiser), Iowa, and Indiana
(battleships), Amphitrite and Terror (monitors),
Detroit, Montgomery, and Wampatuck (light
cruisers), and torpedo boat Porter, was greatly
superior in numbers and fighting power to that
of Cervera, or even to the Flying Squadron
as it was then constituted. And as for coal, his
ships had enough in their bunkers to steam back to
Key West (a distance of about five hundred miles),
which it took nearly three days to do, at a speed of
9.3 an hour. With care they had enough for a week's
blockade off Santiago, and within that time colliers
could have reached them.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 63

No imputation against Admiral Sampson is in
tended when I contend that he lost the opportunity
of his life when he failed to go down off Santiago,
instead of taking his whole force back to Key West,
leaving Cervera's way into Santiago clear and un
obstructed.

Cervera evidently thought it probable that he
would encounter some of our ships on the voyage be
tween Curacao and Santiago, because in the captured
log-book of the Cristobal Colon appears the follow
ing: "May 17-18 — Flagship signaled, 'Admiral in
tends to make port of Santiago; be prepared for ac
tion to-night, in case the enemy appears.' '

We don't know how much Cervera knew of our
naval movements, but he knew that, with all the fast
vessels we had at command, it was probable that
scouting vessels were on the lookout for him.

As soon as Cervera appeared in the West Indies,
and the Flying Squadron had been ordered south,
Sampson, on May 17, at 6 P. M., received while on
his way back to Key West one of its misleading dis
patches from the Navy Department, as follows :

"Department has just heard that the Spanish fleet
have munitions of war essential to the defense of
Havana, and the order of the Spanish fleet is impera
tive to reach Havana, Cuba, Cienfuegos, or a rail
road port connected with Havana, at all hazards;
and as Cienfuegos appears to be the only port ful
filling the conditions, Schley, with the Brooklyn, Mas
sachusetts and Texas, to arrive at Key West morning
of 1 8th, will be sent to Cienfuegos as soon as possible.
So Admiral Sampson take or send his most suitable
armored ship to join Schley, and hurry with remainder
of his heavy ships to Havana blockade."

So strongly was the department impressed with the
idea that Cienfuegos was the port Cervera was aiming

64 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

to reach, that on the I4th it sent the following order
to Sampson (A. 462) :

"On account of presence of Spanish fleet near Cura
cao, send with all possible dispatch swift vessel to
direct all except smallest blockading vessel off Cienfue-
gos to return to Key West."

This was done, and Captain McCalla, with his
division, promptly abandoned the blockade of Cien-
fuegos, on May 16, and started for Key West.

CHAPTER XVII

THE FLYING SQUADRON AND SAMPSON ARRIVE AT
KEY WEST

THE Flying Squadron arrived at Key West during
the night of May 17, some hours in advance of the
Navy Department's expectation ; and on the morning
of the 1 8th, after saluting the flag of Commodore
Remey (who was Schley's senior officer), Schley went
on shore to make him an official visit.

While on shore he was informed by several resi
dent Cubans that the province of Cienfuegos was most
thoroughly occupied by Spanish troops (I. 1348),
and therefore he had best be careful about attempt
ing intercourse with the shore there.

Sampson, in his flagship New York, arrived about
4 P. M. of the 1 8th, and after saluting Sampson's flag
Schley went on board to report to him. While there,
as would naturally be the case, the two officers dis
cussed the situation, and Sampson showed, or stated
to Schley, the contents of a number of despatches or
other communications from the Navy Department,
including the one last above quoted.

Sampson had that day received the following:

"NAVY DEPARTMENT, May 17, 1898.

"Flying Squadron, after being increased by the
armored vessels commander-in-chief North Atlantic
Station considers most suitable, proceed with despatch
[utmost] off Cienfuegos. The remainder of the
fleet to blockade Havana closely. Sampson to have
choice the command of Havana or at Cienfuegos.
Schley, in either case, to remain with his own squad
ron. The commander-in-chief is authorized to make

66 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

such change of detail in this plan as he may think
proper.

"In general, the object is to engage and capture the
enemy off Cienfuegos, if possible; or otherwise block
ade him in that port."

Sampson informed Schley that he (Sampson) had
chosen the blockade of Havana. He also verbally
delivered to Schley the confidential instructions found
in the Department's Confidential Circular of April 6
(A. 171), "that our ships were not to be risked
against the fortified places on the coast of Cuba until
after the Spanish squadron had been disposed of."
They looked over charts together, and agreed that
Cienfuegos came most directly in accord with Cer-
vera's supposed instructions.

A most remarkable circumstance is that, although
Sampson had been informed on the i6th that Cer-
vera's fleet had arrived at Curacao, whence Sampson
believed he would make for Santiago de Cuba, he
never said a word to Schley about that fact.

Of course, the fact that Sampson was Schley's lin
eal subordinate officer could not but be in the minds
of both of them. Sampson could not very well have
asked Schley whether he accepted their new relation.
Indeed, there was no occasion to do so, because
Schley's salute had done that; but Schley voluntarily
said to Sampson that he wanted to assure him "at the
outset that he would be loyal, absolutely and unre
servedly, to the cause they were both representing" (I.
1344).

Chadwick, the chief of staff, testified (I. 540) :
"My only distinct recollection is Commodore Schley's
statement to the admiral that he would be perfectly
loyal; and that he was very pleased to be under his
command; that the admiral could be sure he would
be perfectly loyal in all his conduct." But we may
doubt whether Schley said he was "very pleased to

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 67

be under his junior's command." Schley was not
called upon to give any assurances of the kind; and
we may be certain that if he had not meant what he
said, he would not have said it; and if he had felt
pleased to be under Sampson's command he would
have said that.

Schley testified before the Court of Inquiry (I.
1344) that at this interview he asked Sampson if
any means of communicating with the insurgent
Cubans had been established, to which Sampson re
plied that he did not know; but when he got the
situation better in hand he would write him.

Captain Chadwick, before the Court of Inquiry, en
deavored to deny much of Schley's statements relative
to that interview between Sampson and himself, but
most of his denials are of the non mi ricordo charac
ter. There is every probability that Sampson would
do and say what it was his plain duty to do and say in
order to give Schley all the information he had, and
communicate all instructions he had received from the
department which might affect or control the block
ade about to be established at Cienfuegos, by the Fly
ing Squadron. It would manifestly have been highly
improper for Sampson to send Schley in command of
the Flying Squadron on the important duty assigned
to it, and leave the commodore in ignorance of any
thing essential, or which might contribute to the suc
cessful performance of that duty. It is not possible
to believe that he intentionally did so.

The matter of communication with the friendly in
surgent Cubans might become, at any time, of great
moment, and what more natural than that Schley
should inquire whether any means of such communi
cation had been arranged; and, inasmuch as no such
arrangement had been made, that Sampson should re
ply that he did not know, but would write the com
modore when he ugot the situation better in hand"?

68 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

There was absolutely no reason for anything but the
most perfect confidence and frankness between the two
officers, and there is no evidence whatever of any lack
of such frankness and confidence.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE FLYING SQUADRON SAILS FOR CIENFUEGOS
SCHLEY'S SAILING ORDERS

AFTER coaling with prompt rapidity, the Flying
Squadron sailed the next day, May 19, between 7
and 8 o'clock A. M., under the following order from
Admiral Sampson:

uNo. 5. UU. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

KEY WEST, May 19, 1898.

"SlR: — I send you a copy of a telegram received
last night from Secretary Long, concerning a vessel
which was to sail on the I5th, and carrying a large
amount of specie; and is supposed to be going to
land it at Trinidad, or to the east of Cienfuegos or
even Havana.

"The two cruisers will be sent out to-day, and with
the two torpedo boats following them. As soon as
the Iowa is coaled, she will follow you.

"It is unnecessary for me to say that you should es
tablish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possi
ble delay, and that it should be maintained as close
as possible.

"Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in
that vicinity, and finding you on the lookout attempt
to come around the island, either east or west, please
send me word by the best vessel you have for that
purpose as to their direction, that I may be prepared
for them at Havana. I will try and increase the
number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that
you may have them to send with messages to^me,
should you desire to do so. After I have the situa-

70 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

tion in hand, I will write you, and give you any in
formation that suggests itself.

"Yours respectfully,

"WILLIAM T. SAMPSON,

"Rear Admiral,
"Commander-in-Chief, N. A. Station.

"COMMANDING OFFICER,
"Flying Squadron."

The important part of the foregoing letter is the
sentence : "It is unnecessary for me to state that you
should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the
least possible delay, and that it should be maintained
as close as possible."

It was a remarkable coincidence that Cervera's
squadron entered the harbor of Santiago de Cuba
almost at the same hour the same morning that Schley
sailed from Key West; and Sampson received the
news from the department at 12.30 A. M., of the 2Oth.
He could not therefore have given Schley that inform
ation before that time, because he did not have it to
give. But as soon as he learned it he should have
sent a fast vessel to overtake Schley and give him the
information; and, by the same vessel, Captain Chad-
wick, chief of staff, could have sent the signal system
(to be spoken of hereafter) of communication with
friendly Cubans about Cienfuegos, which would have
enabled Schley to learn, four days before he did, that
Cervera's fleet was not at Cienfuegos.

CHAPTER XIX

SCHLEY MEETS M'CALLA's DIVISION

ON the morning of May 19, a few hours after leav
ing Key West, the Flying Squadron met the Division
of vessels commanded by Captain Bowman H. Mc-
Calla, in the Marblehead, returning from the blockade
of Cienfuegos.

It does not appear that Schley had any knowledge,
before this meeting, that McCalla had been at Cien
fuegos. McCalla signaled, as is usual on such oc
casions, for permission to proceed, but he sent one of
his vessels (the Eagle, commanded by Lieutenant
Southerland) to communicate with Commodore
Schley "and give him such information as they had."
The Scorpion (Lieutenant Marix) was sent by Schley
to meet the Eagle. There was a difference of recol
lection between these two commanding officers as to
what passed between them by means of the mega
phone, but Marix, at that time, caused an entry of
what Southerland had said, to be made in his log
book. This entry is of course the best evidence. All
that was communicated to Schley was that the "mes
sage communicated by the commanding officer of the
Eagle, from Captain McCalla to Commodore Schley,
was to the effect that Captain McCalla had left Cien
fuegos with his ships, and did not believe that Cer-
vera's fleet had arrived there when the Marblehead
had left" (1.500).

An effort was made to show that Schley should have
gone after McCalla, to find out if he had communi
cated all he knew through Southerland; but it is
plainly preposterous to claim that a commodore in
command of a squadron, or any other superior officer,
must himself run after his subordinates for any pur
pose whatever. He has the right to assume that they,

72 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

as is their duty, will give him all the information they
have; and they, and not he, will be blamed for any
consequences resulting from failure so to do.

There was some peculiar practice by the Judge Ad
vocate of the Court of Inquiry (Captain Samuel C.
Lemly) relative to the testimony of Lieutenant Com
mander Marix, who had commanded the Scorpion on
the occasion last referred to. The record shows (I.
pp. 799-600) that on August n, 1901, a month be
fore the court convened, the Navy Department, no
doubt at the instance of Lemly, had cabled to Rear
Admiral Remey, then commanding the Asiatic Fleet,
to take the statement of Marix as to the meeting be
tween the Scorpion and Eagle on May 19, 1898, and
cable it to the Department. On August 18 this was
done, and Marix's deposition was on that day put
into the hands of Lemly. He kept it in his posses
sion, and said nothing about it until October 10 —
which was the nineteenth day of the sessions of the
court. He had put in the testimony of Lieutenant
Southerland, to the effect that the latter had told
Marix about having communicated with insurgent
Cubans near Cienfuegos, and, having Marix' state
ment to the contrary in his possession, he deliberately
suppressed it until Schley's counsel placed him in such
a situation that he could no longer withhold it. Then
he produced it.

Inasmuch as a court of inquiry is convened only for
the purpose of bringing out the whole truth, there
can be no justification for keeping back from the court
anything bearing upon the subject of inquiry; but if,
on the contrary, concealment or perversion of the
truth is the object, then holding back evidence is in
order; and one of the most efficacious methods that
can be employed to that end. Who can doubt that
that was the intention of Lemly; or that he would
have promptly produced Marix's deposition if it had
sustained Southerland ? The man who steps into the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 73

open with a false statement is entitled to the credit
of manliness; but he who suppresses the truth adds
cowardice to his wrongdoing.

After this communication with McCalla's division
the latter continued on to Key West, where it arrived
about three hours later.

The Flying Squadron continued its voyage towards
Cienfuegos, and in the neighborhood of Cape San
Antonio fell in with the Cincinnati, Captain Colby M.
Chester. The latter came on board the Brooklyn,
and in the interview between him and Commodore
Schley, which lasted about an hour, they discussed
coaling facilities and possibilities in the waters near
Cienfuegos and on the south side of Cuba.

Captain Chester asked that his ship be ordered to
continue on with the Flying Squadron, but Schley
did not feel authorized to grant Chester's request.
The Flying Squadron then continued its way, and at
4.20 P. M., of the 2ist, as is recorded in the log-book
of the Brooklyn, "heard the report of two great
guns to Sd & Ed," which was in the direction of
Cienfuegos.

Commodore Schley happened to be on deck at the
time, and also heard the reports, as he testified (I.
1 34?)> "six or seven, fired with the cadence of a sa
lute." Of course, every indication of that sort sug
gested the possible presence of the Spanish fleet, since
none of our vessels was known to be in that neighbor
hood.

The squadron arrived as near the port as in the
commodore's opinion, prudent navigation at night per
mitted, at midnight of the 2ist, and stopped to await
daybreak of the 22d, when it steamed in as near to
the entrance of the harbor as was thought proper by
the commodore. It certainly would have been very
imprudent, with such a fleet, to approach at night an
unlighted port with which no one in the fleet was
familiar. Any landsman knows that.

CHAPTER XX

THE ALLEGED DELAY IN THE VOYAGE OF THE FLYING
SQUADRON FROM KEY WEST TO CIENFUEGOS

IT will be remembered that Schley's "sailing orders"
from Key West, on May 19, signed by Admiral
Sampson, contained the following: "It is unneces
sary for me to say that you should establish a block
ade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and
that it should be maintained as close as possible."

Before the Court of Inquiry was organized no
official or public criticism of Schley in reference to
the speed maintained by the Flying Squadron on its
passage from Key West to Cienfuegos had ever been
made, and the Precept under which the court was or
ganized contains no reference to that subject. But
the majority of the court seems to have been so anx
ious to find something to censure, that they in effect
added another count to the Precept; and in order to
condemn it was necessary that the order under which
Schley sailed should be misstated.

In the majority's first "Finding of Fact" they say
"Flying Squadron sailed with orders from the Navy
Department, and from the commander-in-chief of the
North Atlantic Station, to proceed with despatch
[utmost] off Cienfuegos."

Now, the only order that Commodore Schley re
ceived before sailing for Cienfuegos was that No. 5,
quoted in full on page 69, and that word "utmost"
is not to be found in it. Indeed, there was not a word
of evidence, written or oral, before that court that
Schley had any order from the Department about
going to Cienfuegos; and in fact he had no such order.
He testified (I. 1417) that he had never seen the de
spatch to Sampson containing the word "utmost."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 75

The majority of the court therefore interpolated
into Schley's "sailing orders" the important word
"utmost" and then proceeded to find fault with him
because of it — and this without giving the commodore
any opportunity to be heard about it. Nothing could
be more unfair and unjust, and that opinion, being
without foundation of fact, is mere "brutum fulmen"

Commodore Schley had absolutely no reason or
purpose of delay on that passage. On the contrary,
he had every motive for all proper haste, and there
can be no reasonable doubt that he made all speed
consistent with the best results as to keeping his com
mand in the highest condition of efficiency.

An examination of the log-books will show that
the speed (ten knots) he maintained on that passage
was the same as that subsequently made by the Iowa
(with the exception of three hours, during which the
latter made one knot an hour more), and "perish the
thought" that the valiant Captain Robley Dunglison
Evans ("Fighting Bob") , who commanded the Iowa,
did not do his utmost to get into the presence of the
enemy in the least possible time.

Higher speed, as everybody knows, means greatly
increased consumption of coal. The opinion, there
fore, of Admiral Dewey, that "the passage from Key
West to Cienfuegos was made by the Flying Squadron
with all possible despatch, Commodore Schley having
in view the importance of arriving off Cienfuegos with
as much coal as possible in the ships' bunkers," will
stand as the only justifiable opinion. It is common
sense as well as good judgment.

CHAPTER XXI

THE BLOCKADE OF CIENFUEGOS BY THE FLYING
SQUADRON

ON the forenoon of the 22d the torpedo boat Dupont,
Lieutenant Wood commanding, arrived from Key
West, whence she had sailed May 20, at 11.45 A. M.
She brought despatches from Admiral Sampson, but
what, Lieutenant Wood didn't know. The lieutenant
was worn out by the "great fatigue of commanding
officer's service in torpedo boats," saying he was al
most exhausted; and hoped that the commodore
would give him an opportunity to get four or five
hours sleep" (I. 977). Some of his men were tem
porarily transferred for rest on board the Brooklyn,
where they remained until the Dupont sailed back to
Key West on the 24th. Notwithstanding his fatigue
and sleepiness, the gallant lieutenant seems to have
kept at least one sharp eye on the commodore, and
was able, three years later, to give a minute descrip
tion of what had appeared to him to be the state of
the commodore's nerves.

The Iowa, Captain Evans, arrived at 1.30 P. M.,
on the 22d, having left Key West May 20 at 1 1 A. M.
She also brought despatches. None of the testimony
makes it clear what despatches these two vessels re
spectively brought.

As soon as night came on, the commodore arranged
his ships in column, with the Dupont on picket close
to the entrance, and so blockaded the port. Lights
on shore were seen that night, but they did not seem
to be in the nature of signals, and no one on board
the flagship so understood them.

On the morning of the 23d, at 8.15, the torpedo
boat Hawk, Lieutenant Hood, arrived from Havana,

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 77

bringing further despatches from Admiral Sampson;
and on the same day the Castine and collier Merrimac
joined. On this day, also, the British steamship
Adula arrived from Jamaica, and brought report that
the Spanish squadron had left Santiago de Cuba on
May 20, which was before the Flying Squadron had
arrived off Cienfuegos; and, if it had been the fact,
Cervera's ships had had time to arrive at Cienfue
gos before Schley did.

The Adula also reported that on the night of May
1 8, after she had left Santiago de Cuba bound for
Jamaica, she had met seven ships, seventy miles south
of Santiago, bound to the northward.

All this tended to convince Schley that Cervera was
in the port of Cienfuegos, and he permitted the
Adula to enter the port upon promise that she would
come out next day, when Schley could learn from her
passengers whether Cervera was or was not in the
port.

Admiral Dewey approved the action of the com
modore in permitting the Adula to enter, by his find
ing that "Commodore Schley in permitting the
steamer Adula to enter the port of Cienfuegos ex
pected to obtain information concerning the Spanish
Squadron from her when she came out."

CHAPTER XXII

THE SIGNALS AT CIENFUEGOS ARRANGED BETWEEN
CAPTAIN M'CALLA AND INSURGENTS

ON the night of the 23d lights on shore were seen,
which were apparently signal lights; but no one on
board the flagship knew their significance. So much
has been said about these signal lights, in the effort
to find fault with Schley for not having understood
them, and for not having immediately opened com
munication with the Cuban friendly insurgents, that
a full statement concerning them, when, how, and
by whom they were established, and what had been
done about them by the various officers who had
knowledge of them, is advisable. It furnishes a re
markable illustration of what was a series of blun
ders that ought never to have been permitted to occur.

It will be remembered that Commodore Schley,
while at Key West, had been warned by friendly
Cubans that the country around Cienfuegos was most
amply supplied by Spanish troops, and that therefore
to him every person, certainly every military person
thereabout, was presumably a Spaniard.

Captain Bowman H. McCalla, as everyone who
knows him is aware, was an officer who, without being
in the least foolhardy, was disposed to take rather
more than ordinary risks in the performance of any
duty laid upon him, or which he thought it incumbent
upon him to undertake. He had been blockading
Cienfuegos from the yth to the i6th of May, with a
few days interval, and, as he testified before the Court
of Inquiry (I. 303), did not make any effort to com
municate with people on shore, except one on the
east of the port, which failed because there were no
Cubans there. In fact he had no such communica
tion until the afternoon of May 15, when a boat was

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 79

descried at some distance to the westward of the en
trance. The Eagle was sent to capture it, which she
did. It was found to contain five Cubans of the pa
triot army, who, as Lieutenant Southerland (A. 350)
stated, had "been forty (40) hours in the boat," and
they were sent on board the Marblehead to Captain
McCalla.

The log-book of the latter vessel tells of the sight
ing of the boat, the sending of the Eagle after it, and
gives the names and rank of the Cubans who were in
it, "bearing a letter from Colonel Rodriguez, com
manding (insurgents), requesting arms and ammuni
tion. They had been in the small batteau for 30
hours without food or water."

The Eagle was then sent with four of the Cubans
to a Cuban camp located thirteen miles to the west
ward of the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos, and
after landing them and six thousand rounds of am
munition, and communicating with Colonel Rodri
guez, the Cuban officer in command, she returned.

What further resulted from this visit of the Cu
bans was stated by Captain McCalla before the Court
of Inquiry (I. 277), as follows:

"On the 1 5th and i6th of May, 1898, I had been
in communication with three Cuban officers and two
privates, on board the Marblehead; and I had ar
ranged with Lieutenant Alvarez, who spoke English
very well, a system of signals. In case they wished
to communicate with the Marblehead there were to
be three lights horizontally by night or three horses
in line on the beach by day."

Captain McCalla regarded this system of signals,
thus arranged, as of such transcendent importance
that he locked the knowledge of it up in his own mind,
and never made any of his officers acquainted with it;
never made any report of it, and never made it known
to anyone until after he arrived at Key West, on
May 19, when he told Captain Chadwick, the chief

8o SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

of staff ; but he was certain he did not intrust the im
mense secret to the commander-in-chief. McCalla
said before the court: "It was a secret code, arranged
by myself, and I did not wish any publicity to be
given to this code, in order that the Cubans might
not be betrayed." He seems to have had a fear that
there might be such betrayal by some of our own
people, if the code had been made known to any of
them, which, he said, "was a possible feature of the
case that was in my [his] own mind at the time."

He testified (I. 305) that when he sent the Eagle
to communicate with Commodore Schley, on the
morning of May 19, he did not give her commanding
officer any orders to give the commodore information
about the signals, for the reason that he did not wish
to communicate it in writing; and he did not know
that Commodore Schley was going to Cienfuegos;
but that, if he had thought that the commodore was
going there, he certainly would have gone alongside
the Brooklyn and secretly have given Commodore
Schley the information about this signal arrange
ment."

What a pity it was that McCalla, instead of being
so suspicious even of his own officers, did not, seeing
that the Flying Squadron was on its way towards the
locality whence McCalla's division had just been with
drawn, assume that communication with the friendly
Cubans might at any time become useful, and there
fore give the commodore the means of establishing
such communication.

McCalla testified (I. 303) that when he gave the
signal code to Chadwick, it was his (McCalla's) pur
pose that it should go to the commander-in-chief
through his chief of staff. Captain Chadwick in his
testimony (I. 839) said: " My recollection, of course,
is not particularly definite, because I laid no stress
upon the matter at all. I did not communicate the
signals to anyone, not even to Admiral Sampson."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 81

If he had done so, it is scarcely conceivable that the
admiral (who only the day before had been asked by
Schley if any means of communication with the
friendly Cubans had been arranged, and had replied
that "he did not know of any such, but when he got
the situation in hand would write to him") would
have failed to send off that code, and all the informa
tion McCalla possessed, to Schley, by the Dupont,
when she sailed with other despatches for Schley on
the morning of the 2Oth; or by the Iowa (Captain
Evans), which sailed the same day. If that had
been done, the code would have reached Schley at
8.15 in the forenoon of the 22d, and communication
with the Cubans could have been had more than two
days before it was, enabling Schley to learn nearly two
days and a half earlier than he did, that Cervera was
not in the port of Cienfuegos.

It is a curious fact that McCalla, in his communi
cation with the Cubans, should not have learned posi
tively whether or not Cervera was there. But if he
acquired such knowledge, he locked that up with the
knowledge of the code, and kept such knowledge a
secret. If he had told the admiral that fact, Sampson
would certainly have told the fact to Schley, and not
have left the latter to find it out for himself. And
Lieutenant Southerland, though he testified that he
had learned it from those Cubans, failed to say any
thing about it to Marix, when he (Southerland) was
sent to tell Commodore Schley all they knew.

As above stated, Captain Chadwick testified that
he did not communicate the signals to anyone — in-
which statement he was wrong. Captain Evans testi
fied that Chadwick told him about them on the iQth
or 2Oth, but gave him no directions to inform Schley
about them.

Evans further testified (I. 367) that he did not
tell Schley about them: "It never entered my head
6

82 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

that he did not know it. If I had for a moment sup
posed that Commodore Schley did not have those sig
nals, I would, of course, have given them to him the
first thing, instantly on my arrival.1 I supposed every
captain in the fleet had them."

This last supposition was a very natural one, for
Evans had the right to suppose that, inasmuch as the
chief of staff had given him the knowledge of the
code, he had also sent it to Schley.

It seems peculiar that, knowing through the sig
nals that the insurgents wished to communicate with
the squadron, and seeing that Commodore Schley
paid no attention to the signals, Evans should have
rested tranquilly, without venturing to inquire whether
the commodore knew or not. It was another act
in the "comedy of errors" in which they were all play
ing parts.

From all the foregoing it is quite evident that Com
modore Schley cannot possibly be faulted for not
knowing what had been imparted only to McCalla,
Chadwick, and Evans. No reason can be found why
McCalla should have been so suspicious of his own
officers, for the whole signal system of the navy is ac
cessible to at least the commanding and signal officers
of every ship. There was no reason why McCalla
should not have assumed that the Flying Squadron
was going where the knowledge of the signals might
be useful, and have informed Schley about them. It
was right that McCalla should have given the code
to Chadwick, and it was plainly culpable in Chad-
wick not to inform Sampson, as it was his clear duty
to do.

Even when McCalla came on board the Brooklyn
at Cienfuegos, on the 24th, he seems to have been still
so oppressed by his self-imposed burden of secrecy
that he forgot to mention the signals to the commo
dore.

1 Which would have been exactly proper.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 83

Captain Cook (I. 884) in his testimony said: "I
was present during a portion of the interview between
Captain McCalla and the commodore. They talked
on various subjects at first. I think Captain McCalla
told him that he had brought mining material for the
insurgents, and he was going to communicate with
the insurgent camp. That brought up the conversa
tion about the camp, and where it was. Then the
commodore said to him : 'We have had three lights,
one ahead of the other here, that we cannot make
out; and I believe it is something in connection with
the Spanish fleet.' Captain McCalla gave a start,
threw up his hands, and said: 'Why, Commodore,
that is the signal from the insurgent camp. They
want to communicate with you. I can go and find out
at once.' So the commodore told him to go. He said:
'Get off as soon as possible, and if you can send a
party across, send them; and let me know as soon
as possible.' '

McCalla went off at once, communicated with the
insurgents, and returned at 4 p. M., with information
that Cervera's fleet was not in the port.

If they had all intended not to do anything that
would help the commodore to the knowledge of those
signals, they could not have more effectually accom
plished their purpose than was done apparently by
accident.

The chief of staff (Chadwick) was strangely dere
lict in the matter. It was of the greatest importance
that Schley should be able to communicate with those
friendly insurgents, and, when Chadwick learned
about them, he should have sent them as soon as pos
sible to Schley. If they had gone by the Dupont they
would have reached the commodore at 8.15 A. M. of
the 22d; and if she had been sent off with the signals
on the afternoon of the iQth she would have over
taken Schley before he reached Cienfuegos, and he

84 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

could have known on the 2ist that Cervera was not
in that port.

There is one thing made apparent by the action of
the chief of staff, viz., that in that early stage of the
campaign he had become accustomed to determine for
himself what information should be given to the
commander-in-chief, and what should be imparted to
the commanders of squadrons, divisions, and single
ships of the fleet.

CHAPTER XXIII

DESPATCHES RECEIVED BY SCHLEY AT CIENFUEGOS

OF the despatches received by Commodore Schley
while at Cienfuegos, the first, in numerical order was :

"No. 6. "U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

UKEY WEST, May 19, 1898.

"SlR: — I enclose copy of a memorandum from
Commander McCalla.

"2. You will take steps to prevent the enemy from
continuing work on the new fortifications mentioned
therein.

"3. There is a rumor, by way of Havana, that the
Spanish squadron has put into Santiago.
"Very respectfully,

"W. T. SAMPSON,

"Rear Admiral."

An indorsement, made at the time by a receiving
stamp, shows that No. 6 was received on board the
Brooklyn at 8.15 A. Mv May 23, 1898, which was
the time at which the Hawk arrived.

The memorandum enclosed was as follows:

"A good landing place for troops has been found
13^ miles West of Savanilla Point. The Spanish
force about Cienfuegos is reported, on good authority,
to be between 4,000 and 5,000 men. The Cuban
force, only part of which is armed, is between 2,000
and 3,000 men. The Cubans need arms for 2,000
men; and munitions for the whole number. I was
informed that the Cubans have perfect knowledge
of what was going on in Cienfuegos, and that a force

86 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

of our men could be taken to Cienfuegos without the
knowledge of the Spanish force within that city.
About 1,500 men are said to be kept within the vi
cinity of the castle. The only battery which fired on
the ships at all was made of the old guns in the
castle.

"They have modern guns, 6 in. and 8 in., I am told,
but not mounted five days ago.

"An emplacement is being built on the hill above
the castle. A line passing through the new emplace
ment and the castle leads down the middle of the river
to the sea. There was working a force of men on
the ground immediately below the castle, and I was
told that a water battery was being erected there. It
is possible that since the attempt to cut the cables a
masked battery of small calibre is being erected on
Colorados Point. The insurgents want dynamite to
destroy the railway. I asked them to devote their
efforts to cutting telegraph communication between
Havana and Cienfuegos. They report that the wires
are repaired as fast as destroyed; while the railroad
is intact. The Cuban forces in the San Juan moun
tains control the highway between Cienfuegos and
Trinidad, so that provisions cannot be sent between
those places. Troops must be prepared for rain every
day. No resources in the country; all destroyed.
Fair road leading from landing point to Cienfuegos."

It is quite certain, though McCalla does not say so,
that all the information contained in this memo
randum was given to him by those five Cubans who
came off in that boat on the i6th of May; but the
memorandum is marked by indefiniteness, where it
might as well have been definite. If, at the end of
the first sentence, McCalla had inserted the words
"where the insurgents can be communicated with,"
Schley could have had communication with them
forty-eight hours sooner than he did.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 87

"If," most pregnant of words!

It will be considered that all this business was a
new experience to the actors, and that no one could
foresee the importance of little matters, or words left
out of or inserted in. despatches, which had a signifi
cance not then apparent, but which we now know
were afterwards to be held, as against the commodore,
to be of the greatest possible import.

CHAPTER XXIV

DESPATCH NO. 7

DESPATCH No. 7 is of so great importance that its
consideration deserves a chapter to itself. It is as
follows, viz:

"No. 7. "U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,

"KEY WEST, May 20, 1898.
"DEAR SCHLEY:

"The Iowa leaves this morning at n o'clock,
bound for Cienfuegos. The collier Merrimac, in
company with the Castine, is also bound for Cienfue
gos. The Marblehead and Eagle will both be ready
to depart to-night to join you.

"Enclosed is a copy of a telegram received at Key
West dated May 19, marked A*

"A. The report of the Spanish fleet being at San
tiago de Cuba might very well be correct; so the
department strongly advises that you send word im
mediately by the Iowa, to Schley, to proceed off San
tiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one
small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the de
partment will send the Minneapolis, now at St.
Thomas, Auxiliary No. 461, to proceed at once off
Santiago, to join Schley, who should keep up com
munication via Mole, Haiti, or Cape Haitien, Haiti.
If the Iowa has gone, send order Schley, by your
fastest despatch vessel." "LONG."

"After considering this telegram I have decided to
make no change in the present plan; that is, that you
should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos.2 If the

1 This telegram is here inserted for convenience. — J. P.

2 The italics throughout are, of course, mine. — J. P.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 89

Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must come
either to Habana or Cienfuegos to deliver the mu
nitions of war which they are said to bring for use in
Cuba.

"7 therefore am of the opinion that our best chance
of success in capturing these ships will be to hold the
two points — Cienfuegos and Habana — with all the
force we can muster. If later it should develop that
these vessels are at Santiago, we can then assemble off
that port the ships best suited for the purpose, and
completely blockade it.

"Until we then receive more positive information,
we shall continue to hold Habana and Santiago* \_sic\.
"I enclose a copy of a telegram received at Key
West May 19, marked B. With regard to this sec
ond telegram, in which the consul at Cape Haitien
says that a telegram from Port de Paix, on May 17,
reports two ships, etc., it is probably of no importance,
and the vessels referred to may have been our own
ships. The statement made by the United States
minister at Venezuela, contained in telegram of same
date, is probably not true, because these ships are re
ported to have left Curacao at 6 P. M. on the i6th.
If they were seen on the lyth, apparently heading
for the French West Indies, they could not possibly
be at Santiago de Cuba as early as the i8th, as re
ported.

"From the first cablegram, marked 'A' it will be
seen that the department has ordered the cruiser
Minneapolis and Auxiliary No. 461 to proceed for
Santiago de Cuba to join you. Please send the
Scorpion to communicate with those vessels at Santi
ago, and direct one of them to report to the depart
ment from Nicholas Mole or Cape Haitien the
change I have made in the plan 'strongly advised' by
the department. As soon as this vessel has com
municated with the Department, let her return to

3 This word "Santiago" evidently should be "Cienfuegos."

90 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs, and
report immediately at Habana or Cienfuegos, as he
may think most advantageous.

"Very respectfully,

"W. T. SAMPSON,

"Rear Admiral, etc.
"COMMODORE W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commanding Flying Squadron."

Enclosure B. "The United States consul at Cape
Haitien says that a telegram from Port de Paix,
Haiti, on May 17, reports two Spanish ships cruising
off Mole every night two weeks. The United
States minister to Venezuela says that cable employee
reports, confidentially, Spanish ships of war seen May
17, apparently heading for West Indies, French.

"LONG."

Duplicates of No. 7, with enclosures, were sent to
Schley by different vessels, and were probably re
ceived the one on the 22d and the other on the 23d.

No. 7 is an almost personal letter, beginning "Dear
Schley," instead of with the formal "Sir" usual in
official communications. This beginning shows that
up to that time only the most kindly feeling and con
fidence animated both officers. The only positive
thing that the letter contains is the statement, thrice
made, that notwithstanding the Department "strongly
advised that Schley be sent with his whole squadron
off Santiago de Cuba," Sampson would adhere to the
plan already adopted, viz., that Schley should con
tinue the blockade of Cienfuegos, while Sampson con
tinued that of Havana.

And, as for the uncertainties that pervaded the de
spatch: "If the Spaniards have put into Santiago."
"If, later, it should develop that these vessels are at
Santiago," etc. "Until we then receive more positive

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 91

information." "They could not possibly be at San
tiago de Cuba as early as the i8th, as reported."4

One of these two copies of No. 7 had been copied
into a letter-press copying book, and contained an
interlined word in ink, over an erasure. When they
came to be made up, sheets of the two were mixed up
and the interlined word was left out of the one copy,
showing that the business methods of the staff were
none too carefully conducted.

Another peculiarity of No. 7 is that it directs Schley
to send the Scorpion off Santiago de Cuba, with in
structions to direct the captain of another vessel,
which the department had ordered to join Schley
there, to go to Mole St. Nicholas, and thence inform
the department of the change that he (Sampson) had
made in the plan "strongly advised" by the depart
ment.

Why Sampson should have taken this roundabout
and expensive and slow way to do this, when he was
at Key West, in telegraphic communication with the
department, is one of the things "that no fellow can
find out," as Lord Dundreary expresses it. Perhaps,
as he couldn't cut the connection with that famous
"War Board," he took that method of keeping it in
the dark as long as possible.

There must have been some divided counsel about
it, because, oddly enough, that very evening, after
sending off No. 7 to Schley, the Navy Department
was telegraphed to, as follows (A. 465) :

"Replying to department's telegram of the 2Oth:
After duly considering the information contained, I
have decided to follow the plans already adopted, to
hold position Cienfuegos with Brooklyn, Massachu
setts, Texas, and the Iowa, Marblehead, Castine, and
Dupont, and two auxiliaries. There remain New
York, Indiana, and monitors for Havana. The latter

4 All italics are mine. — J. P.

92 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

very inefficient, and should not be sent from base.
Have directed Schley to communicate with auxiliaries
at Santiago, and direct one of them to report to de
partment from Mole or Cape Haitien ; then to return
to Santiago and report further at Cienfuegos or Ha
vana, as he thinks best. Plan may be changed when
it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago"

Comparing this telegram with No. 7 an important
difference will be observed. In No. 7 Schley was di
rected to "send the Scorpion to communicate with
those auxiliaries at Santiago, and direct one of them
to 'report to the department the change I have made
in the plan' 'strongly advised' by the department."
The important words in italics are omitted.

Someone of the staff, in his testimony, called this
a "paraphrase" of No. 7. Paraphrase is a new defi
nition of omission; and why publish a paraphrase
when the original is to be had, unless it is desired to
conceal the original which may be part of No. 7 ?

CHAPTER XXV

THE REMARKABLE ELUSIVENESS FROM PUBLICITY OF
DESPATCH NO. 7.

A VERY remarkable characteristic of that Despatch
No. 7, and its predecessor No. 6, has been their
elusiveness from publicity.

Rear Admiral Sampson made up a long "Report
of Operations or North Atlantic Fleet," dated from
Guantanamo, August 3, 1898 (just one month after
the Battle of Santiago), which covers forty-seven
pages of the Appendix (A. 458-505). This report
gives a copy of every letter and telegram sent and
received by him relative to those operations, no matter
how long or short or apparently unimportant, up to
July 3, 1898, except those important two, Nos. 6 and
7, which managed to get omitted; but the memo
randum enclosed in No. 6 was put into the report.

It is not suggested that Sampson was knowingly
privy to those omissions. Such reports are generally
compiled by the staff of the commander-in-chief, who
must trust them to make a correct compilation. He
could not be expected to keep in mind all the de
spatches he had sent and received, or personally make
the compilation.

The reason for omission of those two despatches
is apparent enough, for they are a complete justifica
tion of Schley's remaining at Cienfuegos as long as
he did. And a reason for publishing the memorandum
taken out of No. 6 is just as apparent, for it could
be used, as it subsequently was, against Schley.

By the time (August 3) that report came to be
made by Sampson, the Sampson-Schley controversy
was raging, and every possible effort was being made
to throw odium upon Schley. To this end the "sup-

94 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

pressio veri" was more efficacious than the "suggestio
falsi" because harder to detect and expose.

The letter-press copybook of the commander-in-
chief (as already stated) contains a copy of No. 7,
and the latter is too long and important to have been
accidentally overlooked. It shows upon its face that
it was copied into such book, and that letter-book was
in possession of and kept by the staff. The com-
mander-in-chief would never see it except as he might
call for it to clear up some doubt as to the contents of
some letter that had been sent off.

To say that such an important despatch in the in
terest of a truthful account of Schley's conduct of the
Flying Sqadron was accidentally omitted by those who
made up the report of the commander-in-chief, is an
excuse rather more culpable and reprehensible than
intentional concealment, and it requires rather more
credulity than the average man possesses to believe
that it was innocently done.

Schley brought No. 7 out for the first time by his
letter to the Senate of the United States (Ex. Doc. D.
p. 62), but the Department seized it and put it back
in its secret files, whence, so far as the Department
could control, it has never since been allowed to es
cape into the light of day, except when brought out
by Schley's counsel's demand, before the Court of In
quiry.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE NOMINATIONS OF SCHLEY AND SAMPSON FOR
PROMOTION

MORE, however, remains to be told of the elusiveness
of No. 7 from publicity. On August n, 1898,
President McKinley advanced Schley six numbers and
Sampson eight, and gave them each an ad interim
commission as rear admiral. This placed Sampson
one number above Schley on the Navy List, whereas
he had theretofore been two numbers below Schley.
Schley's commission, among other formal things,
contained the following:

WILLIAM MCKINLEY
President of the United States of America

To All to Whom These Presents May Come:

Know ye, That, reposing special Trust and
Confidence in the Patriotism, Fidelity and Abili
ties of

WINFIELD SCOTT SCHLEY,

I do advance him Six numbers, and appoint him
a Rear Admiral in the Navy, for eminent and
conspicuous conduct in battle, from the loth day
of August, 1898, in the service of the United
States.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.
By the President,
JOHN D. LONG,

Secretary of the Navy.

96 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

In addition to this promotion, President McKinley
had appointed Rear Admiral Schley as one of the
commissioners to receive from the Spanish authorities
in Porto Rico the surrender of that island and all
governmental property therein. Schley most ef
ficiently performed the duties thus imposed.

Admiral Sampson was advanced by the President
eight numbers and nominated to be rear admiral.
The writer has never seen a copy of Sampson's ad in
terim commission, but the President could hardly have
promoted him for "eminent and conspicuous conduct
in battle/' because he had never been in any battle.
He was also honored by appointment as one of the
commissioners to receive the surrender of Cuba.

On December 7, 1898, Schley and Sampson were
both nominated to the Senate of the United States for
its advice and consent to their advancement and pro
motion, Sampson's proposed promotion being such as
to place him one number on the Navy List ahead of
Schley, whereas up to that time Sampson had been
two numbers below Schley, as already stated.

By these several appointments and proposed pro
motions President McKinley set the seal of his ap
proval upon Schley's conduct up to that time.

When the Senate came to consider the promotions,
the absurdity of promoting Sampson over Schley was
so apparent that the Senate, on January 23, 1899, in
executive session (Ex. Doc. C. i)

"Resolved, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and
he is, hereby directed to furnish the Senate with the
facts and military records in the possession of his de
partment affecting the proposal that, under Section
1506 of the Revised Statutes, Commodore Sampson
be advanced eight numbers; and Commodore Schley
six numbers; and the same information with respect
to other nominations for promotion under the same
section, and Section 1905, which were sent to the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 97

Senate with the above nominations, on December 7,
1898."

Secretary Long thereupon appointed a board of
officers to make up such "facts and military records";
but instead of appointing on that board impartial
members senior to both Schley and Sampson, he ap
pointed Captains Robley D. Evans and Henry C.
Taylor (Evans's brother-in-law), who, as was well
known, were two of Schley's most pronounced critics.
To assist them he named Ensign Henry H. Ward,
another of the same sort, and then, to give an appear
ance of fairness, placed on the board Lieutenant
James H. Sears, Schley's former flag lieutenant and
devoted friend.

No more unseemly, not to say scandalous (in a
military sense) act was ever done than the appoint
ment of that board, and for the two following
reasons :

First — It is a universal rule of the military and
naval services that no inferior shall ever, except in
case of absolute necessity, be allowed to sit in judg
ment upon a superior officer, or express any opinion
upon the conduct of such superior.

Admiral Dewey, as president of the Court of In
quiry, speaking for the court, stated the rule (I.
291) : "We have twice ruled that questions calling
for the opinions of a junior on the actions of a senior
ought not to be asked."

Second — Not one of those officers should have been
appointed: Evans and Taylor because of their well-
known antagonism to Schley, and their inferiority
in rank to him, and also because the record they were
to make up was to affect their own promotions then
pending before the Senate; Sears because he was an
ardent friend of Schley, and Ward because he was the
superserviceable servant of Schley's enemies.

There were plenty of officers from whom the mem-

98 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

bers of the board could and should have been se
lected — all senior to those who were to be affected by
the report.

That board made up the record as unfavorably to
Schley as they possibly could, and the Secretary of the
Navy sent it to the Senate to be considered by that
body, in secret session (as he supposed it would be),
with the statement that "the board report that the
facts as therein stated correspond with the facts and
military records in the possession of the Department."

But the Secretary failed to inform the Senate that
Lieutenant Sears had made up an additional, and, in
some particulars, contradictory report, and upon ask
ing if he might send it to the department, was in
formed that he might so send it, but that it would not
be sent to the Senate as part of the board's report.

What could a mere lieutenant do against three
others, two of whom were captains, whose nomina
tions were also to be affected by the military records
upon which they themselves were reporting?

The board had unlimited access to every record of
the department, every paper that had been sent it by
Schley or Sampson, and at Sampson's letter-books.
But of course they accidentally or purposely failed
to send, as part of the record, Dispatches Nos. 6 and
7, although copies of these were in Sampson's letter-
books. Schley's report of May 30 (A. 402) also
contains reference to Despatch No. 7, as follows:
"That day (May 22) the Dupont joined me with
despatches from Admiral Sampson, directing that the
blockade of Cienfuegos be preserved, and that the
Scorpion be sent to communicate with the Minne
apolis and Harvard, off Santiago."

When this precious report reached the Senate, the
overwhelming majority of that body considered it so
unjust to permit an honorable officer thus to be, as it
were, stabbed in the back and in the dark, that the
injunction of secrecy was removed and a copy of the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 99

report, and of Secretary Long's letter which ac
companied it, was sent to Schley by the Committee on
Naval Affairs, with the request that he would make
such communication to the Senate as he might desire.

In Schley' s reply (I. pp. 1661-1663) sent to the
Senate under date of February 18, 1899, No. 7 was
for the first time made public.

It would have slept in some unapproachable stow-
hole of the Department until the present hour but
for its production by the commodore, for the depart
ment has never yet published it among the other
records of the Spanish War.

Its production by the commodore was what in old
times was called a "shot betwixt wind and water."
A blunderbuss fired at a flock of wild ducks would not
have produced a greater sensation among the ducks
than did Despatch No. 7 among Schley's enemies in
the Navy Department.

The Secretary made haste to deny that the depart
ment had suppressed the despatch. Well, nobody
had charged that it had suppressed it. Schley stated
that it had not been published, which was a fact, but
charged nobody with suppressing it. "Qui s' excuse,
s'accuse" seems not inapplicable. The Secretary
should have been above any such suppression, but
there were plenty of malicious ones surrounding him
who were none too scrupulous about use of means to
discredit Schley.

In this connection, however, it is a noticeable fact,
which compels some doubt of the accuracy of Mr.
Long's disclaimer, to find that in his book, since
printed, he makes no reference to Despatch No. 7,
and thus virtually suppresses it, although he makes
effort to show that Schley's delay off Cienfuegos was
unwarranted.

Ought one who intends to be fair, to suppress or
keep back any of the orders under which the com
modore acted? Only one answer can properly be
given — Certainly not.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE BLOCKADE OFF CIENFUEGOS CONTINUED

IT would seem, from the indorsements made on them
at the time by the commodore's secretary (Lieutenant
Wells), that the same vessel that brought the second
copy of No. 7 also brought No. 8, which was as fol
lows:

"No. 8 (Received May 23, 8.15 A. M.).

"U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,
"KEY WEST, May 21, 1898.

"SiR: — i. Spanish squadron probably at Santiago
de Cuba — four ships and three torpedo boat destroy
ers. // you are satisfied they are not at C^enfuegos^,
proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago
de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in
port.

"You will probably find it necessary to establish
communication with some of the inhabitants — fisher
men and others — to learn definitely that the ships are
in that port, it being impossible to see into it from
outside.

"2. When the instructions sent by the Iowa and
Dupont (duplicates) were written, I supposed that
two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica,
but I have since learned that they have been ordered
by the department to get in touch with the Spanish
fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just
telegraphed them to report for orders at Nicholas
Mole.

1The italics are all mine.— J. P.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 101

"3. Report from Nicholas Mole.
"Very respectfully,
"W. T. SAMPSON,
"Rear Admiral

"Commander-in-Chief.

"THE COMMODORE,
"Flying Squadron."

The fact that the department had sent scouts to
get in "touch with the Spaniards on the north coast
of Venezuela" was another exhibition of its uncer
tainty of the whereabouts of Cervera.

The commodore received at the same time with
No. 8, the Memorandum following, viz:

"It is thought that the enclosed instructions will
reach you by 2 A. Mv May 23. This will enable you
to leave before daylight (regarded very important),
so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at
Santiago, A. M., May 24. It is thought the Spanish
squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they
must have some repairs to make, and coal to take.

"The St. Paul and Minneapolis have been tele
graphed to scout off Santiago, and if the Spanish
squadron goes westward, one is to keep in touch, and
one is to go west and meet you.

"If the Spanish squadron goes east, one will keep
in touch, and the other will go into Nicholas Mole
to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be off Cay
Francis, two hundred miles east of Habana. If you
arrive off Santiago, and no scout meets you, send a
vessel to call at Nicholas Mole, and get information
to be left there by scout as to direction taken by
Spanish in case they have left Santiago de Cuba.

"The Yale has been ordered to cruise in the Ba
hama Channel, until May 24. It is thought possible
that the squadron, hearing of your departure from
Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there. If this word

102 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to
mask your real direction as much as possible.

"Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction
they may take.

UW. T. SAMPSON, Rear Admiral.
"THE COMMODORE,
"Flying Squadron."

In manuscript on the margin of the above memo
randum is the following:

"Our experience has been that ships may be traced
by their smoke from twenty to thirty miles, and it is
suggested in case you leave in the daytime to stand
a good distance to the westward before turning to the
eastward."

As has already been shown by endorsements on
them, these two papers came together, and were re
ceived at 8.15 A. ML, several hours after daylight of
the 23d. The manuscript suggestion on the memo
randum was childlike. No one of any sense what
ever would have left that blockade in the daytime.

In addition to the direction contained in No. 7 to
Schley, to "Hold his squadron off Cienfuegos," an
other condition was now imposed by No. 8, requiring
him to leave for Santiago de Cuba, only when he was
"satisfied that the Spaniards were not at Cienfuegos."

Suppose he had gone away without satisfying him
self, and that the Spaniards had been left in that port;
and, after Schley's departure, had come out and run
the blockade into Havana, which, with Sampson two
hundred miles to the east, at Cay Francis, there would
have been no difficulty in doing, what a howl of criti
cism would have been raised about it !

On that same day the British steamer Adula ap
peared with her budget of conflicting reports, and
Schley, who up to that moment had nothing but un-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 103

certainties from Sampson and the department about
Cervera's whereabouts, was not satisfied that Cer-
vera was not at Cienfuegos.

Availing himself of the Adula, he permitted her
to go into the port under promise to come out next
day, so that he could get from her passengers infor
mation as to whether Cervera was there or not.

Admiral Dewey commended Schley for this ac
tion (I. 1830), saying, "Commodore Schley, in per
mitting the British steamer Adula to enter the port
of Cienfuegos, expected to obtain information con
cerning the Spanish squadron from her when she

came out."

It will be remembered that up to this time knowl
edge of the code of signals that Captain McCalla had
arranged with the Cubans near Cienfuegos was still
slumbering peacefully in the mind of Captain Robley
D. Evans, who, when informed that the signals had
been made, knew that the Cubans were asking to be
allowed to communicate with the commodore, and
who, although he saw that no attention was paid to
the request by the commodore, let the knowledge
slumber on.

On the 23d the commodore sent to Admiral Samp
son the following despatches:

"M. 43. "U. S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,

"OFF CIENFUEGOS, May 23, 1898.

"SiR: — In reply to your letter No. 8 I would state
that I am by no means satisfied that the Spanish
squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large amount of
smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence
of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances
it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up a
probability at Santiago de Cuba, reported via Ha
vana, no doubt as a ruse.

"I shall therefore remain off this port with this

104 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

squadron, availing myself of every opportunity for
coaling, and keeping it ready for any emergency'.

"Regarding the enclosed information from Com
mander McCalla, I would state that I went twice
yesterday close to the mouth of the harbor, the first
time about two thousand yards, and the second time
about fourteen hundred yards, but saw no evidence
of any masked batteries near the entrance.

"Well up the river, across their torpedo mine fields,
now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is a
new battery constructed, hardly within range from
the mouth of the river.

"The Castine, Merrimac, and Hawk arrived this
morning, and I send the Hawk back with these de
spatches.

"Last night I sent the Scorpion East to Santiago
de Cuba, to communicate with the scouts off that
port, with instructions if they were not there, to re
turn to me at once here, and I expect her back day
after to-morrow. I am further satisfied that the des
tination of the Spanish squadron is either Cienfuegos
or Havana.

"This point, being in communication with Havana,
would be better for their purposes, if it were left ex
posed; and I think that we ought to be very care
ful how we receive information from Havana, which
is, no doubt, sent out for the purpose of misleading
us.

"Iowa is coaling to-day, having reached this sta
tion with only about half of her coal supply.
"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore, &c.
"To THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF."

The commodore also sent to Admiral Sampson the
following :

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 105

"M. 44. "U. S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,

"OFF CIENFUEGOS, May 23, 1898.

"SiR: — Steamer Adula, chartered by Consul Dent,
with proper papers from U. S. State Department, to
carry neutrals from Cienfuegos, was stopped off this
port this morning. She had no cargo, and was per
mitted to enter. She reports that she left Santiago
de Cuba at 4.30 P. M., May 18, and that night she
saw the lights of seven vessels, seventy miles to the
southward of Santiago. Next day, Thursday, May
19, at Kingston, cable reported Spanish fleet at San
tiago. Friday, May 20, the fleet was reported to
have left Santiago. Now, on Saturday, May 21,
when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard
from the bridge of this vessel firing of guns towards
Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the
Spanish fleet; and the news this morning by the Adula
convinces me that the fleet is here.

"Latest war bulletin from Jamaica, received this
morning, asserts that the fleet has left Santiago. I
think them here, almost to a certainty.
"Very respectfully,

"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore, &c.
"To THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF."

One who reads the foregoing despatches from
Commodore Schley to Admiral Sampson cannot but
be struck with the doubtfulness and uncertainty that
pervade them. There is nothing positive in any of
Schley's expressions, but, on the contrary, many
expressions of doubt whether the Spaniards were at
Santiago de Cuba.

Remembering that the only information received
through Sampson as to the whereabouts of Cervera
had come through Spanish sources, and what Schley
knew in addition was what the Adula had brought

io6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

him, can there be any doubt that he was correct in
saying in No. 43, to Sampson, "It would be ex
tremely unwise to chase a probability at Santiago de
Cuba, reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse"; and
UI think we ought to be very careful how we receive
information from Havana, which is, no doubt, sent
out for the purpose of misleading us"?

If Admiral Sampson had thought it advisable to
change the uplan strongly advised by the depart
ment," all he had to do was to give Schley a positive
order to leave Cienfuegos and go off to Santiago de
Cuba. He was wise not to do this, leaving to Schley,
who was on the spot, the responsibility of finding out
whether Cervera was at Cienfuegos.

The Navy Department's despatch said, "The re
port of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba
might very well be correct." Yes, so it might; and it
might just as well be incorrect.

On May 22 Sampson issued to that part of his
fleet on the north coast of Cuba, then off Havana, an
"Order of Battle" (A. 469), which he began as fol
lows:

"It is possible that the vessels of this squadron now
off Havana will meet the Spanish ships [naming
them] .

"These vessels are supposed to be now in Santiago
de Cuba, where they are taking coal and provisions.
The squadron of Commodore Schley will probably
leave Cienfuegos to-morrow, bound east in pursuit of
the Spanish ships ; and it is anticipated that they will
leave Santiago de Cuba on the same day that Com
modore Schley leaves Cienfuegos, to reach Havana
by north coast of Cuba ; in which case the blockading
squadron off Havana will attempt to intercept them,
by going east about two hundred miles beyond the
junction of the Santaren and Nicholas channels. The
object in view (A. 470) is to occupy the Nicholas

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 107

Channel in such manner as to prevent the approach
of the Spanish squadron from the east towards Ha-

On the morning of the 24th he received from the
Navy Department the despatch following:

"WASHINGTON, May 23.

"The information of the department all goes to
indicate that the principal aim of the Spanish fleet
and government is to introduce a supply of munitions
of war and food to Blanco by Havana and Cienfue-
gos. This is for your information.

"ALLEN, Assist. Secy."

"Cienfuegos!" "Cienfuegos !" "Cienfuegos!" was
always the cry.

Schley's despatches, M. 43 and M. 44, above given
in full, were sent to Admiral Sampson by the Hawk,
delivered by her commander to the Dolphin, and by
the latter vessel were delivered on board the flagship
New York, at some distance to the eastward of Ha
vana, on the 26th of May. When these despatches
were received the situation was naturally and properly
discussed in the cabin of the flagship New York be
tween the admiral and other officers of rank.

From an officer of high rank (whose declarations
import, in the navy, absolute verity) the following
statement has been received:

"There were present, besides myself, Admiral
Sampson, Captain Chadwick, chief of staff, and per
haps others. Chadwick was animadverting upon
Schley's proposed delay at Cienfuegos. I said: 'Let
us see the orders that have been sent to him.' These
were brought in, and as they were read aloud I saw a
surprised look come into Chadwick's face, and he said
to the admiral, 'I didn't know that you had sent such

io8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

orders to Commodore Schley.' 'Yes,' replied the ad
miral, 'he is only obeying his orders.' '

Captain Chadwick testified before the Court of
Inquiry (I. 854) relative to that Order No. 8, —
which, it will be remembered, contained the instruc
tion: "If you are satisfied that they [the Spanish
fleet] are not at Cienfuegos, then proceed, but cau
tiously, to Santiago de Cuba" — "I did not read the
original despatch until the answer was brought by the
Hawk. That was on May 26, when the ship [New
York] was at a point between Havana and Cay
Francis, and in the vicinity of Cay Pedros."

Chadwick thus partly confirms the statement
above.

The impartial mind, in view of the foregoing, will
be satisfied that Commodore Schley was right in doing
just what he did — to obey in letter and spirit the or
ders he had received from Rear Admiral Sampson
with regard to remaining off Cienfuegos, until he
(Schley) was "satisfied that the Spanish ships were
not there, and then proceed, but cautiously, to Santi
ago de Cuba."

Having finally learned from Captain McCalla the
significance of the signals that he had noted along
shore for some time, Schley promptly sent the Marble-
head and Eagle to communicate with the Cubans,
from whom it was definitely learned that Cervera's
fleet was not in that port. The vessels did not get
back until about 4 o'clock p. M. Commodore Schley
then wrote to Commodore Remey, at Key West, that
he would leave for Santiago de Cuba next day (25th) ;
but instead, as soon as night set in, having meanwhile
arranged his squadron for the purpose, he started at
about 8 o'clock P. M. of the 24th, for that port.
That he had a right to change his mind about the
time he would leave Cienfuegos cannot be questioned,
and particularly when the change was for an earlier
departure.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CHARACTER OF SCHLEY's BLOCKADE OF
CIENFUEGOS

THE majority of the Court of Inquiry expressed the
opinion that "Commodore Schley should have main
tained a close blockade of that port" (Cienfuegos).
They do not say that the blockade was not effective.
All authorities agree, however, that if a blockade is
"effective," it is a "close blockade."

What constitutes an effective or "close blockade"
has been much discussed by writers on international
law, but the following from the work of Rear Ad
miral Henry Glass, of the Navy, is as clear a state
ment of the requisites of a "close" (in the sense of
effective) "blockade" as can be found:

"The doctrine of the Paris Conference of 1856,
that blockades, to be obligatory, are to be effective;
that is to say, maintained by a sufficient force to shut
out the access of the enemy's ships and other vessels
in reality, is now a recognized principle of interna
tional law."

Mr. Madison, Secretary of State under Thomas
Jefferson, stated to our minister to England, Mr.
Charles Pinckney that "the law requires that to con
stitute a blockade there should be the presence and
position of a force rendering access to the prohibited
place manifestly difficult and dangerous."

The Navy Department instructed the flag officer
commanding the United States naval force in the
Pacific in 1846 that "a lawful maritime blockade re
quires the actual presence of a sufficient force situ
ated at the entrance of the ports sufficiently near to
prevent communication."

Admiral Glass further says: "The doctrine that

no SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

has been laid down by the English and American
courts, which is approved by English and American
writers, and which is embodied in the policy of both
countries, requires that the place shall be watched by
a force sufficient to render the egress or ingress dan
gerous; or, in other words, sufficient to render the
capture of vessels attempting to go in or come out
most probable."

Admiral Sampson himself issued to his fleet
"Squadron General Order No. 10," in which he says
(A. 1 68) : UA blockade, to be effective and binding,
must be maintained by a force sufficient to render in
gress to, or egress from, the port dangerous."

Tested by these principles and definitions, the opin
ion expressed by Admiral Dewey, that "the blockade
of Cienfuegos was effective," has common sense as
well as international law to back it, while the opinion
of Admirals Benham and Ramsay is without warrant
of either.

During his three days there Commodore Schley, in
the daytime, let his vessels "loll about" in positions
near the entrance where they could be seen, so as to
give the impression of a want of preparation for
battle, in hopes that the enemy might thereby be
tempted to come out. When night came they were
formed in line of battle, in complete readiness, with
the lighter vessels that he had available, on picket
duty, much nearer to the entrance.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE VOYAGE OF THE FLYING SQUADRON FROM
CIENFUEGOS TO SANTIAGO

IT will be remembered that Order No. 8 of the com-
mander-in-chief to Commodore Schley was (A.
466) : ''Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de
Cuba. If you are satisfied they are not in Cienfuegos
proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago
de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in
port."

And in his memorandum he added: "Follow the
Spanish squadron, whichever direction they take."

It is a fact of some significance that up to this time
the Flying Squadron had never been formally placed
under the command of Sampson; but on May 24,
1898, this telegram was sent to Sampson, by the
Navy Department: "Until further orders the Flying
Squadron is under your orders, and Schley will be so
informed. — LONG/'

And to Schley: "Till further orders the Flying
Squadron is under the orders of Sampson, Com-
mander-in-Chief North Atlantic Station. — LONG."

Schley did not receive this order until after his ar
rival off Santiago de Cuba, but he had already, on the
1 8th of May, and since, recognized Sampson as his
commanding officer.

The evidence and log-books of the vessels show
that on the voyage towards Santiago de Cuba the
commodore proceeded as fast as he could and yet
maintain the integrity of his squadron ; that is to say,
without abandoning his smaller vessels and the collier
Merrimac. The distance was about 340 nautical
miles.

Admiral Sampson, in his Century article, says, "It

ii2 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

was a day's run." To have run it in a day would
have required an average speed of more than fourteen
knots an hour, and none of the vessels except the
Brooklyn could make that speed except upon a spurt
of an hour or so.

The log-books of the ships show that on the 25th
the weather and sea were rough, with stiff to fresh
breezes from the east (these were head winds) .

Rear Admiral Higginson testified (I. 36) : "The
weather was rough; not rough for a battle-ship, but
it was rough for small vessels." Rear Admiral
Evans (I. 361 ) : "The weather on the evening of the
24th was squally, raining and squally. On the 25th
the weather changed, and we had a long swell from
the southeast. On the 25th the weather got worse.
In the afternoon the squalls were fresh; there was a
good deal of rain, and a long swell from the south

east^

The log-book of the Marblehead: uMay 25th,
commences overcast, cloudy, drizzling and squally.
Fresh breeze from E. S. E. Rough sea from S'd and
Sd. & Eastward. The port lower boom was unship
ped and carried away. Stiff to fresh breezes from
E. N. E., rough sea."

Log-book of the Vixen: "Fresh breezes from
E. S. E. ; overcast and cloudy with frequent and
heavy rain, and moderate gale in squalls. Moderate
to heavy sea, breaking over forecastle occasionally.
About 7.05 A. M. an unusually heavy sea was taken
on board, and washed C. Buehler (Ch. G. M.) from
the forecastle to the main deck, inflicting thereby a
severe flesh wound in his'thigh."

All through that day this log-book shows "stiff to
fresh breezes, heavy head sea; ship pitching and roll
ing uncomfortably."

The log-books record slowing to allow the Eagle,
which had dropped astern, to come up. That of the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 113

Texas: "Stopped to allow the Eagle to rejoin squad
ron." The collier Merrimac also fell behind.

Enough has been quoted from those log-books to
show that while the weather and sea were not such as
to interfere very much with the large vessels of the
squadron, they did interfere very greatly with the
speed of the smaller vessels.

The testimony of Captain Francis S. Cook, with
respect to the weather on that voyage, should be ac
cepted without question. He commanded the flag
ship Brooklyn, and was acting as chief of staff to the
commodore, and, as such, it was his duty to keep an
eye over all the other ships of the squadron and regu
late the speed of his ship so as best to keep the squad
ron together. He testified (I. 887) : "We had a fair
run the night of the 24th. The weather gathered
during the night, and the next day it was squally,
stormy; and there was from a moderate to a rough
sea. The 2^th was a bad day. On the 26th the
weather had moderated so far as the wind was con
cerned, but there was a long, nasty sort of a sea, and
the ships rolled a good deal."

While on the subject of the weather, it may be said
for the benefit of the non-professional reader that it
is quite true that there may be a heavy sea
running while there is little or no wind} and when
steaming against such a sea a small vessel would have
a very rough time of it. Even so large a vessel as the
Marblehead lost one of her swinging booms by it.
The Vixen was being boarded by heavy "green seas,"
one of which swept one of her petty officers from the
forecastle and severely injured him, and the Eagle
fell so far behind that she was lost sight of by the
rest of the fleet.

The majority of the court expressed the opinion
that Commodore Schley "should not have permitted
the Eagle to delay the progress of the squadron,"

ii4 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

but they ignore the fact that it was not the Eagle alone
that had to be considered. The Vixen and the collier
Merrimac, and to some extent the Marblehead also,
were a cause of delay.

It is a mere opinion, after all, about which there is
room for difference, and it may well be doubted if
either Benham or Ramsay, or any other of Schley's
critics would have done very differently if any of
them had been there in command.

That Commodore Schley would not have been jus
tified in abandoning those smaller vessels and his col
lier seems really not open to dispute. They were a
necessary part of his force, and he required them for
scouting, for picket duty. Like Lord Nelson's frig
ates, they were the ueyes of his fleet." Nelson said
that when he died they would find the word "frigate"
engraved on his heart. If perchance, and that was
one of the possibilities, Schley had met Cervera's fleet,
the smaller vessels might have been a great protection
against the torpedo-boat destroyers of the enemy.

Of course, as the commodore said in his letter to
the Senate, if he had known with any certainty that
the Spanish fleet was in Santiago harbor, no consider
ation of the Eagle or any other vessel would have
prevented him from getting off that port, with his
heavier ships, at the earliest possible moment."

Admiral Dewey's opinion, expressed in the finding
of the Court of Inquiry (I. 1830), that "the pas
sage from Cienfuegos to a point about twenty-two
miles south of Santiago was made with as much de
spatch as was possible while keeping the squadron a
unit," is abundantly justified by the facts above
shown.

CHAPTER XXX

THE EVENTS OF MAY 26, 27, AND 28

THESE embrace what has been called the "Retrograde
Movement"; and will be treated, not apologetically,
for rightly considered they need no apology, but
candidly and fairly, with a view to their explanation
in the interests of truth and justice.

Admiral Schley, in his letter to the Secretary of
the Navy asking for the Court of Inquiry, said (I.
4) : UI admit the right of fair criticism of every pub
lic officer."

On the evening of May 26, at about five o'clock,
the Flying Squadron had arrived at a point about
twenty-two miles S. S. E. from the entrance to the
harbor of Santiago de Cuba.

The scouts Yale (Captain William C. Wise),
Minneapolis (Captain Theodore F. Jewell), and St.
Paul (Captain Charles D. Sigsbee) had been cruis
ing off the harbor and in the vicinity for several days
prior to that time.

Captain Jewell testified before the court (I. 351)
that on the 23d the captains of all those vessels were
on board a fourth (the Harvard, Captain Charles
W. Cotton), and "had some talk."

Here were four vessels commanded by extremely
capable officers, whose duty it was to find the Spanish
fleet, if possible, and they had been diligent, but en
tirely unsuccessful.

Captain Wise testified (I. 212) : "My ship and
the St. Paul were off Santiago all day of the 22d.
Together we reconnoitered Santiago very carefully
and closely. Could see nothing. I saw nothing, ex
cept around the corner of Cay Smith, where some
small vessel was anchored, either a torpedo boat or

n6 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

a small gunboat; I could not determine which it was.
There was nothing in sight whatever. So the St. Paul
and my vessel cruised all that day and that night, the
St. Paul to the eastward, while I took to the west
ward.

uOn the 23d the Harvard joined us, and she took
the course to the westward, the St. Paul to the east
ward, and I took to the southward. We observed
carefully and reconnoitered, going in as closely as
we could, but we could see nothing."

Captain Sigsbee testified (I. 406) : "I proceeded
for Santiago, where I arrived early in the morning
of the 2 1 st. Within a few days the Yale, Harvard,
and Minneapolis arrived. On the 25th captured the
British steamer Restorval, coal laden, bound into
Santiago de Cuba."

Now the testimony of all these officers (except
Cotton of the Harvard) is to the effect that, although
they all believed at the time that the Spanish squad
ron was in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, none of
them expressed that belief to anyone outside of them
selves, or, so far as the testimony given shows, even
to each other; and they left the commodore in ig
norance of their belief, and of whatever reason for
such belief any of them had.

There is a remarkable fact about these scouts. As
stated by Captain Sigsbee, his vessel (St. Paul) cap
tured the British steamer Restorval on the 25th.
Now the log-book of the Cristobal Colon (of Cer-
vcra's fleet) shows that on the morning of the 25th
she came down from the inner harbor and took po
sition in plain sight from outside the harbor entrance.
I quote from her log-book as follows: "Anchored at
7 A. M. At this time the vessels of the enemy were
discovered off the mouth of the harbor. Morro made
signal to begin firing; but in a short time it was seen
that it would be obstructed, as an English steamer
was about to enter the harbor." That was the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 117

Restorval. The Colon could sec our ships and the
Restorval; but our ships could not see the Colon.

As soon as those scouts were discovered by the
Flying Squadron the latter "went to quarters" (which
is the nautical expression for made ready for battle),
but it was soon discovered that they were not enemies.
At 6. 20 p. M., in obedience to signal, Captain Sigs-
bee went on board the Brooklyn, to make report to
the commodore.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN SCHLEY AND SIGSBEE

WHAT occurred between those two officers at that
meeting was of the greatest importance, because
Schley immediately acted upon what Sigsbee had said.

Sigsbee testified (I. 458) : "I knew nothing posi
tively about the Spanish fleet at that time. I re
ported the situation generally to Commodore Schley.
I did not say I believed the Spanish fleet was not
there. I said I had not seen it." Sigsbee did not
claim to have expressed the belief that it was there.

Commodore Schley testified (I. 1356) : "The
first thing that I asked Captain Sigsbee when he
came over the side" — and I want to say before I
make this statement, that I do not believe that Cap
tain Sigsbee would misstate anything for his com
mission. I do not believe he is capable of stating
what is not true; I think that in this instance his
recollection is in fault, and not his veracity — "I said
to him, 'Captain, have you got the Dons here/ or 'in
here'? He stated to me: 'They are not in here. I
have been in very close.' He said, 'They are not
here, they are only reported here.' I said to him,
'Have any of the other vessels seen them, the Yale
or Minneapolis f He said, 'No; they have not; they
have assured me so.' I assumed from the communi
cation with Captain Sigsbee that he was bearing to
me the assurance of all of them.

After this conversation Captain Sigsbee went on
board his ship.

Ensign Ralph N. Marble testified (I. 1902) : "I
heard a conversation between Captain Sigsbee and
Commodore Schley, on board the Brooklyn, on the
afternoon of the 26th of May, 1898, when we met

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 119

the three scouts off Santiago. Captain Sigsbee came
on board and reported to the commodore. As Cap
tain Sigsbee came aft Commodore Schley asked him :
'Have we got them?' (or something to that effect),
meaning the Spanish ships as I took it. Captain
Sigsbee answered: 'No, they are not here. I have
been here for about a week, and they could not be
here unless I knew it.' [I. 1094.] I do not say
those are the exact words. That is the text of what
I heard. I think they are almost the exact words.
The incident was recalled to my mind less than a
year later, by some article that was printed in a news
paper, with Captain Sigsbee's signature. I was not
more than seven or eight feet from them."

The judge advocate asked Marble if Captain
Sigsbee may not have said: "I have been here about
a week, and have not seen any of them ; or words to
that effect?" to which Marble replied, "No, sir. As
I remember, he said, 'They could not be here unless
I knew it.' "

The commodore's orderly (Cronin) testified (I.
I235) : "I heard the commodore ask something of
Captain Sigsbee. I could not tell exactly what it was.
I couldn't quite understand. But I heard Captain
Sigsbee answer, 'They are not in there; the Spanish
fleet are not in there.' '

Mr. George E. Graham, a correspondent of the
Associated Press (who had been on board the
Brooklyn since March 29, 1898), testified (I. 1223) :
"I saw Captain Sigsbee on board the Brooklyn on
May 26. Heard him in conversation with Commodore
Schley. After he had reached the quarterdeck by
the gangway, he stopped, and Commodore Schley
said to him : 'Have we got them, Sigsbee ?' He said :
'No, they are not here. I have been here for a week,
and they are not here.' He went from there back on
the quarterdeck, and he continued the conversation.
Commodore Schley said: 'Are you sure they are not

120 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

in -there?' He said: 'I have been very close to the
harbor entrance two or three times; and Cotton has
been in and cut the cable; and they are not there.' I
heard Captain Sigsbee say that. I took some sort of
a part in the conversation; I can't tell exactly what.
There were several officers near the gangway when
he made his first statement, I believe; and when we
went aft there were simply the commodore, Captain
Sigsbee, and myself.

"I made a report of our conversation at the time.
Captain Sigsbee knew I was a newspaper man and
was there looking for information, and Captain Sigs
bee later took a despatch written by me, and vised
by Commodore Schley. I described the fact that
the fleet was not there, I think; it was open and un
sealed."

Three days later (on the 29th) Sigsbee wrote to
the department (A. 411) :

"This morning, while in towards the coast, after
chasing, I saw the smoke of a number of vessels to
the westward; and at once made for the Santiago
entrance, believing it possible that the strangers were
the Spanish squadron approaching that port."

Now, it is pertinent to inquire, how, if eight days
after the Spanish were reported to have entered Santi
ago harbor Captain Sigsbee believed (as he now says
he did) that the Spaniards were in there, he could
three days later have believed it possible that they
were outside and "approaching the port"? Such a
dilemma "puzzles the will."

While there is not the slightest intention of sug
gesting any purposed change of statement on the
part of Captain Sigsbee, it must be said that the fore
going testimony shows "beyond a reasonable doubt"
that Captain Sigsbee's memory was in fault; and
that he did say, in substance, to Commodore Schley
what Schley says he did; and that he stated to the
commodore that the Spaniards were not in Santiago

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 121

harbor at that time. And, whatever his language,
he certainly conveyed that impression to the commo
dore.

In addition to what Sigsbee said, he had brought
with him a Santiago pilot, Eduardo Nunez, who testi
fied (I. 914) : "I was asked by the commodore if I
knew the Spanish vessels were then at Santiago? I
replied that I doubted if they were in yet, because
they were very large vessels, and the water was not
deep enough, and the channel was too narrow."

Captain Sigsbee, in a letter written to the depart
ment on February 24, 1899, said: "In my position
as commanding officer as a scout it would have been
a great mistake to have stated to Admiral Schley
that I did not believe Admiral Cervera's fleet was in
Santiago harbor."

It is difficult to accept that proposition. A scout
is defined by Webster, as "One employed to gain in
formation of the movements of an enemy," and Mil
ton says:

"Scouts each coast light-armored scour,
Each quarter to descry the distant foe."

According to Captain Sigsbee, when they have
"descried," or failed, or have acquired such informa
tion as gives them an opinion as to the whereabouts
of the foe, they must keep silent until particularly
asked by the commander-in-chief before it would be
proper to impart to him the tidings they may have
gained of the movements of an enemy, or the opinions
they have formed of his whereabouts.

Such a conception of the duty of a scout seems pre
posterous to the common mind. The idea that a
scout should stand dumb and require the senior officer
to worm out of him by adroit questionings such in
formation and opinions as he may have acquired and
formed, is original with Captain Sigsbee. It would,
on the contrary, seem to be the duty of a scout to give

122 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

to the commanding officer present all the information
he may have obtained, and to express any opinion he
may have formed.

If his opinion was that Cervera's fleet was in San
tiago Bay, it was his clear duty to say so; and if he
had said so, no one could have supposed that he had
expressed to Schley the opinion that it was not there.

But whatever was or was not said, the result was
not to remove from the commodore's mind the un
certainty and doubt indicated by the telegram from
the department to Sampson, which had been sent him
by the admiral in that Despatch No. 7, which up to
that time was all that Schley had concerning the
whereabouts of the Spanish fleet.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE COALING PROBLEM

IT should be remembered that prior to the war with
Spain coaling in the open sea was a problem that had
not been solved. To the sailor nothing seemed more
dangerous than to attempt to bring two heavy ships
close enough alongside of each other at sea to en
able one to coal from the other. As soon as the
collier , Merrimac arrived off Cienfuegos coaling
efforts were begun, but without much success.

Admiral Sampson, in the article printed over his
own signature in the Century Magazine for April,
1899 (at page 898), well says: "Schley had become
greatly disquieted by the difficulty he experienced in
coaling his ships, and by the fear that, with a continu
ance of bad weather, he might become short of coal,
although he had the Merrimac in company, with
about four thousand tons aboard. Only those who
have experienced the anxiety caused by such a doubt
can appreciate its wearing effects."1

Having the coal on board the Merrimac was well;
but to get it out of her holds into the bunkers of the
fighting ships was the problem to be solved.

Captain Cook's testimony (I. 892-3) states the
exact conditions: "Until dark of the 27th, when the
weather indications decidedly moderated, we [himself
and the commodore] were both watching the weather
pretty closely. I did say at that time that they could
coal, as it had moderated, and he evidently thought
so himself, as he made signal to them to coal. The
weather overhead had been good, as I recollect it, for
twenty-four hours, and the sea was moderating. At
that time the sea was getting quite moderate; and,

*The italics are mine.— J. P.

124 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

as I knew that the commodore wanted to coal as soon
as he could, I spoke to him at that time. The signals
were made, and the Marblehead commenced coaling
at once, first with boats,2 and then they got the ship
alongside to coal. Signal was made to the Texas*;
that was the only ship I thought he was particularly
anxious about, and I knew that on board the Texas
they were very anxious, and I presumed they were
watching the weather, too. But they had not asked;
and he signaled — wigwagged. They did try; and
they succeeded and got coal.

Captain Philip, commanding the Texas, was cer
tainly as anxious to fill up his ship's bunkers as any
one else could possibly be. A modern battleship
without coal is like a sailing ship with her masts and
sails gone, and if he had not been doubtful, Philip
would undoubtedly have answered "Yes," and not,
"We can try."

The judge advocate of the court of inquiry
(Lemly) made persistent effort to show, by Captain
Cook, that Schley did not order the coaling until
after Cook suggested it to him; but Cook testified
further (I. 893) :

"I really couldn't say whether the order was given
after that conversation. I wouldn't like to say that
he was controlled by anything I said, because I knew
that his anxiety was mine. He had the responsibility,
and I did not. I don't say the sea was smooth. I
say the sea was better. There was always a long
swell there. It was a new experience entirely."

The judge advocate put the following question :
"This matter of coaling at sea is not a very easy
matter, under any conditions, Captain, so far as you
know?" To which Cook replied: "No, I think after

3 This would not have been done if it had been thought safe to
go alongside the collier. — J. P.

8 The signal record is as follows : "7 P. M. Do you think you could
coal to-night? Ans. 7.01, We can try. 7.02. Brooklyn to Texas,
Try."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 125

experience, perhaps, changed our opinions a good
deal; but I must say that in coaling down there,
I never did see as bad a sea as we had at that time.

"We never had anything like it afterwards, accord
ing to my recollection — a sea that made it so trouble
some to go alongside a collier. The 25th was a very
bad day; I don't think it was practicable at all, to
coal. The next day (26th) was a bad day, and up
to the 27th. I think that, possibly, if the Texas had
made the trial a little before on the 27th, she could
have done so. They coaled all night of 27th, and
part of next morning, the 28th; and at noon we
started for Santiago."

Lieutenant Harlow, of the Vixen (I. 1320),
clearly stated the coaling problem thus: "I should
say that, in the light of all the experience we had
during the war, no one would have attempted to coal
ship on the 26th. In the early part of the 26th no
amount of experience would have warranted in coal
ing ship. In the after part of the 26th, with the ex
perience we had at that time, it is doubtful whether
they would have tried it. But with experience we
learned a good many things." A most pregnant re
mark which the ancients expressed by the two words :
Experientla docet.

It is worthy of notice that, in a report made by
Admiral Cervera (published by the Navy Depart
ment), that officer states that the weather ("storm,"
he calls it) on the 26th was such as to prevent the
Spanish squadron from putting to sea, as had been
resolved upon for the day.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE EVENTS OF MAY 26, 27, AND 28 CONTINUED

The interview with Captain Sigsbee had not re
lieved the uncertainty of the situation, and the coal
ing problem was pressing for solution. Therefore,
acting in accordance with his best judgment; without
any certain knowledge of the whereabouts of that
Spanish fleet; after having been informed by the
scouts that, although they had all been off Santiago
for a week, they had seen nothing of it, and knew
nothing of its movements or whereabouts since it had
left Curacao; after having been assured by Captain
Sigsbee that he did not believe it was in Santiago;
and knowing that as the sea and weather then were
it would be impossible to coal his squadron off the
port, Commodore Schley deemed it best to return,
via the south side of Cuba and the Yucatan Channel,
to Key West, to fill up his ships bunkers with coal and
be ready for any emergency. And so on the night of
the 26th, at 9.50, he started to the westward with
his whole squadron.

The collier Merrimac had broken down and had
to be towed, and but little progress could be made;
and so after standing west for two hours and a half,
and for a distance at the most of 16.5 knots, the
fleet was stopped by signal from the flagship, at 1 1.30,
to enable the collier to make repairs. Great difficulty
was experienced by the Yale in towing her, and the
log-book of the latter shows that all that night, and
next day up to 1 1 o'clock A. Mv was passed in various
efforts to get the Merrimac in tow ; also that the sea
was "rough and confused." Meanwhile the fleet
drifted.

At 9.30 A. M. of the 27th the Harvard (scout)

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 127

arrived from St. Nicholas Mole. She brought a de
spatch from the Navy Department, which was in the
following words :

"WASHINGTON, May 25, 1898.
"HARVARD, St. Nicholas Mole, Haiti :

"Proceed at once and inform Schley, and also
the senior officer off Santiago, as follows : All depart
ment's information indicates Spanish division is still
at Santiago de Cuba. The department looks to you
to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does
not leave without a decisive action.

"Cubans familiar with Santiago de Cuba say there
are landing places five or six nautical miles west from
the mouth of the harbor; and that there insurgents
probably will be found, and not the Spanish.

"From the surrounding heights can see every ves
sel in port. As soon as ascertained, notify depart
ment whether enemy is there. Could not squadron,
and also Harvard, coal from Merrimac leeward of
Cape Cruz, Gonaives Channel, or Mole Haiti? Re
port, without delay, situation at Santiago de Cuba."

The above despatch is the one upon which the
charge of "Disobedience of Orders by the Commo
dore" was based.

The Secretary of the Navy, in his letter of Febru
ary 6, 1899 (Ex. Doc. 3, p. 3), to the Senate, gives
to the despatch a significance which it does not import.
He reads into it a word which it does not contain, and
speaks of it as "directing Schley to remain at Santi
ago and ascertain whether the enemy is there or not."
This may have been in the mind of the Secretary, but
it is certainly not in the despatch.

In the first place, it is not addressed to Schley, but
to the Harvard. There is no order in it, except to the
Harvard "to proceed immediately and inform

128 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Schley," and also the commanding officer off Santi
ago, who — as the despatch shows — was thought to be
some other than Schley, what the department's infor
mation "indicated" as to Cervera's fleet. There is
no order to Schley to "proceed" to, or remain off,
Santiago de Cuba, or anywhere else. The word "re
main" is not in the despatch. It will be observed that
the despatch was dated and sent on May 25. It
therefore was not sent because Schley had started
back towards Key West, inasmuch as he did not so
start until May 26, at 9.50 p. M. As a matter of
fact, the department did not learn of the start back
until it received Schley's despatch announcing it, which
was dated the 27th, and was sent by the Harvard to
Jamaica, to be cabled thence to the department, as it
was on the 28th, after 9 A. M. (A. 406) , and received
same day.

It must have been received by the department
about the time Schley started back to Santiago, after
the coaling problem had been solved.

That despatch which the Harvard had delivered
to Schley on the 2yth was characterized by the same
uncertainty that up to that time was manifested by
all the department's despatches with respect to Cer-
vera's whereabouts. Its language was: "All the de
partment's information indicates." "The department
looks to you to ascertain the facts, and that the enemy,
if therein, does not leave without a decisive action."
"As soon as ascertained, notify Department whether
enemy is there." Everybody knows now that the
enemy was there ; but the question that must be faced
in forming any judgment upon Schley's action is,
"What did Schley know or believe then"? Nobody
can have the slightest belief that, if he had then
known or believed that Cervera's fleet was in Santi
ago harbor, he would have turned his fleet away
towards Key West or anywhere else.

In truth the despatch suggests that "under Cape

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 129

Cruz," or in "Gonaives Channel," or at "Mole,
Haiti," the squadron might go to coal; but to go to
any of those places would leave Santiago harbor as
open as it had been left since Cervera had arrived
there.

The despatch delivered by the Harvard, on the
27th, gave no new information as to Cervera's
whereabouts. The coaling difficulty still continuing,
Schley did not then change his plan of procedure, but
sent the despatch (A. 397) to Jamaica by the Har
vard to be cabled thence to the department. The de
spatch, as shown by the commodore's letter-press
book, was as follows:

uOrr SANTIAGO, May 17, 1898.
"SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington.

"Received despatch of May 25th, delivered by
Harvard off Santiago de Cuba. Merrimac's engine
is disabled, and she is helpless. Am obliged to have
her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely un
able to coal the Texas, Marblehead, and Brooklyn
from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous
weather since leaving Key West. Brooklyn is the
only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal
to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santi
ago, in present state of coal in the squadron. It is
not possible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in sum
mer, owing to southwest winds. Harvard just re
ports to me she has only sufficient coal to proceed to
Port Royal. Also reports that only small vessels
could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Haiti.

"Minneapolis has only enough coal to reach Key
West, and same of Yale, which will tow Merrimac.

"It is to be regretted that department's orders can
not be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that
end. I am obliged to return to Key West, via Yuca-

130 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

tan Passage for coal. Can ascertain nothing con
cerning enemy. Was obliged to send Eagle to Port
Antonio, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only twenty-
seven tons of coal on board. Will leave St. Paul
here. Will require 9,500 tons at Key West.

"SCHLEY."

As to the charge of "disobedience of orders" grow
ing out of this despatch and the one to which it is a
reply, it is to be said that disobedience is an act of
commission or omission done with disobedient intent.
That the commodore had any intent to be disobedient
will not be pretended. The state of facts, as they ap
peared to him (just as on the i6th they had appeared
to Sampson) , seemed to require a return to Key West
for coal; and, so after stating the necessity, he ex
pressed his regret for it. There is no disobedience
in that, absolutely none.

Not a word of suggestion of disobedience was ever
made by the Navy Department until after Schley's
request for a court of inquiry, when the department
came to frame the Precept, and then it required the
court to "Report the reasons for the disobedience of
the orders of the Department contained in its despatch
dated May 25, 1898."

The commodore (I. 5), wrote to the depart
ment asking that "Par. No. 5 be modified so
as to omit the department's expression of opinion, and
thus leave the court free to express its own opinion on
that matter"; but the Assistant Secretary of the
Navy (Mr. Hackett) declined the request, saying:
"The Precept treats certain matters as established,
among which is the fact that you disobeyed orders."
But the department further said: "Inasmuch, how
ever, as it is the Department's purpose that the court
shall be absolutely free to report, if such shall be
found to be the case, that you [Schley] did not wil
fully disobey the orders, or that you were justified

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 131

in disobeying them," the two letters would be sent
to the court.

It is a fact that the majority of the court did not
find that the commodore had disobeyed, but merely
expressed the opinion that he "should have promptly
obeyed the Department's order of May 25."

Well, there is room for difference of opinion; but
common sense teaches that "the man on the spot" is
probably the best judge as to what should be done.

After the Harvard's departure the same condition
as to coaling, of the Merrimac's disability, and of
inability, owing to rough seas, to take her in tow,
continued until about 4 P. M. of the 27th, when the
Yale at last got the collier in tow. The squadron
then started to the westward, but after proceeding
about twenty-three knots the sea had so calmed down
that coaling seemed possible. The commodore made
signal to the Texas at 7 o'clock: "If collier is cast off
do you think you could coal to-night?" Texas re
plied: "We can try." Brooklyn at 7.02 replied:
"Try." At 7.20 commodore signaled to Texas: "Go
alongside Merrimac"

The Texas and Marblehead continued all night to
take coal, and up to 1.20 P. M. of the 28th.

The coal problem having been solved, the commo
dore had made up his mind as early at 8.05 A. M. of
the 28th to return to and remain off Santiago de Cuba,
because at that hour he signaled to the Minneapolis
(which vessel had the collier in tow) : "We are
going to hold on here as long as coal lasts." One of
the engines of the Massachusetts had become disabled,
but it was repaired at 12.25; and at 1.20 P. M. the
signal was made to the squadron, "Form column in
regular order, course E.J^N., speed 6 knots."

The squadron proceeded on that course until about
6.30 P. M., when it stopped for the night, with the
works at entrance of Santiago de Cuba in plain sight.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE RETURN TO SANTIAGO

THIS return movement was made by the commodore
entirely of his own motion, without any communica
tion from the Navy Department or Rear Admiral
Sampson, or influence or suggestion from any officer
or man in the squadron.

A strong effort was made by the judge advocate
of the court of inquiry to show otherwise; but the
effort was unsuccessful.

Captain Cook was asked (I. 893) : "Did you have
any conference with the commodore before starting
back for Santiago cle Cuba, with respect to that?"
and he replied: "None whatever. I don't recollect
anything at all, until I knew that the order was given.
I saw him on deck afterwards, and asked him if that
was his intention ? That was all. After he started
for Santiago we had a little talk. He started as soon
as he found that the Texas had enough coal ; and my
impressions — I can only state them as impressions —
are that he said he should go to Santiago, and if he
found it practicable to coal from colliers, there he
should stay; and if he got short of coal he would go
to Gonaives Bay and try there, or elsewhere."

Effort was also made to show by the testimony of
Commander Mason, who had been the executive
officer of the Brooklyn, of Lieutenant-Commander
Sears (then flag lieutenant) and Lieutenant Wells
(flag secretary) that they had exerted some influence
over the commodore towards beginning the coaling
and returning to Santiago, but without success. They
all said that the commodore had acted entirely of his
own motion, without influence from anybody, in all
the movements of those two days.

Harsh criticisms of the so-called "retrograde move-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 133

ment" are utterly unwarranted. It is absolutely im
possible to place one's self in the commodore's place;
to invest one's self with the sense of responsibility
that he then felt; to divest one's self of the after
acquired knowledge that we have, but he did not have ;
to feel the effect of the "serious doubts" in relation
to coal and coaling mentioned by Admiral Sampson
in his Century article (before quoted), that, as he
says, "can only be felt and appreciated by those who
have experienced them in command."

We think that we have already shown "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that there was no purpose on the
commodore's part to disobey any order; that the de
spatch brought by the Harvard on the 2yth was no
order to Schley to return or remain at Santiago de
Cuba, because it was issued on the 25th, before the
retrograde movement was begun, and merely stated
that he or the senior officer off Santiago was expected
to find Cervera; and to "see that he did not escape
without a decisive action."

Both of these things Schley unquestionably did.
He found Cervera, and as to escaping without a de
cisive action — all of Cervera's ships were destroyed;
nearly all his officers and men were killed, drowned,
or captured; the poor old admiral came on board
of our ships clad in a pair of drawers and an under
shirt, without hat to his head or shoes to his feet.
"Decisive action." Could any action have been more
so?

Granting, however, for argument's sake, that there
was a disobedience of orders, the ethics of the situa
tion were settled by the Savior of Mankind, in His
parable of the man who had two sons, to the elder of
whom he said: "Son, go to work to-day in my vine
yard," who answered and said: "I will not," but af
terwards he repented and went; and to the second son
he said : "Son, go work to-day in my vineyard" ; and
the second son said : "I go, sir," and went not.

134 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Even the chief priests and elders, unfriendly as
they were, could see that the first, though nominally
disobedient, so far as expression went, did the will of
his father, and was entitled to praise. But the chief
priests and elders of the Navy Department (includ
ing Rear Admirals Benham and Ramsay) were not
willing to concede the same praise to Schley.

A disobedience of orders from which no evil results
flow is of no consequence whatever, especially where
the alleged disobedience is a mere exercise of judg
ment. A disobedience from which good results flow
is to be commended. Earl Jervis acted upon that
principle with Nelson, after the Battle of St. Vincent,
to be alluded to hereafter.

Neither the Navy Department nor Admiral Samp
son, up to July 10 (a week after the Battle of San
tiago) , wrote or expressed verbally, so far as appears,
a word of criticism of Schley's conduct of the Flying
Squadron ; and there can be no doubt that but for the
fact that when the battle took place Sampson, through
no fault of his own, was unot in it," such criticism
would never have been made. It is a further fact that
neither has ever done so, officially or otherwise, to
Schley to the present time.

President Roosevelt, on Schley's appeal, said:
"Admiral Sampson, after the fight, in an official letter
to the Department, alluded for the first time, to
Admiral Schley's 'reprehensible conduct' six weeks
previously." And there is great force in what the
President adds: "If Admiral Schley was guilty of
reprehensible conduct of a kind that called for such
notice from Admiral Sampson, then Admiral Samp
son ought not to have left him as senior officer on the
blockading squadron on the 3d of July, when he
(Sampson) steamed away, on his proper errand of
communication with General Shafter."

Diagram II shows the whole movement of the
Flying Squadron during these three days, May 26, 27
and 28.

CHAPTER XXXV

SCHLEY DISCOVERS CERVERA^S FLEET IN HARBOR OF
SANTIAGO

DURING the night of the 28th the ships lay off the
harbor, with the Marblehead and Vixen on the flanks
of the battle-ships. On the morning of the 29th the
whole squadron steamed in about six miles towards
the Morro at the mouth of the harbor, and at 5.30
discovered two or three of Cervera's ships lying at
anchor near Smith Cay. The Cristobal Colon was
recognized because of the fact that her military mast
was between her two smoke-stacks.

The chart opposite shows her position as given by
her log-book. The positions of the other vessels are
as given by Lieutenant Jose Miller y Terjiero, of the
Spanish service.

Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, in his volunteered let
ter of February 24, 1899, to the department (Ex.
Doc. D. 175) says: "It is possible that the admiral
saw the Spanish vessels a short time before they were
sighted by the St. Paul [Sigsbee's ship]. I had not
before seen them, or any sign of them." The Colon's
log-book contains this entry: "At 7.30 enemy's
squadron coming from eastward, and steaming in
column past the mouth of the harbor."

Thus the long agony of doubt was ended. Schley
had discovered the enemy; and had them safely
blockaded in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba.

Well might the commodore have exultingly said, as
it is reported he did say, "I have got them now; and
they will never get home."

The St. Paul was at once sent to St. Nicholas Mole,
to cable the good news to the Navy Department, and
to Sampson, by the following despatch.

136 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

UOFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 29, 10 A. M.

"Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colon, In
fanta Maria Teresa, and two torpedo-boat destroyers,
moored inside of Morro behind point. Doubtless the
others are here. I have not sufficient coal. Making
every effort to get coal in. Vixen has blown out man
hole gasket. I have sent boiler-makers on board to
repair. Collier repaired, machinery being put
together. Have about three thousand tons of coal in
collier; but not easy to get aboard here. If there is
no engagement in next two or three days, Sampson's
squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or
Port au Prince. Hasten me despatch vessels for
picket work. The Brooklyn) Iowa, Texas, Massachu
setts, Fixen, and Marblehead compose squadron here.
I am sending St. Paul to communicate with Sampson."

"SCHLEY."

Between the 25th and 29th the department's infor
mation that Cervera's fleet was at Santiago de Cuba
received almost hourly confirmation, and its nervous
anxiety, when on the 28th it received Schley's despatch
of the 2yth (sent by Harvard, via Jamaica), an
nouncing his purpose to return to Key West, was very
natural; and the cables in every direction were kept
hot in frantic efforts to reach him. The department
sent a cable on the 28th as follows ( A. 397) :

"HARVARD, Kingston, Jamaica :

"Following must be delivered to Schley as soon
as possible. Utmost urgency. Unless unsafe for
your squadron, Department wishes you to remain off
Santiago. So cannot you take possession of Guanta-
namo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave,
are authorized to sink collier in mouth of harbor; but
if not so used, and if necessary to you, it would be de
sirable to leave her Nicholas Mole, or vicinity. You

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 137

must not leave the vicinity of Santiago unless it is
unsafe your squadron; or unless Spanish squadron is
not there." "LONG."

The department, in getting up the charge of dis
obedience of orders, evidently confused the two de
spatches of 25th and this one of 28th. It has already
been shown that the word "remain" is not in the de
spatch of 25th. It appears, for the first time, in that
of 28th.

The Harvard did not leave Jamaica until 3.15 P. M.
of 30th, and arrived off Santiago on 3ist at 7 A. M.
This was Schley's first despatch from the depart
ment, and none of the others reached him until later.

Without knowledge of Schley's change of purpose,
or of his return to Santiago, or of the fact that
Schley had discovered Cervera, the department on
the 28th cabled Sampson as follows, viz (A. 398) :

"Schley telegraphs from Santiago de Cuba he must
go to Key West with his squadron for coal, though he
has four thousand tons coal with him in a broken-
down collier. How soon after arrival of Schley at
Key West could you reach Santiago de Cuba with
New York, and Oregon, the Indiana, and some lighter
vessels ; and how long could you blockade there, send
ing your vessels singly to coal from our colliers at
Gonaives Channel, Mole, Haiti, Porto Nipe, Cuba,
or where? Schley has not ascertained whether the
Spanish division is at Santiago de Cuba. All infor
mation seems to show that it is there. "LONG."

"Seems to show." Doubting, still doubting! But
not a word of criticism of Schley's proposed move
ment.

As soon as he received Schley's despatch announc
ing his discovery of the Spanish ships, Sampson, on
29th, sent to Schley the following:

138 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

"Congratulate you on success. Maintain a close
blockade at all hazards, especially at night. Very
little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers. Coal in
open sea, whenever conditions permit. Send a ship
to Guantanamo, with a view of occupying it as a base,
coaling one ship at a time."

Captain French E. Chadwick, the chief of staff,
testified (I. 842) : "I protested [to Sampson]
against his congratulations. He persisted in putting
it that way; and when I asked him why, he said, 'Oh,
I want to encourage him.' '

This picture, which Chadwick volunteered, of the
subordinate "protesting" against his admiral's pro
posed action shows the assumption which that sub
ordinate had accustomed himself to display; but on
this occasion the chief of staff does not appear to have
been uthe dominant mind."

Why shouldn't Sampson have congratulated
Schley? The latter had "discovered Cervera," and
whatever credit belonged to anyone for that service
unquestionably belonged to Schley.

The writer hereof doubted, at the time Captain
Chadwick volunteered that statement to the court,
and still doubts, the correctness of what Sampson was
stated to have said. Sampson was, unfortunately,
so impaired in mind that he could not be brought be
fore the court.

CHAPTER XXXVI

SCHLEY'S PLAN OF BATTLE AND BLOCKADE OF SAN
TIAGO DE CUBA

HAVING found Cervera's fleet in that port, Schley at
once took measures to prevent them from "leaving
without a decisive action."

Accordingly, at 8.50 A. M. (less than two hours
after their discovery) the commanding officers of all
ships were summoned, by signal, on board the flagship
Brooklyn, to a conference with the commodore.

What occurred there is best told by the following
statement of Captain McCalla, of the Marblehead,
which he caused to be entered, immediately after the
conference, in the log-book of that vessel (A. 426) :

"Commodore Schley explained to the commanding
officers that, in case the Spanish ships came out, he
wished to concentrate the batteries of all our ships on
a portion of those of the enemy. This was not ex
plained as a tactical concentration of our whole force
on a part of the enemy, but as a division of our whole
fire on several of the enemy's ships.

"During the time the commanding officer was on
board the flagship Captain Evans asked if it was his
intention to steam at the enemy's ships in case they
should start to come out? Commodore Schley
answered, 'Certainly,' and added words indicative of
his intention to attack them as they came out of the
narrow defile."1

Captain McCalla testified (I. 299) : "The con
ference was with regard to the work of the blockade.
I can only remember one specific thing, and that was
that Captain Evans asked Commodore Schley if the
Spanish ships came out, was he going for them ? He
said: 'Certainly,' and then arranged for a subdivision

1 Italics are mine. — J. P.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

of fire from the ships under his command, on the
Spanish ships, should they come out."
^ Before the Court of Inquiry Rear Admiral
Evans testified, relative to that conference (I.
385) : "Commodore Schley was in the cabin
when we assembled, and there was a general talk
about the Spanish fleet having been located, at last, in
Santiago. I do not recall any special conference. I
do not think it was in the nature of a conference.2 I
do not recall now that the officers were asked to ex
press any opinion.3 I remember having a conversa
tion with Commodore Schley about the effect of
fighting batteries with the ships, in which I told him
of the experience that we had at San Juan; and ex
pressed the opinion to him that it was not worth while
to risk ships for fighting shore batteries alone, as
there was nothing to be gained by it. But in the case
under consideration, as the Spanish ships were present
in the harbor, the conditions were changed; and we
would have to take the risk of fire from the batteries,
in order to get at them."4

"I remember Commodore Schley remarking
further, before we left, that he felt that the country
would hold him responsible; that the ships should
not be risked under the fire of shore batteries until the
Spanish fleet was destroyed."

This was exactly the rule laid down for Sampson's
guidance by the Confidential Circular of April 6, be
fore referred to; and confirmed in Sampson's sailing
order from department, of April 21, 1898.

The extract from Captain McCalla's log-book,
above given, was then read to Evans, who pronounced
it "quite correct."

The foregoing is substantially the same as the

2 This is a mere play upon words. — J. P.

3 That did not deter Evans from so doing, as may be noted from
the sentences immediately following.

4 All this is not mentioned by anyone else who was present.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 141

"Order of Battle" (so-called) afterwards issued by
Admiral Sampson on June 2, to be referred to here
after. It was the natural, obvious, and indeed the
only plan of battle that could be pursued under the
circumstances; and it was pursued on July 3, when
the enemy tried to escape.

If that statement by Schley was not an "Order of
Battle," it would be difficult to say what was. It was
in several respects more explicit than the one — so-
called — given out by Sampson two days later, as will
hereafter be shown.

Having only four ships (besides the Marblehead
and Vixen, which two he was compelled to use as
picket boats at night) Schley kept his fleet moving in
column, backward and forward, before the entrance
to the harbor, at a distance of about four miles from
the Morro, with the picket boats some two miles
further inshore.

His force was thus kept compact, with the ships in
proper supporting distance from one another, and so
well in hand that, if the Spaniards had attempted to
escape, a simple right or left wheel would have en
abled him to pursue to the best immediate advantage.

If he had made the semi-circular disposition after
wards adopted by Admiral Sampson, the distance be
tween his most easterly and westerly ships would have
been nearly, if not quite, ten miles, with the two inter
mediate ships nearly four miles apart. One does not
need a nautical eye to see that this last method of
blockade was out of the question with only four ships.
And in the judgment of the writer, the circular forma
tion made collision between the blockaders not only
possible, but probable. Captain Clark, of the Oregon,
told before the court of a narrow escape from col
lision, owing to smoke, between that ship and the
Texas and Iowa, which occurred during the battle of
July 3. If that danger could come in the daylight,
what might have happened if the darkness of night

H2 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

had been added to the smoke! In the daytime the
vessels were permited to lie about in seeming disorder,
coaling as opportunity permitted.

Captain Cook testified in relation to this blockade
(I. 894) : "I recall that the commodore's general
idea was that the vessels were to be kept full of coal,
and steaming, moving all the time. His idea was to
keep the vessels at night, in column, at distance, mov
ing all the time — because his idea was to get that fleet
to come out. I think he wanted more to have the
fleet come out than to keep it in, and his idea was that,
in moving that way, the squadron was always ready
for action, and he was sure of that fact. So we
steamed in a circle. That is the way he expressed
himself to me."

Commodore Schley's methods in that instance were
much like those of Nelson, pursued by that great
commander in the blockade of the French fleet at
Toulon in 1803-05. Concerning this, Captain Alfred
T. Mahan (our great naval historian) in his admir
able "Life of Nelson" (p. 577), says: uHis [Nel
son's] dispositions were taken rather with a view to
encourage the enemy to come out." "My system,"
Nelson wrote to Admiral Pole, "is the very contrary
to blockading. Every opportunity has been offered
the enemy to put to sea, for it is there we hope to
realize the hopes and expectations of our country."

CHAPTER XXXVII

SAMPSON'S UNOFFICIAL STATEMENT ABOUT SCHLEY'S
BLOCKADE

No official criticism of Schley's blockade of Santiago
de Cuba has ever been made by anyone, so far as ap
pears; certainly none has ever been made public by
the Navy Department. But Admiral Sampson, in his
article printed over his own signature in the April
number of the Century Magazine for the year 1899,
undertook to make such criticism (of course unoffi
cially), saying:

"The log of the Brooklyn, Commodore Schley's
flagship, for the five days from May 26 to June i, in
dicates that, whatever might have been the disad
vantages under which the blockade had been main
tained, it can hardly be described as a close one, of the
sort desired and expected by both the department and
myself.

"During this period it had been the custom to retire
from the coast at night for a distance of twenty-five
miles."

uThe day service had been maintained at a distance
of about six miles off the coast, the ships moving at
very slow speed, in column, first to the eastward and
then to the westward, about four or five hundred
yards apart, or three times the length of a ship, the
total length of column being about a mile and a half,
and the total distance traversed probably about seven
miles."

The whole of that statement is grossly inaccurate,
and the part italicized (by the writer) is absolutely
untrue, as will now be shown.

Admiral Sampson could never have seen the log
book of the Brooklyn, for, if he had, he would have

144 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

known that it indicated nothing of the sort ; but pre
cisely the contrary. Her log-book and those of all
the other ships of the Flying Squadron are printed as
Appendices to the Report of the Court of Inquiry, and
may be consulted if desired; and there is not a word
in any of them about going off twenty-five miles. It
would certainly be in all of them if it had occurred.

On the strength of this assertion in the Century
Magazine (for there had been no such statement
made by anyone else) , the judge advocate put into the
Precept for the court as Art. 8 : "The necessity,
if any, and the advisability of withdrawing at night,
the Flying Squadron from the entrance to Santiago
harbor, to a distance at sea."

He didn't dare to put in the twenty-five-mile state
ment, because he had (or could and should have) ex
amined those log-books; and he knew that the state
ment about withdrawing twenty-five miles at night was
absolutely untrue. If it had been true, we can imagine
the comfort it would have given to Schley's detractors
to be able to show that the commodore had done such
an absolutely foolish thing.

Before the Court of Inquiry, Admiral Higginson
(who had been the captain of the Massachusetts off
Santiago) testified (I. 38) : "We kept our vessels
there in sight of the port, and at night we cruised
up and down in front of the harbor. I think we
cruised nearer during the night.

"The vessels were in column, the flagship leading,
and we would cruise up to the eastward and then
countermarch and cruise to the westward. We kept
going round in an elliptical track. I suppose we went
on perhaps a mile or a mile and a half past the harbor,
and then turned around and went back. They gener
ally turned with a port helm, as nearly as I can re
member.

"The extreme blockading distance was six miles in
daytime, and 'closer in at night.' '

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 145

Q. Was there ever a time when that fleet went off
twenty-five miles at night? Ans. No; I can say per
fectly clearly, that I have no memory that that fleet
ever went off further than six miles at night.

Captain McCalla testified (I. 307) : "To the best
of my recollection, the fleet at night kept closer to
shore than it did during the day. The blockade at
night was maintained four miles off shore, to the
best of my recollection. "

Q. Did you ever go off at night to any distance of
twenty-five miles ? Ans. Never.

Captain McCalla further testified (I. 635) : "I
understood that we [referring to the picket boats]
were always to keep two miles inside of the larger
vessels. I estimated that we were about two miles
from shore at night."

This would make the distance of the larger ships
from shore at night four miles.

The log-book of the Cristobal Colon (Spanish)
contains the entry: "May 29, 4 P. M. to midnight.
American vessels continue to pass by mouth of the
harbor with their searchlights thrown on the coast."
And "May 31, at 9.30 P. M. Six of the enemy's ves
sels passed E. to W., across the mouth of the harbor,
returning at 1 1.30 the other way." So that they were
so close as to make them visible to the Spaniards in the
harbor.

Captain Folger (of the New Orleans) testified (I.
635) : "During the nights of 3Oth and 3ist of May
and ist of June1 the fleet was generally in a more
regular and uniform position at night than it was in
the daytime. It was also somewhat closer, in my
opinion, to the shore at night than it was in the day
time. When we passed the entrance at night we were
nearer than we generally were in the daytime."

The mention of that twenty-five-mile story served

1 This last being after Sampson's arrival.
10

146 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

to make the judge advocate very anxious, for when
the question, "Then the story, by whomsoever told,
that the fleet was in the habit of withdrawing twenty-
five miles at night, is not true?" was put to Captain
McCalla, he viciously objected, and the witness was
not permited to answer. It was a sore subject.

The majority of the court utterly ignored the testi
mony given by Higginson, Folger, and McCalla, be
sides the statements of the log-books, and found that
"the Flying Squadron did not withdraw at night from
the entrance to Santiago harbor to a distance at sea.
The blockade was maintained at an average distance
of about six of seven miles from the harbor entrance
during the day; and probably somewhat nearer dur
ing the night. Two vessels performed picket duty at
night, two miles inside the line of vessels." That
majority was skillful in "damning with faint praise."
There was nothing in the testimony of those gallant
and capable officers that rested on mere "probability."
They stated, not probabilities, but facts.

The majority of the court expressed no opinion as
to the "propriety of Commodore Schley's conduct in
the premises" (that is, in that blockade), as the Pre
cept required them to do. They could not condemn,
without condemning Sampson, because he continued
Schley's disposition for one night; but it was written
that nothing that Schley had done was to be praised.

However, by their finding the court condemned as
untrue in fact the statement made by Admiral Samp
son, over his own signature, in the Century article,
that "it had been the custom of our vessels during that
period to retire from the coast at night to a distance
of twenty-five miles."

It is not intended to make any reflection upon Ad
miral Sampson's personal veracity in this matter.
Somebody in whom he trusted deliberately deceived
him by false statements of the contents of those log
books, But, considering the delicate relations then

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 147

existing between him and Schley, he should have been
scrupulously careful not to accept and publish state
ments of others as the basis for such a charge. He
never could have seen the log-books himself. If he
had, he would never have made such a statement.

Admiral Dewey's opinion, expressed in his Special
Findings of the Court, that "the blockade of Santiago
de Cuba was effective," is supported by all the evi
dence given before the court, and will stand, the
opinion of the critics to the contrary notwithstanding.

On May 30 the New Orleans (cruiser), Captain
Folger, and the collier Sterling arrived, and became
part of the squadron. Captain Folger brought an
order from Sampson to Schley, about sinking the col
lier in the entrance to the harbor, which will be con
sidered hereafter.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE RECONNAISSANCE OF MAY 31, 1898

THE Spanish cruiser Cristobal Colon had remained in
the position (near Smith Cay) in the harbor which
she had occupied when first discovered on the morning
of May 29.

On May 31 (the Brooklyn being engaged in coal
ing) , shortly before noon, Commodore Schley shifted
his flag to the Massachusetts, Captain Higginson.
When he arrived on board the last named vessel and
communicated his purpose, it was suggested that he
defer the movement he was about to make until after
dinner by the crew. Accordingly, shortly after din
ner, accompanied by the Iowa and New Orleans, he
steamed in towards the entrance of the harbor to make
a reconnaisance.

Before discussing this movement, it will be well to
go back a little.

The Confidential Circular (before referred to)
sent to Captain Sampson (as he was then) by the
Navy Department on April 6, 1898 (A. 171), con
tained the following:

"Second — The department does not wish the ves
sels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the
batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other
strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more for
midable Spanish vessels should take refuge within
those harbors. Even in that case the department
would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment
of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired
object, viz. : the destruction of the enemy's vessels
without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war
to the fire of the land batteries. The lack of docking

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 149

facilities makes it particularly desirable that our ves
sels should not be crippled before the capture or de
struction of Spain's most formidable vessels."

Admiral Schley testified that Sampson, during their
interview at Key West, on May 18, either showed, or
told him of, this circular.

On May 26 the department again wrote Sampson:
"While the department does not wish a bombardment
of forts protected by heavy cannon, it is within your
discretion to destroy light batteries which may protect
vessels you may desire to attack, if you can do so
without exposure to heavy guns." It is claimed, by
Schley's critics, that the last quoted direction was a
modification of Circular No. 6 ; but it is, on the con
trary, a renewed caution against attacking "forts pro
tected by heavy cannon" and "exposure to heavy
guns," and a permission to attack "light batteries"
only. Schley never heard of, much less saw, that so-
called modification of Circular No. 6 until several
days after June i, 1898; so that, so far as he is con
cerned, it "cuts no ice," in the matter.

Commenting on the above extract from Circular
No. 6, the then Secretary of the Navy, in his book
published two or three years later, at page 232, says:
"It would have been the height of recklessness to
have risked the destruction of one or more of our
battle-ships while the Spanish fleet was afloat intact."

Very good sense that, in the mind of the Ex-Sec
retary; but in the same mind it was very bad sense
when applied by Schley to the situation that con
fronted him.

The purpose of the reconnaissance was so clearly
stated by Flag-Lieutenant Sears (I. 972) that his
statement is here given in full :

"The commodore said to me that he wanted to
know what the batteries were; that he was going to
take the ships available, not coaling, and that he had
fixed upon a distance to pass in front of the fortifica-

150 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

tions, which was seven thousand yards. We went on
board the Massachusetts, and the commodore, on ar
riving on the quarterdeck, directed Captain Higgin-
son to make his preparations to pass in front of their
fire at once."

Incidentally, it may here be stated that, as the
commodore greeted Captain Higginson, he jocularly
said that he "hoped to pot," or "expected to pot," or
"might pot," the Colon. This joke would not have
been mentioned here but for the fact that it was
made use of to build an insinuation against the com
modore.

Continuing the narrative of Lieutenant Sears:
"Captain Higginson, I think, after consulting with his
executive officer, Mr. Schroeder, demurred, and asked
the commodore to wait until after the men had din
ner. The commodore assented, and during the wait
I consulted with the navigator (Lieutenant Potts),
by instructions from the commodore, as to ascertain
that distance. We looked up the height of the Morro.
He made a table of sextant angles, and made his
preparations to make that reconnaissance at seven
thousand yards. After the men's dinner the squadron
was formed with the Massachusetts leading, the New
Orleans following, and the Iowa third. The naviga
tor told Captain Higginson about the time we were
[supposed to be] on the range; and the course was
changed from the oblique course we had been pursuing
to a course parallel with the coast; and the moment
the Colon opened [to view], one of the thirteen-inch
guns of the forward turret of the Massachusetts
opened fire. We passed up and back once, and then
stopped for a time, before turning out. The com
modore seemed to be satisfied with the reconnaissance,
and gave the order to resume the blockade."

The forts at the entrance and on the hills, and the
Colon inside, returned the fire of the ships.

There was some conflict of testimony about the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 151

ranges at which the firing was done. The commo
dore had ordered a range of 7,000 yards, and
it was the duty of the navigator (Lieutenant
Templin M. Potts) to inform his captain as soon as
that range had been reached. It was not the busi
ness of the commodore to do anything more than give
the order to the captain.

Captain Evans, of the Iowa, testified: "I saw the
first shot from the Massachusetts fall a long way
short, and, supposing that she was firing at 7,000
yards, I gave the range of my guns at 8,000 yards;
and, when I saw the shots falling short, increased it to
9,000 yards, as we stood across the harbor."

Captain Folger, of the New Orleans, testified:
"We fired at ranges varying from 8,000 to 11,000
yards."

From all this it would seem that Lieutenant Potts
was not a very successful range-finder on that occa
sion. He testified that the first shot was fired at 7,800
yards, and "after that he was unable to determine any
accurate range with the sextant, because it was com
pletely covered with powder-smoke." In his testi
mony the gallant lieutenant condemned to a "state of
innocuous desuetude" and general worthlessness the
stadimeter, the sextant, and all the other instruments
which were given to our navy for use in determining
ranges.

It is possible that on the occasion in question he
was so busy watching the personal conduct of the com
modore that he could not give proper attention to his
duty with reference to the range. However, the
lieutenant, very shortly after he had given his testi
mony before the Court of Inquiry, was able to find
the exact range of the second best position in the gift
of the Navy Department for officers of his rank, viz.,
that of naval attache to our embassy at Berlin, where
he luxuriated for about two and one-half years.

Inasmuch as the ranges for the other two ships were

152 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

set by the Massachusetts, Mr. Potts got them all
wrong.

Several shots from the enemy passed over and be
yond our ships, but none of them struck, and the log
book of the Colon states that "an enemy's shell ex
ploded near the stern, making dents in the side, and
cracking some bowls in the round-house."

As usual, the Iowa did this damage to the enemy.
At least Captain Evans claimed that that shell was
from his ship.

Commodore Schley on the next day made official
report of this reconnaissance to the Navy Department
and Admiral Sampson, and has never had a word of
official criticism from either concerning it. Later non-
official criticism has been made in the light of later
acquired knowledge of the defenses of Santiago
entrance, and is manifestly unfair. What was then
known and believed is plainly the only proper cri
terion.

It is said that the Colon could and should then have
been destroyed. That is matter of opinion, and it is
not probable that if her safety had been seriously
menaced she would have remained in an exposed posi
tion, but would have shifted to a safer one, as she did
next day.

All she had to do was to let go the hawsers from
her stern to the shore, and the tide in a very few
minutes would have carried her behind Smith Cay into
perfect safety.

CHAPTER XXXIX

ADMIRAL SAMPSON ARRIVES AT SANTIAGO DE CUBA
AND ASSUMES COMMAND

IT has been stated, ante, that when the department re
ceived Schley's announcement of his purposed return
to Key West, but before Schley had discovered Cer-
vera, it cabled Sampson to know when he could go to
Santiago. He left Key West on the 3Oth, with the
Oregon, Mayflower, and Porter, and arrived off
Santiago de Cuba on the morning of June i, at 6
o'clock. Commodore Schley, of course, went immedi
ately on board the flagship New York to make report
of the situation to Admiral Sampson.

Schley testified (I. 1383) : uOn the first of June
Admiral Sampson arrived. He brought with him the
New York, Oregon, and Mayflower, and steamed
down to the westward, a little inside of the line of
blockade.

"He found us, at that time, just making the turn,
and I went on board. He was very cordial, very glad
to see me ; and I explained to him the situation, and
the facts of the reconnaissance. He seemed very glad
to find out the situation that was there, and / pointed
out the Colon to him in the entrance"

At this point in Admiral Schley's narrative the
judge advocate endeavored to stop him, and the fol
lowing colloquy occurred :

The Judge Advocate: If the Court please, I
think we are getting beyond the Court's construction
of the scope of the Precept.

Admiral Dewey: As I understand, he is turning
the command over to the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral Schley : Yes, sir.

Admiral Dewey: I want to hear it: I should like
to hear that part.

154 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

That little colloquy illustrates the general spirit of
unfairness displayed by Judge Advocate Lemly
throughout the whole inquiry. As soon as anything
was suggested that might bear upon Sampson, his ob
jections became fervent.

Admiral Schley, continuing his narrative, said: "I
handed him a number of despatches, explained to him
the situation and told him the form of blockade I had
maintained, and I heard no word of complaint from
him. In fact, in view of the telegram of congratu
lation, I supposed, naturally, that everything was ap
proved. Admiral Sampson's relations and mine were
always very cordial. I never had any difference with
him.

"So I turned over the command to him, and my
squadron was not broken up until the io,th or 2Oth of
June. I was still in command of the Flying Squadron,
and it composed the left half of the blockading line
at Santiago."

The log-book of the New York for June i, 1898,
contains the following entries :

"At 6.30 A. M. stopped; the harbor entrance bear
ing north. Commodore Schley came on board. In
passing the harbor entrance sighted two Spanish men-
of-war inside; one of the Fiscaya class close to the
westward, and the Cristobal Colon opposite the mouth
of the harbor, bearing north.

"The fort fired a shell alongshore; and the
Cristobol Colon fired one toward us, which fell short
about two miles."

The log-book of the Colon for June i (A. 433),
contains the following: "4 to 8 A. M. — The enemy's
squadron in sight, passing the mouth of the harbor
from E. to W., afterwards from W. to E. at a great
distance, and beyond the reach of our guns. They
appear to have been reinforced by several vessels."

In the report that was prepared by Admiral Samp
son's staff for his signature on August 3, 1898, the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 155

admiral says (A. 479) : "June i. Immediately on
arrival I steamed down past the entrance to Santiago
harbor, and saw, lying close within, the Cristobal
Colon, and one of the Biscay a class."

So that there can be no doubt whatever that these
two Spanish vessels were distinctly visible to Admiral
Sampson.

In his report last mentioned he adds to what is
quoted above: "Both of these got up steam and
moved up into the harbor out of sight."

The time at which they so "got up steam and
moved up into the harbor out of sight" is not given,
but the inference manifestly intended to be drawn
from the statement is that they did so at once.

But the log-book of the Colon contains the state
ment: "At 10.35 got under way, and passed at slow
speed between Punta Gorda and the bow of the
Oquendo. Directed our course into the inner harbor,
until 1 1.30 A. M., at which time we came to anchor."

So that, from all the above, it appears that Ad
miral Sampson, as soon as he arrived, at 6 A. M. June
i, saw the Colon and another of the Spanish fleet
lying in plain sight just inside the entrance; that the
Colon fired a shot at the flagship, which was a direct
challenge to battle, as much as to say, "Come on, you
Yankees, if you dare" ; that Schley pointed her out to
Sampson, as they sat on the New York's quarterdeck ;
that the Colon remained in plain sight for four hours
and a half before she "got under way and moved up
into the harbor," instead of going at once, as Samp
son's report suggests.

The ships of the Flying Squadron, and the Oregon,
were as ready for battle that morning as they proved
to be on the morning of July 3. Sampson had a better
chance to destroy the Colon than Schley had had the
previous day, because he had a larger force, and had
the benefit of the knowledge of the shore batteries
Schley had gained by the reconnaissance. But he

156 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

seems to have been of the same mind as Schley relative
to risking his ships by attacking unknown batteries,
even for the chance of destroying the Colon, and not
withstanding the fact that he had just been challenged
by her shot fired at his passing flagship.

The majority of the Court of Inquiry gave its
opinion that Schley "should have endeavored to cap
ture or destroy the Spanish vessels at anchor near the
entrance of Santiago harbor on May 29 and 30; and
did not do his utmost with the force under his com
mand, to capture or destroy the Colon and other ves
sels of the enemy which he attacked on May 31."

Part of that opinion is an absurdity on its face.
Only in one way could either of those vessels have
been captured, and that was by going into the harbor
of Santiago after them, and nobody can pretend to
believe that it was Schley's duty to attempt that.

Sampson for the whole month of June and part of
July, with the full approval of the Navy Department,
refused the importunate demands made by General
Shafter, backed by the War Department, that he
should make an effort to force an entrance into that
harbor. The Spanish vessels were in there. The fact
that they could not be seen was of no consequence.

As for the effort to destroy the Spaniards on the
3ist, there is room for diversify of opinion as to what
more, if anything, Schley should have attempted to
do to that end. It was a matter of judgment, and the
"man on the spot," upon whom the burden of respon
sibility rested, was the best judge.

If that criticism of the court is just, as applied to
Schley, it applies to Sampson with greater force. The
fair-minded man will be unable to see any reason why
one should be faulted and not the other.

The truth is that neither should be so faulted, and
so far as the Navy Department or Sampson is con
cerned, neither ever wrote a word of criticism.
Sampson could not criticise Schley for the obvious

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 157

reason that he had done just what Schley had done,
and the Navy Department could not criticise the one
without criticising the other.

I said that the Navy Department had never done
so. I beg Mr. John D. Long's pardon. When on
February 6, 1899, he sent the report of Captains
Evans and Taylor to the Senate to be considered in
secret session (as he expected), he for the first time
did undertake to fault Schley about it ; but the Senate
regarded the whole report as "a blow in the dark."

CHAPTER XL

THE SINKING OF COLLIERS IN THE ENTRANCE TO
SANTIAGO BAY

THE sinking of colliers in the narrow entrance to the
harbor of Santiago de Cuba, to keep Cervera's fleet in,
seems early to have commended itself to the Navy De
partment, and also to Admiral Sampson. Both had
forgotten our experience in the Civil War, when it
was attempted to close up the main ship channel into
the harbor of Charleston (the scene of Sampson's
only war service of a few months), by sinking a fleet
of old New Bedford whalers, laden with stone ; which
attempt was a complete failure. The commerce of
that port now enters through the same channel, draw
ing more water than was ever possible before the stone
fleet was sunk.

In its despatch to Schley of the 28th, the depart
ment used the language: "If you must leave, are
authorized to sink collier in mouth of harbor."

As has been stated, the New Orleans (Captain
Folger) arrived off Santiago de Cuba on the 3Oth of
May. She came under the following orders :

"U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,
ST. NICHOLAS CHANNEL, May 27, 1898.. .

"SlR: You will proceed to Santiago de Cuba, to
convoy the collier Sterling. You will communicate
with Commodore Schley, and direct him to remain on
the blockade of Santiago de Cuba at all hazards, as
suming that the Spanish vessels are now in that port.
Tell him that I desire that he should use the collier
Sterling to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part
leading into this harbor. Inform him that I believe

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 159

that it would be perfectly practicable to steam this
vessel into position, and then drop all her anchors,
allow her to swing across the channel ; then sink her,
either by opening the valves or whatever means may
be best in his judgment. Inform Commodore Schley
that the details of this plan are left to his judgment.
In the meantime he must exercise the utmost care that
none of the vessels already in the port are allowed to
escape; and say to the Commodore that I have the
utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a
successful conclusion, and earnestly wish him good
luck. "W. T. SAMPSON,

"Rear Admiral, etc., etc.
"Commandingg Officer,
UU. S. S. NEW ORLEANS/'

Schley does not seem to have entered very enthusi
astically into this project. We have already seen that,
following the example of the illustrious Nelson, he
was of the opinion that the thing most to be desired
was to persuade the enemy to come out, and not to
keep him in.

Schley, in his testimony given before the Court of
Inquiry (I. 1382), said: "Captain Folger brought
with him a direction to sink the collier Sterling in the
fairway leading into Santiago. He brought also some
verbal explanations of the admiral's desire to leave
the matter to me. We had, of course, quite a lot of
conversation in relation to that matter, and I did not
understand, at that time, in view of the despatches
from the Secretary, that it was intended that that
passage should be blocked, unless we were obliged to
abandon the port. In that event I rather suspected,
rather thought, that that was the intention."

No neater explanation of a failure to obey an order
than that has been made since Nelson, at the battle of
Copenhagen, with his blind eye to the glass, re
marked: "I can't see the signal to discontinue the

160 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

action." And we can almost hear Schley mentally re
peat Nelson's further remark: "Damn the order;
I'll not obey it."

At any rate, Schley didn't obey the order; and
didn't sink the collier.

CHAPTER XLI

THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC"

As soon as Sampson arrived, on June i, as he says
(A. 481):

"Preparations were at once made for sinking the
collier Merrimac in the entrance. The night of this
day was particularly favorable for the enterprise — the
tide, the setting of the moon — all conjoining most
favorably.

uln consulting Naval Constructor Hobson as to
the best means of sinking the vessel, he showed him
self so interested, worked to such a degree in the
preparation, and entreated so strongly to be allowed
to take the ship in, that I consented, though several
hundred officers and men had volunteered; and many
begged hard to be allowed to go."

The crew finally selected were as follows : Naval
Constructor Richmond P. Hobson ; D. Montague,
chief master-at-arms of the New York; Mate, Third
Class, Charette, of the New York; Coxswain R.
Clausen, of the New York; Machinist, First Class, G.
F. Phillips, of the Merrimac; Coxswain O. Deignan,
of the Merrimac; and Coxswain J. F. Murphy, of
the Iowa.

In the Century article (pp. 898-9), Sampson gives
the details of the organization and attempted execu
tion of the project. They are, in some respects, very
dramatic. One can imagine the intensity of the in
terview, on board the flagship, between the admiral
and Captain Miller, of the Merrimac y when Miller
learned that it was proposed to deprive him of the
only chance for distinction that was likely to come to
him; and to supplant him by a young naval con
structor who was not even a line officer.

n

1 62 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

The admiral tells us of Miller's most urgent pro
test against being deprived of his command, even
questioning the admiral's authority uto remove him
from a ship where he had been placed in command by
the Navy Department; and of his positive refusal to
give up his command to anyone in the circumstances."
But the admiral does not tell of the entreaties, the
arguments, almost (if not quite) the prayers of Mil
ler, that this, his one possible opportunity, should not
be taken from him.

The admiral was inexorable. He says: "He
(Miller) had my sympathy, but I succeeded in con
vincing him that, in the short time, it would be most
unwise to make a change in the plans."

Hobson, in his Century article for December, 1898,
"The Sinking of the Merrimac" puts this matter
rather differently, and says (p. 247) :

"Captain Miller had given directions to the officers
and crew of the Merrimac to prepare to leave the
ship, and was himself leaving to go and see the ad
miral."

Again (p. 278) : "Captain Miller, who expected
to go in, had spoken in high terms of his quartermas
ter and coxswain, young Deignan.

Hobson and Miller then both went on board the
flagship, and saw the admiral. We have not Miller's
statement of this interview, but he returned to his
ship, evidently believing that he would not be deprived
of his command.

Hobson continues the narrative (p. 278) : "When
I was about to leave, the admiral sent for me and said
that Captain Miller claimed it as his right to go in
with the Merrimac; and that he did not see how his
claim could be disregarded. My answer was, in
effect, that I should be happy to serve in any capacity,
but that it must be evident to all that Captain Miller
could not be anything but a passenger, even if nomin
ally in command." And he used other arguments

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 163

(all this in Miller's absence), and finally Hobson said
to Sampson that "when the situation was clear to the
captain, he surely would not insist on going, however
great his desire, as he could not really consider it right,
or his duty to go."

The result of his argument was that "the admiral
concluded that he would not allow the captain to go."

Hobson then followed Miller back to the Merri-
mac, and the preparations were continued far into the
night. Hobson continues the story :

"Captain Miller was sitting on the bridge ; Deignan
was at the wheel. The ship replied well to the
helm, and the gallant captain told about her steering
and maneuvering qualities and other virtues, still ex
pecting to go in with his ship. He had let me take
complete charge, and I had not thought it necessary
to tell him of the admiral's final decision."

When Admiral Sampson came on board, at nearly
three o'clock in the morning, to make a final inspec
tion, Miller was still in ignorance of his coming fate,
and remained on the bridge, managing his ship, and
still expecting to go. Hobson continues the story
(p. 283):

"On coming on board, the admiral had gone up
on the bridge,1 and as he spoke to Captain Miller I
heard an exclamation of disappointment from the lat
ter. The admiral was the last to leave. Though
bitterly disappointed, the generous captain came up to
say a kind word, and wish us success."

Miller, from Hobson's account, does not seem to
have been very strongly "convinced" by Admiral
Sampson. He obeyed his order to leave the ship, —
he had to do that, — but as for the admiral's "sym
pathy," he will no doubt to his dying day regard his
treatment as the refinement of cruelty.

Hobson, in that Century article, relates an incident

1 As a matter of fact, this occurred just before the admiral was
about to leave.

1 64 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

that is not mentioned in any of Admiral Sampson's
reports, but it will bear repeating here. After a
day of anxious preparation and a sleepless night, Hob-
son started in to sink the Merrimac; but he was re
called by command of the admiral, and early in the
morning he brought the Merrimac out near the flag
ship New York. He and his crew were worn out by
want of sleep and want of food (which in the excite
ment of the hour had been forgotten), and the re
action of the excitement had set in.

Hobson, in the January number of the Century
(p. 427) continues the narrative: "We stood over
near the New York, and stopped. The executive
officer hailed, and said a relief crew would soon be
over; but asked if we would take care of her until the
relief crew could get breakfast. We replied that we
would take care of her as long as might be desired.
The headway having carried us forward some dis
tance, we put the helm a-starboard to steer across and
circle back, when suddenly the New York started up,
her propeller race began to seethe, and she shot by us
at full speed. We looked ahead, and on the horizon,
to the southwest, discovered a craft standing towards
the harbor. Soon the smoke began to pour out of
the New York's funnels. The craft stopped, turned
about, and took to her heels, and a chase was on.
The quarry was fleet, and had ten or twelve miles
start. She drew hull down, and then disappeared.
The New York stood straight on, and gradually dis
appeared; and for a long time the two columns of
smoke told of hot pursuit. The Porter stood out at
full speed to join in, and we saw her cut over the hori
zon.

"There would be hours of chase; and hours for
return.

"A scorching sun rose high in a cloudless sky; not
a breath of air stirred ; a blinding glare came out of a

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 165

glassy sea ; and a day of waiting lay before us. We
remained there until late in the afternoon."

What a picture is thus presented !

Without food, until late in the forenoon (when by
accident Ensign Gherardi learned of their condition
and brought relief), and without relief, those brave
fellows were left, and compelled to wait, until the
commander-in-chief in his flagship could get back
from chasing a possible prize again out of sight
and signal distance of the rest of the fleet. It was
nearly two o'clock in the afternoon when she got back.

That story is but a repetition of the one already
given of the chase of the Spanish steamer Pedro on
April 22, and it seems almost incredible. But the
following extracts from the log-book of the New York
completely verify the statements of Hobson.

"June 2. Midnight to 4 A. M. — The commander-
in-chief visited the Merrimac from 2.25 until 3.20,
when he returned with working party from the vessel,
and Commander J. M. Miller.

"4 to 8 A. M. — About 4.30 the Merrimac started in
for harbor under command of Naval Constructor R.
P. Hobson, U. S. N., to be sunk in the channel; but
was recalled by order of the admiral.

"At 5.55 sighted smoke of a steamer hull down to
the Wd. Set out in pursuit, added another boiler,
and increased speed to 17 knots.

"8 A. M. to Merid. — Standing to Wd in chase of a
steamer, until 8.50, when we overhauled her. At
9.20 set course; and stood back to rejoin squadron,
until 1.50; when stopped near the Brooklyn."

The log-book also shows that the New York
steamed thirty-one miles from her station before she
caught up with the steamer.

A further and very significant extract from that log
book on that same day is the following: "At 2.30
p. M. Commodore Schley came on board from the
Brooklyn, and was received with the honor due his

1 66 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

rank, viz., full guard of marines, and band." This
is the officer whose conduct up to that time Admiral
Sampson subsequently characterized as reprehensible !
What absurdity !

Suppose that, while the commander-in-chief was off
chasing that possible prize, with Schley left as "senior
officer on the spot," present in front of Santiago, Cer-
vera had taken the opportunity to try and escape ; and
that his destruction had been as complete as it was on
July 3, whose would and ought to have been the glory
and credit of that destruction? There can only be
one name given in reply, and it would not be "Samp

son."

Cervera had a better chance to escape that morning
than he ever had again, for by some misunderstanding
the Oregon went off chasing, during the absence of
the New York, and the Marblehead was sent after
her, and they did not get back until 7 P. M.

The Merrimac went in on the night of June 2, and
was sunk, but the attempt to block the channel was
a complete failure.

The writer may be pardoned the expression of his
opinion that it was very fortunate for the country that
Captain Miller was not allowed to take the ship in.
Miller was a good sailor, while Hobson, brave and
able as he otherwise undoubtedly was, was not a
sailor, and was therefore lacking in that readiness of
resource in emergencies that comes only from long
experience in handling vessels as a sailor.

So long as everything went according to the pre
arranged plan, all was well; but when the plan was
broken there was none of the ability that was needed
to adapt itself to the unexpected situation. The
writer does not mean to disparage Hobson, in assert
ing the belief that Captain Miller would probably
have made more successful the effort to block the chan
nel.

The sinking of the Merrimac has furnished occa-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 167

sion for the thanks of Congress to Hobson and his
men who undertook it. Their bravery was not ex
ceptional. When volunteers were called for, pretty
much all the young officers and men of the fleet re
sponded; but there should be and is no wish or pur
pose to detract in the least from the praise their
bravery has rightfully received.

But one cannot help the feeling that it was a new
proceedure on the part of an admiral in the Navy of
the United States, to put any obstruction whatever
between his ships and the ships of an enemy.

Imagine, if one can, Admiral Farragut, when the
progress of his wooden ships up the Mississippi be
low New Orleans was obstructed by Forts St. Philip
and Jackson, by two or three ironclads, by fire-ships
and rafts, by booms and chains, all commanded by
officers who had been brought up in the navy of the
United States, deliberately sinking a vessel in the nar
row channel left open by the enemy, and through
which only he could get at that enemy. Or at Mobile
endeavoring to block up the narrow channel for the
same purpose. Imagine, if possible, Admiral Dewey
endeavoring to block up the entrance to Manila Bay,
to keep Montojo's fleet in, and necessarily, to keep
his own fleet out. Imagine Nelson endeavoring to
block up the channel leading into Toulon, to keep the
French fleet in there ! Imagine any of these things !
Impossible !

If Admiral Sampson could thereby have persuaded
Admiral Cervera to come out, he should have sent
a message to him that he would do as the French
colonel did, when he exclaimed to the English regi
ment confronting his own in a battle: "Aprez vous,
Messieurs!'' And have allowed Cervera to fire the
first broadside.

The attempt to obstruct the channel, fortunately,
proved utterly futile. Its best success was its com
plete failure.

CHAPTER XLII

SAMPSON'S ORDER OF BLOCKADE

SCHLEY'S method of blockade was continued by Samp
son until the night of June 2. On that day he issued
the following (A. 481), which was styled,

"ORDER OF BATTLE

"The fleet off Santiago will be organized during
operations against that port, and the Spanish squad
ron, as follows:

"First Squadron (under the personal command of
the commander-in-chief), New York, Iowa, Oregon,
New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.

"Second Squadron (Commodore Schley), Brook
lyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.

"Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by
the commander-in-chief. The vessels will blockade
Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about six miles
from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at
night, the lighter vessels well inside.

"The first squadron will blockade on the east side
of the port; and the second squadron on the west
side.

"If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close,
and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink
his vessels, or force them to run ashore in the channel.

"It is not considered that the shore batteries are of
sufficient power to do any material injury to battle
ships.

"In smooth water, the vessels will coal on station.
If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the
blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle
thus left vacant."

[To accompany onior of battle, dated June 2, 1893.]

_ IH

'— U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK, IST RATE,

Off Santiago de Cuba, June 2, 1898.

DIAGRAM III. — "Accompanying this Order of Blockade was a
diagram showing the position each vessel was expected to
maintain."

PACING 168

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 169

Accompanying this Order of Blockade was a dia
gram showing the position each vessel was expected
to maintain. It is here reproduced, Diagram III op
posite. The ships were placed in a semicircle, the
radius of which was six nautical miles, with the
Morro, at the entrance of the harbor as the center.

The distance in a straight line between the May
flower, on the extreme right, and the Fixen, on the
extreme left, was nearly twelve miles; and between
Commodore Schley's flagship Brooklyn and Admiral
Sampson's flagship New York was nearly seven miles.

These distances evidently were found embarrassing,
in the matter of reading signals, because, on June 15
(A. 514) the admiral directed:

"If, at any time, the flagship makes a signal which
is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once
approach the flagship, or repeating vessel, to a point
where she can read the signal."

The blockade was thenceforth maintained in this
order, but the distance from the Morro was subse
quently decreased in daytime, to about four miles.
No hungry cats could have watched a hole out of
which a rat was expected to come with a more sleep
less and persistent vigilance than was displayed by that
whole blockading force during the whole period be
fore the day of the battle on July 3, and when the
Spaniards did come out, "There they come" ! was an
almost simultaneous cry from the lookouts of those
ships whose station permitted them to look into the
entrance. It was expected that this should be, and it
was most efficiently done; and there should be noth
ing but praise about it.

Commodore Schley's flagship Brooklyn faithfully
performed her share of the arduous duty. Others of
the ships went to Guantanamo to coal, but she re
mained and did her coaling on her blockading station,
ever alert and ready for any emergency, as the event
proved.

i;o SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

The only order that Admiral Sampson ever gave,
after his assumption of command at Santiago de
Cuba, which bears any semblance of an "Order of
Battle" with Cervera's fleet, is found in the last pre
ceding order. It is here reprinted in parallel columns
with the order, or direction, that had been given by
Admiral Schley to his captains on the morning of
May 29, within two hours after Cervera had been
discovered.

COMMODORE SCHLEY'S
ORDER

ADMRAL SAMPSON'S
ORDER.

gage as soon as possible; and
endeavor to sink his vessels, or
force them ashore in the channel.

Commodore Schley explained If the enemy tries to escape,
to the commanding officers that, the ships must close, and en-
in case the Spanish ships came
out, he wished to concentrate
the batteries of all our ships on
a portion of those of the enemy.
This was not explained as a
tactical concentration of our
whole force on a part of the
enemy, but as a division of our
whole fire on several of the
enemy's ships.

During the time that the com
manding officer was on board
the flagship, Captain Evans
asked Commodore Schley if it was
his intention to steam at the;
enemy's ships in case they came
out?

Commodore Schley answered
"Certainly," and added words
indicative of his intention to
attack them as they came out
of the narrow defile.

The above statement of Schley's "order," "direc
tions," or "views" (whichever it may be called), is
the statement made by Captain McCalla in the log
book of his vessel (the Marblehead) within a few
hours after Commodore Schley gave them. They are
in accord with what the commodore had said to his
officers while at Hampton Roads, in April previous.

If Sampson had summoned his officers on board of

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 171

his flagship, on the morning of June i, and there dis
cussed with and explained to them his views, instead
of writing that order, he would have done what Nel
son did before the battles of the Nile and Trafalgar;
and just what Schley did on the morning of the 29th,
as soon as he had discovered Cervera.

Aside from verbal difference, the orders of both
Schley and Sampson were: "If the enemy tries to
escape, we will attack and try to sink them in the nar
row channel." That was the natural, and in fact the
only general direction that could have been given, for
neither officer expected that our ships would do any
thing else than attack the enemy as soon as he ap
peared; and the giving of any formal order was
about as necessary as it would have been to say to the
cats watching the rat-hole: "Now, if that rat at
tempts to escape, you must go for him." That was
cat nature; and it is the nature and education of the
officers of the navy of the United States to "go" for
the enemy as soon as he appears.

Nelson's rule of battle: "No captain can go very
far wrong if he puts his ship alongside that of an
enemy," has always been the rule of our navy.

CHAPTER XLIII

EVENTS DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE

THE month of June was not entirely uneventful. On
the 6th a part of the fleet bombarded the batteries at
the entrance to the harbor of Santiago de Cuba for
about two hours and a half. The admiral then
cabled the Navy Department (A. 485): "Have
silenced the works quickly, without injury of any kind.
If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be
ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration
demands immediate army movements. If delayed,
city will be defended more strongly, by guns taken
from the fleet."

General Shafter had on that very day embarked
his army at Tampa Bay, Fla.

Ex-Secretary of War General Alger, in his book,
"The Spanish-American War," at page 72, says:
"During all night of the yth the transports moved
down the bay towards the gulf, on their way to Santi
ago; but just at that moment the phantom Spanish
fleet revealed itself a second time."

The first revelation of this phantom had been dur
ing the month of April, or first part of May, when the
whole New England coast got frantic with apprehen
sion about it; and the then Secretary of the Navy
(being from Massachusetts) sent Schley's two
cruisers (Minneapolis, and Columbia) away from the
Flying Squadron to "search for and descry" the im
aginary foe.

Shafter's transports were stopped until the "phan
tom" could be laid, but finally (as General Alger
facetiously says, "When the navy thought it safe to
furnish an escort") sailed on June 14 for the seat of
war, and, in due time, with the assistance of the boats

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 173

and steam launches of the navy, and under the man
agement of Captain Caspar F. Goodrich of the navy,
the troops were all safely landed (except two or three
soldiers drowned) at Daiquiri and Siboney, two small
villages to the east of the entrance of Santiago Bay.

The ten thousand men (it was fifteen thousand)
were there, but the city was not "ours," for several
periods of forty-eight hours, because then began a
series of misunderstandings and bickerings between
Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, of which the
least said the better. The views and strictures of each
upon the other are set forth on pages 86-89 of Gen
eral Alger's book.

To sum it up, Shafter insisted that Sampson should
force the fleet into the harbor of Santiago, which
Sampson, with full approbation of the Navy Depart
ment, refused to try to do. He declined to risk his
battle-ships, and insisted that Shafter should first
capture the Morro and other batteries at the entrance,
so that the channel might be cleared of torpedoes,
mines, and other obstructions before attempting an
entrance.

The fact is, however undeniable, that no effort
whatever was made by Admiral Sampson to destroy
the connections between the Spanish submarine mines
and the electrical batteries by which they were to be
exploded; or to do anything whatever looking to
wards the forcing an entrance.

The admiral had had one very frightful experience
with torpedoes, during the Civil War, when the
Patapsco was blown up under him at Charleston har
bor in 1865. He was wise in his wariness to subject
his battle-ships to any such risk.

CHAPTER XLIV

THE OCCUPATION OF GUANTANAMO

ON June 10 a battalion of marines that had been
organized at, and sent from New York, under com
mand of Colonel Robert W. Huntington, arrived;
and under convoy of the Marblehead (Captain Mc-
Calla) and Suwanee (Lieutenant Delahanty) and
other small vessels, landed at Guantanamo, and took
possession of that excellent harbor. The marines were
attacked vigorously, on several occasions, by Spanish
troops, but, with their accustomed gallantry, the ma
rines maintained their hold, and thenceforth that im
portant harbor was occupied by our vessels as a coal
ing station.1

On June 12, during a very severe attack by the
Spaniards on the camp, Assistant Surgeon John Blair
Gibbs, of the navy, was killed.

On June 15 the Texas (Captain John W. Philip),
Marblehead, and Suwanee attacked and demolished
the forts guarding the channel at the head of the bay.
In this attack the Texas and Marblehead each picked
up, by their propeller screws, a submarine contact
mine, containing about one hundred pounds of gun-
cotton. The screws whirled them over and over sev
eral times before they were discovered. Philip
naively says : "Owing to Divine care, neither of them
exploded." A better explanation is that the incident
demonstrated that in a short time after they were put
down the contact mines became useless from cor
rosion, and were little to be feared. These had been
planted only about a month.2

On June 16 another bombardment of the batteries

1 Under our treaty with Cuba it has become permanently such station.

2 One of them can be seen at the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 175

at the entrance to Santiago took place. The admiral
reported that "the batteries were quickly silenced, and
after firing with great deliberation for some forty
minutes, the fleet returned to its blockading position,
without any shot from the batteries following this
movement. This fact undoubtedly shows the effi
ciency of our fire."

There can be no doubt of the efficiency of our fire,
but the failure of the Spaniards to return it is probably
better explained by lack of ammunition to waste.
These bombardments were an undoubtedly useless
waste of our ammunition and straining of our guns.

The weary blockade continued all through the
month of June, and until July 3.

CHAPTER XLV

THE BRAVERY OF LIEUTENANT VICTOR BLUE, UNITED
STATES NAVY

THERE is a personal incident of that blockade that de
serves especial mention, and certainly deserves especial
commendation.

Up to June 10 Admiral Sampson seems to have
continued uncertain as to whether all of Cervera's
ships were in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and so
he directed Lieutenant Commander Delehanty (com
manding the Suwanee) to "communicate with the in
surgent forces and obtain, through them, positive in
formation concerning the presence of the enemy's
ships in the harbor."

Delehanty subsequently reported (A. 444) that, in
order to furnish absolutely reliable information, he
had sent Lieutenant Victor Blue, that he might pro
ceed to the hills north of Santiago, to make the de
sired observations. Lieutenant Blue returned and re
ported, on June 13, how, "after going through the
Spanish lines, he proceeded to a hill top, from which
he had an almost unobstructed view of the entire bay,"
and "in the bay he counted five large vessels that were
unmistakably men-of-war. Three of these answered
the descriptions of Cervera's vessels." "I was fully
satisfied from my own knowledge that the vessels I
saw were those of Cervera's squadron."

Not satisfied with this, Sampson again gave verbal
directions to Delehanty "to procure further informa
tion of the location of the enemy's vessels in the har
bor," and a second time Lieutenant Blue was sent
within the Spanish lines for the purpose.

Delehanty, in forwarding Lieutenant Blue's report
of this second venture, says (A. 445) : "While it is

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 177

a simple and modest statement of his trip and its re
sults, I beg to invite your attention to the perilous na
ture of the trip, and the prompt and satisfactory man
ner in which it was performed. This is the second
time that Lieutenant Blue has successfully undertaken
this hazardous duty, and while he has only done that
which is expected of every officer, a due recognition of
such valuable services is a great stimulation to the best
efforts of officers and men."

Admiral Sampson, on June 27, wrote the depart
ment:

"I desire to recommend to your consideration the
excellent conduct of Lieutenant Victor Blue, U. S. N.,
who has, on two occasions, at my request, undertaken
to locate the positions of the Spanish fleet in the har
bor of Santiago de Cuba. To accomplish this, it has
been necessary to travel on one occasion over a dis
tance of seventy-five miles, and on another a distance
of sixty miles, mostly through territory occupied by
the intrenchments of the Spanish Army.

"I think the manner in which he has accomplished
these tasks is deserving of promotion, and I respect
fully recommend that he be advanced ten numbers."

On these occasions Lieutenant Blue "wore his uni
form and side arms."

It was chivalrous for the lieutenant to do this, but if
he had been captured within the Spanish lines it is to
be feared that uhis uniform and side arms" would not
have saved him from the fate of Major Andre or
Nathan Hale.

"Promoted ten numbers!" He should have been
promoted immediately to be lieutenant commander,
for if he had been taken by the Spaniards, his reward
would probably have been the erection, a hundred
years after his death, of a statue to his memory, such
as that which stands in the City Hall Park, at New
York, to the memory of Nathan Hale ; for we may be

12

178 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

quite sure that those Spaniards would have been
prompt to take his life away.

More than a year later the gallant lieutenant was
advanced for those deeds — five numbers only. The
statute authorizes such promotions for "extraordinary
heroism." If that was not "extraordinary heroism,"
it would be difficult to say what falls within that defi
nition.

CHAPTER XLVI

THE MORNING OF JULY 3, 1898, SAMPSON, IN HIS
FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK," LEAVES FOR SIBONEY

THE signal-book of the flagship New York records on
the morning of July 3 that the following signals were
made:

"8.15 A. M. — New York to Indiana. To Captain
Taylor. The admiral wishes to know if you will join
him this morning, in going to see General Shafter?

"8.37 A. M. — Indiana to New York. Captain
Chadwick. Work aboard ship previously going on
prevents me from going with you to-day. Taylor."

The log-book of the New York contains the follow
ing entries :

"At 8.50 A. M. started at full speed under three
boilers, for Altares (Siboney), accompanied by the
Hist and Ericsson, after making signal to the rest of
the fleet: 'Disregard movements of the commander-
in-chief.' '

The signal-book shows that this last signal was
made at 9.10, so that the flagship had been on her
way towards Siboney for twenty minutes, at full
speed, when it was made.

It is a very significant and important fact that
neither Admiral Sampson nor Captain French E.
Chadwick, the chief of staff and captain of the flag
ship New York, has ever, in the official reports of the
events of that day, made any mention of those signals,
particularly of the last and most important one, while
other unimportant signals are mentioned.

The failure to mention it was not accidental in both.
Captain Chadwick probably prepared both reports.
Why, except upon the principle of "Suppressio veri,"
mention of it should have been omitted passes com
mon understanding.

i8o SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

The log-book continues: " Mustered at quarters at
9.30. The admiral, captain, and assistant chief of
staff prepared to land at Altares, to visit the head
quarters of the army."

In his article printed in the Century Magazine,
Captain Chadwick says : "The admiral, having made
the engagement to consult that morning with Gen
eral Shafter, and expecting to ride to headquarters on
landing, had put on leggings and spurs (as had also
the assistant chief of staff, Lieutenant Staunton), and
did not remove them until after the battle ; a costume
that would have surprised the uninformed observer."

Certainly it would; but it as certainly shows the
completeness of the preparation that had been made
for landing.

The story of the succeeding events of that day has
been told, not only in the cold official reports, but in
the pages of the magazines and in the newspapers by
their respective correspondents who were on board
the ships in the action.

These correspondents shared all the dangers of the
occasion, and displayed a bravery unexcelled by that
of any of the trained and disciplined officers and
crews of the respective ships that took part in the bat
tle that ensued on that day.

Mr. George E. Graham, who was on board the
Brooklyn, and Mr. Thomas E. Dieuwaide, who was
on board the Texas, deserve particular mention and
commendation.

The stories told by these gentlemen, at the time,
were carefully vised by the commanding officers of the
respective ships, and are therefore as reliable in every
particular as the official statements. There was no
occasion for controversy, at the time they wrote, about
what they had seen in the fight.

Mr. Dieuwaide, constrained no doubt by his rela
tions to the New York Sun, afterwards undertook,
before the Court of Inquiry, to qualify somewhat

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 181

some of the statements that he had made on the very
day of the battle, while its roar had hardly ceased;
but such qualifications, made more than three years
afterwards, are of little worth, especially in view of
the fact that Mr. Dieuwade had become involved in
the Hodgson dispute, to be treated of hereafter.

CHAPTER XLVII

THE BATTE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898.

IN the Century Magazine for May, 1899, the captains
of all the fighting ships that took part in the battle
(except Clark of the Oregon] have told the story of
the battle as they saw it. Lieutenant Eberle, of the
Oregon, told his vessel's story. Most graphic de
scriptions they all are.

Admiral Sampson also gave his version in the April
number, 1899, of the same magazine.

Admiral Schley, up to the time when he told it
before the Court of Inquiry, had resisted all induce
ments (and they were many, pecuniary and other) to
tell that story, except in his official reports.

It is now purposed to give it in his own words, as
testified to before that court, and to supplement it by
the testimony of other officers of the Brooklyn, of the
Oregon and the Vixen, given under oath before that
court.

Before doing this, however, the following from the
book of the Spanish Lieutenant Jose Muller y Ter-
jiero (reprinted by the Navy Department), will not
fail to be interesting. The lieutenant says :

"If I were to live a thousand years, and a thousand
centuries, never would I forget that 3d day of July,
1898 ; nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it.

"The day dawned beautifully — one of those sum
mer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the
leaves of the trees; when not the smallest cloud is
visible in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills
the atmosphere, which was wonderfully transparent,
so that the horizon could be observed at a great dis
tance.

"Nothing was to be noticed among the ships of our

REAR-ADMIRAL PASCUAL CERVERA

FACING l82

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 183

fleet, motionless on the waters of the bay, which re
flected their hulls, though inverted, with wonderful
accuracy. They looked as though they ought not to
leave an anchoring place where they could remain in
such perfect safety.

"To my mind the going out from Santiago harbor
under the circumstances Cervera did, and as confirmed
by the commanders of the ships of the fleet, constitutes
the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to
go out to certain death, not only with fearlessness, but
with a clear head; for a man must be completely
master of himself in order to command a ship with
out becoming excited or losing his head."

CHAPTER XLVIII

ADMIRAL SCHLEY'S STORY OF THE BATTLE1

SUNDAY, July 3, broke a perfectly beautiful day. The
skies were flecked with white clouds, and the breeze
continued a little longer, off the land that morning,
than usual; light, it is true.

After I had gotten my breakfast, I came up to take
a survey of the situation ; to look about, and see what
could be observed with the glasses.

We were lying, at that time, possibly three miles, or
a little bit over, from the land; and I remember to
have wondered very much why they had permitted us
to lie so close to the shore — for we were constantly in
range — and it was a matter of constant inquiry and
discussion, on board the ship, why the batteries did
not fire on us.

At a quarter of nine o'clock my orderly reported to
me that a signal had been made from the flagship
(New York) to "Disregard movements of com-
mander-in-chief," and that she had gone eastward.

I looked over the ground and situation. I did not,
of course, know where she had gone.

I sat under an awning that we usually had put into
position each day as the sun rose, in order that the
officers might collect there. I think we also had one
forward for the men.

After having gone below for a little while, I came
back on deck, with my glasses; and while I was sit
ting in this position, abaft on a hatchway, I heard a
call from the forward bridge :

"Tell the commodore that the fleet are coming
out."2

1As told to the Court of Inquiry, I. 1336 et seq.
2 Throughout the course of Schley's own story the italics are all
mine. — J. P.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 185

That was some time after the men had been called
to quarters; how many minutes I do not now re
member; but in the vicinity of 9.35, according to our
time.

The ship was at that moment lying with her head in
toward the land, in the direction of Cabanas; which
was a little cove to the westward; one of the marking
points which we used in maintaining our position.

I looked over the starboard side and saw the enemy
coming out of the entrance; and, realizing that there
was very little time, I looked eastward to see the order
of the ships, as they were arranged. I saw the Texas,
apparently, I should say, a point or more abaft the
starboard beam. My recollection now, as nearly as
I can state it, is that the ship's head (Brooklyn], was
pretty nearly north-northwest, having drifted around.
The Texas appeared to me to be heading on some one
of the easterly courses. I saw just ahead of her, to
the left, the Iowa. She was, of course, to the east
ward of the Texas. The Oregon was to the eastward
of the Iowa; the Indiana was to the eastward of that
position; and the Gloucester was lying in under the
land, I thought, in the neighborhood of Aguadores.

The New York (Admiral Sampson's flagship) was
out of sight, and out of signal distance, with glasses.

I looked at that, in order to determine what my
position in the action was to be. Of course, if she had
not been, I should not have given, or made, a signal!

In the meantime I had gone forward to a little plat
form that I had had constructed around the conning
tower, as my position in battle ; — the position I would
take in order to be very close in with Captain Cook.
I had only been there a moment or two when Cook
joined me.

In the meantime Mr. Hodgson (the navigator),
who was on the bridge sang out something to the cap
tain about being "connected up," and all ready; and
he (Hodgson) said to me about the same time:

i86 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

"Commodore, they are coming right at us." "Well,"
I said, "go right for them."3

The helm was put a-port; the ship was started
ahead; at first at, perhaps, half-speed; I don't recol
lect that. She took her way very quickly; and when
we headed around, of course I said to Captain Cook,
"Go ahead, full speed," and hoisted the signal "Clear
ship for action." We generally made that signal,
because there was around the quarterdeck and fore
castle of those ships a little temporary railing, com
posed generally of oars and rope, to keep the people
from getting overboard ; and generally an awning of
some sort or other.

That signal was followed up by, "Close up," or
"Close action."

The Brooklyn, as well as the other vessels of the
squadron, charged immediately in to the entrance, in
accordance with the original plan of sinking them in
the entrance, or driving them ashore there.

We continued directly for the head of the enemy's
column, the idea uppermost in my mind being that, if
we could arrest them long enough for the battle-ships
to close in and knock them to pieces, that would be our
best point of attack.

We continued on this course, porting and starboard
ing, to meet the movement of the leading ship, which
I assumed to be the flagship, from a flag at her mast
head; and I suppose that, from the start, as nearly as
I can recall, we were ten to twelve minutes turning;
first with port helm, and then advancing directly to
wards the enemy. I saw the ships to the eastward and
westward (of the entrance) closing in.

I said to Captain Cook: "Close action," or "Close
up" has been hoisted; and it means to keep about a

3 Mr. Hodgson confirmed this statement, and testified (I. 571):
"I told him (the commodore) that they were evidently making
for us; and he said, 'Well, go for them.' I rang full speed, and
put the helm a-port."

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thousand yards away, so as to be out of their effective
torpedo range."

"Much will depend upon this ship this day."

Captain Cook was standing close alongside of me.
He said : "Yes, we will soon be within the cross-fire
of these ships." I said: "Yes." We had advanced
and were firing.

The first gun, I think, was fired (from the port for
ward turret) by Lieutenant Simpson, almost directly
over the forecastle of the ship. I saw the leading
[Spanish] ship, which apparently had started with
the intention of ramming, take a most decided sheer
to the westward, leaving a gap between her and the
ship following, which subsequently proved to be the
Fiscaya. We were standing in the direction of the
Viscaya, when she also, if she had been minded to
ram, seemed to have given up the intention; and
turned also to the westward, following the direction
of the leading ship.

It then became apparent, as we were steering on
diametrically opposite courses, that the original plan
had failed; and that the Spanish fleet in order, and
apparently at distance,4 had succeeded in passing the
battle-ship line.

The new feature of the fight became immediately
apparent, the first having failed.

The disposition was to be made then that was to
control the subsequent battle.

THE LOOP (SO-CALLED) is MADE

Immediately Cook gave the order to port the helm.
I did not. I should have done it in a second. I saw
the ship's head swinging very rapidly, and I asked
him if the helm was hard-a-port. He replied that it
was either "a-port," or "hard-a-port"; I think he
said "hard-a-port." (Diagram IV shows situations
at the time.)

*This means about four hundred yards apart. — J. P.

i88 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

I have never seen a ship turn more rapidly than
she did; and her turn was absolutely continuous;
there was no easing of her helm.

I never saw the starboard side of the Texas at all.
I only saw her port side, and she never approached
any position that was within six hundred yards of the
Brooklyn. She was so distant that she never entered
my head as a menace or danger. We passed com
pletely around the circle.

The last range [of the Spanish ships] was noo
yards, and a feature of the nearness of that ship which
has impressed itself on my mind, and will never be
forgotten, was that I could see, with the naked eye,
men running from her turret to her superstructure
deck ; and I observed the daylight between their legs,
as they ran. It was the second ship upon which I saw
this. We turned immediately about, and I was for a
long time under the impression that our starboard en
gine was backed; but I found out subsequently that
it was not.

During the turn Mr. Hodgson (the navigator)
very properly made some allusion to look out, per
haps, for the Texas; I do not recollect what it was ;
but there was never any colloquy of any character
between Mr. Hodgson and myself. First, he was too
good an officer to have transgressed one of the
plainest duties of an officer at that time ; and, second,
if he had undertaken it, I would not have permitted it
for a second. As I say, that is fiction. There was no
colloquy.

Before we turned, the leading [Spanish] ship was
abeam, or a little abaft the beam. When we had
turned about she was ahead of us, — that is, on the
starboard bow, — and all four of the Spanish ships and
the fort were firing at the same time. I looked over
and saw the forts firing. From that moment, the next
ten or fifteen minutes was the most furious part of the
entire combat. I remember very distinctly seeing,

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 189

from time to time, as my attention was attracted for
the moment, the jets of water ahead and astern; and
over and short; and the roar of the projectiles was
one of the things that can be heard once in a lifetime,
and never forgotten.

It appeared to me, at that moment, that all four of
those ships were at work on the Brooklyn; and up to
that moment, up to the moment of turning, so far as
we could perceive, there was not the slightest evidence
that they had been even injured.5

The thought passed through my mind that after all
our precautions and waiting, those fellows would get
away.

At that moment I felt, and I think I remarked to
Captain Cook, that we were alone; and would per
haps have the most of that fight upon ourselves, be
cause I did not know then that the battle-ships could
possibly keep up with their speed ; but I said to him :
"We must stay with this crowd." I had no idea we
would escape. I thought, of course, that if they could
have shot as well as we did, they certainly would
have gotten us.

When we had turned around, when we had got
completely turned around, and on a westerly course, —
the Spanish ships appeared to have been broken up a
little, although still in some semblance of forma
tion, — just at that moment I saw the Oregon breaking
through the cloud-envelope. She broke through on
to the starboard quarter of the [Brooklyn] flagship.
I had hoisted the signals of "Close up" and "Follow
the flag," believing that a new disposition was neces
sary; and that signal was replied to, and I saw it re
peated to our other ships.

Captain Clark knew very well that it was not in-

8 This same idea impressed itself upon Captain Clark's mind, who
said (I. 1335) • "The Oregon ran between the Iowa and Texas, and
soon after we sighted the four Spanish ships ahead, apparently
uninjured at the time."

igo SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

tended for him, because he was "following the flag,"
so he repeated it to the other ships.

In a very few minutes after the Oregon broke
through the cloud of smoke — she was, at that time,
perhaps four hundred or five hundred yards distant,
not much farther — the Brooklyn and Oregon were a
sheet of flame. I never saw such a fire; and never
realized what rapid gun firing really meant before,
because both ships were, at that time, a sheet of flame;
and in a very few minutes after that I saw that the
leading [Spanish] ship was very badly hurt, for she
lagged astern. I saw the smoke coming out of her
hatches, and the fact that impressed itself upon me
was that the columns were going almost straight into
the air.

I said to Captain Cook, who was constantly at my
side, and always in my confidence: "We have got
one. Keep the boys below informed of all the move
ments. They can't see; and they want to know";
and he did throughout the action. Every few mo
ments messages were sent below to the men ; and they
were answered oftentimes with cheers that we could
hear through the ventilators.

It appeared a very short interval after that that I
saw a second one on fire, which proved later to be the
Oquendo. She had evidently suffered very severely,
and she started, of course, immediately inshore, leav
ing the Vis cay a and the Colon. The Vis cay a imme
diately took a leading position on the bow, and I
thought for a while that perhaps she would outfoot
us. The Colon worked inshore, and from the drop
ping out of those two ships, until the Fiscaya turned
inward, was a period of perhaps thirty minutes, dur
ing which she was abreast of the Brooklyn and
Oregon.

I looked to the eastward just before these ships
turned in, and I got occasional glimpses of the Indiana
and Gloucester. I could not see very well, for the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 191

smoke, what they were doing; though I knew that
they were doing admirable work. I felt that the mo
ment those vessels ran on the beach the command
ing officers of our ships who could not keep up the
pace with the leaders would take care of the prisoners,
and save them from the insurgents as well as from the
fire that had been started by our gun fire.

I should say that, as nearly as I can remember the
time, about thirty minutes elapsed from the time of
the turning in, or wounding of those two vessels, until
the Viscaya followed their example.

The Viscaya was a little forward of the beam of
the Brooklyn, and I do not think over about 2300 or
2400 yards distant, at any time.

She was in most excellent target range, and I re
member, on the way out, inquiring from a man in the
top [one of the marines] who was under this heavy
fire of the two Spanish ships; and he reported that
he did not see any of our shots hitting the water; and
so I imagined that he meant they were striking the
ships.

CHAPTER XLIX

THE TRAGIC DEATH OF YEOMAN GEORGE H. ELLIS

YEOMAN ELLIS was the only man killed in the battle,
and Schley, continuing the narrative, said:

On the trip outward, after the turn, I was very
anxious about the ranges, because I did not want the
Viscaya and the Colon to get out of good fighting
range.

Ellis, who was an expert man with the stadimeter,
constantly kept the stadimeter on those vessels ; and,
knowing exactly their heights, he reported to me that
they were maintaining the same range. I thought,
however, that my eye was a little bit more sensitive,
and I said to him, "No, they are evidently gaining."
He went from me a second time, and that was the last
I saw of him.

In performing this magnificent duty, he lost his
life.

I don't think he was distant from where I was
standing over eight or ten feet. His brains and blood
were thrown over a great many people, and some of it
reached me. He immediately fell to the deck, of
course, and it was a shocking sight, to men who had
never seen such things. Lieutenant McCauley and
Doctor Du Valin were standing between me and the
tower, and they picked up the body and carried it to
the side. I just happened to see them through this
opening, and called out to them, "No, don't throw
that body overboard." I thought that one who had
fallen so gallantly deserved to be buried like a Chris
tian, and his body was laid under the lee of the for
ward turret, covered with a blanket, and kept there
until the battle was over.1

1 Lieutenant Ryan gave the following account of Ellis' death.
"Ellis was forward of the forward turret, perhaps about three

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 193

He was buried at Guantanamo.

Just before the Fiscaya turned to run ashore she
put her helm a-starboard, apparently starting out for
the Brooklyn or the Oregon, I don't know which. At
that moment she evidently got a severe wound, for I
saw quite an explosion under her port bow. In a
moment afterwards she put her helm hard-a-port,
turning inshore, with smoke coming from all of her
hatches, and I thought she was going to capsize, as
she had such a tremendous list to port.

At that moment I saw a shell strike her,2 which ap
peared to me to rake her fore and aft, and I thought
she would sink in deep water. So I told the signal
officer to signal to the Texas to look out for her peo
ple, and save them.

The Texas was, however, too far astern to receive
the message, and I made the remark at the time,
"Well, Philip is always sensible; he needs no instruc
tions about such things."

In the tremendous part of the fight to the eastward,
all of the signal halyards of my ship were cut, with, I
think, probably one exception. One of the speed cones,
that we had hoisted to indicate speed, was cut, and
came very near striking me on the bridge. It came
down in front of me and went overboard.

After the Fiscaya had turned in, on fire, her colors
down, the Colon had edged inshore, and appeared to

feet, taking ranges; and, while he had the stadimeter in his hand,
a shell, from what I thought was the Colon, struck him in the face
and took his head off instantly. Blood spouted out of his neck, and
went over all the people about there. We attempted first to drop
his body overboard, on account of the blood that was around the
deck, but the commodore said not to throw him overboard, and
he could be buried on shore."

2 Concerning this shell, Schley was too modest to claim that it
was from his own ship, but Lieutenant Harlow (I. 1330) says: "I
have a very good reason for believing that the projectiles which set
on fire the Viscaya, and compelled her to turn inshore, came entirely
from the Brooklyn; and that there was, at that time, no other ship
within range of the Viscaya"

13

194 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

be following the contour of the coast. I thought at
the time that, looking astern, and seeing what had
happened to her consorts, she was looking for the best
place she could find in order to end the matter at once.

But from Asseraderos, which is a point some fifteen
or sixteen miles west of the harbor of Santiago, to the
Rio Tarquino, is about thirty miles perhaps; and I
saw she was out of range. So I made the signal to
"cease firing," and told Captain Cook to let his men
come out of the turrets into the cooler air and get
something to eat; and to hurry up his men from
below.

I think I went into the tower myself at that time,
and sang out to the men below that we had got all
hands of them [the Spaniards] except one; and I
thought they could be relied upon to catch that other
vessel. I heard a good deal of merriment and rejoic
ing.

I went back to the bridge, and soon realized that
they were doing their best. There was a jingle to the
rails and a vibration of the vessel, but I perceived, at
that time, that the motions of the ship were very slug
gish. It developed that one of the after compart
ments was filled with water, which we thought at the
time was due to the fact that we had received some
injury below the water line.

The ship's speed, of course, came up with some
rapidity. I think the Fiscaya had run ashore some
where in the neighborhood of eleven o'clock, and
towards twelve it became very apparent that we were
gaining on the chase. I said to Captain Cook several
times during the action, that it would be a good idea
to edge in a little closer, so that we could finish those
fellows quicker. He replied that we had them in
most excellent range, and that the guns were doing
most admirable work.3

3 Captain Cook confirmed this statement (I. 991) saying: "He
[the commodore] spoke to me a number of times, asking me if I

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 195

We were pointing at that time for Tarquino
Point — not Cape Cruz. It was Tarquino Point, a
point extending to the southwest.

My idea was that, in steering that course, if this
ship [Brooklyn] kept up her speed, the Colon would
be obliged to come out; and at that time I said to
Cook, "I would get up a lot of extra ammunition, so
that when we come to close quarters it will be a very
few minutes to knock her out."

As we were going out, of course there were various
signals between the Oregon and myself, some of a
pleasant character and some official.

I gave the order (which Captain Clark has testified
he did not receive) to open fire with her thirteen-inch
guns.4

However, we continued to advance, — the Oregon
and the Brooklyn. I do not think the Oregon was
ever farther astern than eight hundred yards, and at
times she worked up on our quarter. We continued
in this position until about 12.50 P. M., when we
realized that we were within range of the vessel, and
we tried the thirteen-inch and eight-inch guns on her.
Several of the shots fell short, but I recollect that a
shot from one of the Oregon's thirteen inch guns
passed entirely over the Colon; and one from the
Brooklyn's eight-inch guns passed over her. I saw
with my own eyes the jet of water beyond, and
thought it had gone through her; but it appears that
it did not strike her.

couldn't edge in on them a little. I recollect this distinctly, be
cause I was anxious to keep a straight course, believing that we
gained by that; and we had them at all times under our range.
We had their range ocmpletely; and our shots were landing, while
theirs were not."

4 Concerning this Lieutenant McCauley, who was Schley's signal
officer, testified (I. 1038) : "We ceased firing shortly after the
Viscaya went ashore, and the Brooklyn chased the Colon; and
finally, when the signal was made to the Oregon to try the thirteen
inch guns — or whatever the words were, — I don't remember the
words exactly, — she opened fire with her thirteen inch guns. I re
member that signal distinctly, and particularly (I. 1041) ; because
I made it myself."

CHAPTER L

THE "COLON" HAULS DOWN HER FLAG

SCHLEY continues the story: At that time the Colon
being directly under the fire of the two ships (Brook
lyn and Oregon), there was no question, apparently,
in the mind of her captain that it would be fatal to
continue the attempt to escape; and I think he did
exactly right. The sacrifice of life would have been
unnecessary. So at 1.15 he fired a gun to leeward,
and hauled down his flag, and ran in on to the bar at
Rio Tarquino.

I signaled at once that the enemy had surrendered,
and gave the order to cease firing.

At the time she hauled her colors down I do not
think she was over four miles from us. We were then
running in the neighborhood of fifteen knots.

We hauled up and immediately passed into a posi
tion, I should say, of one thousand yards from the
Colon; and I should say that we arrived in the vi
cinity of the Colon certainly at 1.30 o'clock p. M.

When this surrender took place I naturally felt in
terested in the vessels that were following. I was
then on the bridge, and with glasses saw three vessels
astern. I could see the masts of two, but only the
smoke of the third one.

We lowered out boat, and Captain Cook went on
board the Colon.

He asked me, "What were the terms of sur
render?" I replied, "Unconditional. Those are
matters that the commander-in-chief must arrange.
We can only receive unconditional surrender."1

1The captain of the Colon seems to have had peculiar ideas of
his duty as one who has surrendered. It goes without saying that
when an enemy hauls down his flag and fires a gun to leeward, it

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 197

"About 2.23 the New York came up. We had dis
tinguished her. I made signals to her, and one of the
signals I made she was quite half an hour in answer
ing. When she came up I also made signal to her
that it "was a glorious day for our country " to which
the reply was: "Report your casualties."

As soon as I could, I went on board the flagship to
pay my respects to Admiral Sampson. In the mean
time Captain Cook, who had been detained some little
time on board the Colon, started back to make his
report, and went on board the flagship to make his re
port to Admiral Sampson ; and did so. When he re
turned to the Brooklyn I took the boat and went on
board the flagship myself.

There I reported to the admiral substantially what
had occurred, narrating the features of the battle in
a hurried way. After making this statement to the
commander-in-chief, a group of the officers who were
standing on the opposite side came up to me and asked
me about the details of the battle, everybody, of
course, being interested in them; and I rehearsed
them again, in a hurried way.2

means that his ship belongs to the victor; and the defeated party
has no right to injure or destroy or imperil her. And yet the
Spanish captain had, after surrendering, run his vessel ashore, opened
her sea-cocks in such a manner as to fill her with water, and had
caused all the breech-blocks of her guns to be broken off and thrown
overboard, so as entirely to disable her battery.

J The Battle of Santiago was then over, and a complete victory
won, and with total destruction of the Spanish fleet had been secured
with Schley as the "senior officer on the spot."

CHAPTER LI

THE "BROOKLYN" is SENT TO FIGHT A NEW FOE

SCHLEY'S story then continues as follows: At that
time Chaplain Royce, of the New York, came up to
me and said: "Commodore, your work is not over
yet. The Resolute has just arrived. Captain Eaton
reports that there is a Spanish battle-ship on the coast,
and the admiral wishes to see you."

I went over, and there I found Captain Clark in
the presence of the commander-in-chief. I made
some suggestion to the commander-in-chief about
hoisting the flag on the Colon, and said to him that,
if he had not come, I was prepared to have a force
of fifty or sixty men mechanics and marines on board,
to avoid anything like "monkeying with her."

He stated to me that he wished me to take the
Oregon and go eastward to meet this ship.

I must say that I felt some little delight as soon as
he said that, because I thought that, after the ad
mirable work of the squadron on that day, and the
part the Brooklyn and Oregon had had in it, there
was not anything that carried the Spanish colors that
we should have hesitated to meet.1

1 Captain Clark gave the following statement of this episode (I.
1336):

"It was reported by Captain Eaton of the Resolute that a Spanish
battle-ship had arrived off Santiago, and I think he said he had
been pursued by her. He was positive he had seen a Spanish battle
ship.

"The admiral did not seem to be much impressed by that; he
seemed incredulous. I remarked that it must be Camara's fleet, but
that they had arrived too late. The admiral did not dissent; he
did not say anything to that. Presently he said: 'Well, Clark, you
will have to go after that ship !'

"Believing, as I did, that there really was a Spanish ship there,
I said: 'Well, Admiral, in war we want to overpower the enemy,
if possible. Why should not the Brooklyn go along? He turned,
and said, 'Certainly; Schley, you go also!'

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 199

I immediately went on board my ship, stopping on
the way to get the chaplain of the Texas, in order to
bury the man who had been killed.

I made signal to the Oregon to "Follow the flag,"
and started eastward at pretty high speed. After I
had gone some little time I saw that the Oregon did
not follow. After I had gotten about an hour
away, — perhaps a little less, — I saw, coming from the
eastward, what proved to be the Vixen, with the flag-
lieutenant [Staunton] on board. He came up along
side of the Brooklyn, hailed me, and said that the
smoke that I saw on the eastern horizon was that of
the Pelayo; that he had gone close enough to distin
guish her, and make out her colors; and that he was
sure it was the Pelayo. I told him to go west and
inform the commander-in-chief, and that the Brooklyn
would go east and meet the Pelayo.

As we approached what was supposed to be the
Pelayo I must confess that I was a good deal con
fused in attempting to distinguish her two colors."2

"Then, feeling that I had perhaps assumed too much in speak
ing, and suggesting that a commodore also accompany me, I turned
to the commodore, and said: 'Commodore, we have knocked out
several vessels this morning; and we can knock out another, can't
we?'

"He [Schley] said, 'Certainly we Can; come on.' And started
over the side. I started for my boat too — I think on the other side of
the vessel.

"What I was impressed with was his cheerful, cheery manner of
approving of my having mentioned his going; that, as a senior,
he had no feeling against me for suggesting it; but was approving,
rather, and cheerful in his manner."

To the ordinary mind, the question will suggest itself:
Why didn't Admiral Sampson himself go in his flag-ship N&w
York to meet the new foe?

He had not been able to take any part in the battle, and one
would think that he would have hailed with delight the approach
of the new enemy, and gone promptly east with the Oregon, to
meet her, leaving to Schley the duty of taking care of his prize, the
Colon. But, no ; he preferred the Caring for the prize, and sent
Schley to fight the new enemy.

2 The Spanish flag consisting of horizontal stripes, red, yellow, and
red; and the Austrian, red, white, and red.

200 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

She had flags at both mastheads, and that only
impressed me with the idea that she was cleared for
action and in battle array.

We kept our battery trained upon the ship, and had
reached a position about eighteen hundred yards from
her, and I had just given Captain Cook the order to
ustand by" [to fire]. Perceiving, however, that we
were a little too close inshore to maneuver, and that
our starboard battery was almost entirely disabled, I
ported the helm to get a little more room, and to en
gage her on the port side, the battery of which was
almost complete and entire. As I ported the helm she
did the same, and that only convinced me that she was
looking for us, as we were looking for her. In a few
moments my signal officer, Mr. McCauley, said to me :
"She is making a signal." It was towards dusk, and
she had turned her searchlight upon her flags, in order
to call our attention to them, and that signal was in
terpreted by the code to mean that she was an
Austrian.

Of course we immediately trained our guns off of
her, passed under her stern, and stopped. Her com
manding officer came on board. She proved to be the
Infanta Maria Teresa, of the Austrian navy, the sec
ond ship of that name that we had encountered that
day.

When the Colon surrendered, the battle, of course,
ended, and there were no other operations. The
commander-in-chief signaled to me that he would re-
main and transfer the crew from the Colon to the
vessels there, and I went on to the eastward, feeling
that, under the circumstances, the proper position for
the second in command would be off Santiago. To
that place I went, reaching the position of the squad
ron off the harbor somewhere near midnight.

At ten or half past, in passing down the coast, just
when we were abreast of the F is cay a, an explosion of

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 201

one of her magazines occurred. We all said, as we
passed, "Well, that is the final salute."

As I approached the Indiana, of course all on
board of her were very anxious to know what had
become of the Colon. I announced her surrender, and
there was great cheering.

CHAPTER LII

SCHLEY MEETS ADMIRAL CERVERA NO CHEERS

ALLOWED

SCHLEY continues: As I passed on, Captain Evans
(of the Iowa) hailed me, and said that Admiral
Cervera was on board, and would like very much to
see me.

I went over to see him, and found him on the after
part of the ship. But before approaching him I di
rected that there should be no cheering, as I did not
think it proper to exult over a foe who had fought
and behaved so gallantly, and that we ought to omit
that, — which was done.1

I went over to see the admiral, whom I found, of
course, very greatly dejected. I said to him that I
knew he had lost everything, clothing as well as

1 Much praise has been properly given to Captain Philip of the
Texas, for his order given to his crew: "Don't cheer, boys; those
poor devils are dying." But Philip was not alone in his kindly
expressions towards the beaten foe.

Major Paul Saint Clair Murphy, of the Marine Corps, who was
on board the Brooklyn that day, testified before the Court of In
quiry (I. 1319) :

"I remember distinctly, because it made a very great impression on
me at the time. The Colon had hauled down her flag, and was
ashore.

"We were preparing a cutter to take Captain Cook to the Colon,
to receive the surrender of that ship. The officers and men were
gathered forward, in the neighborhood of the forecastle, and Com
modore Schley addressed the men, cautioning them not to cheer when
the Spanish captain came on board. He spoke of their gallantry,
saying they had made a good fight, and they should not be humili
ated; that we should treat them chivalrously; and not humiliate
them with cheers.

"It was a gallant speech, and we all felt it very deeply. The
commodore made the same speech about midnight of the same day,
when we were ranging up alongside the Iowa. We had learned
that Admiral Cervera and his officers were on board the Iowa."

It is quite evident that vae victis had no place in the commodore's
heart.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 203

money, and that I wanted to say that the object of my
visit was to inform him that my wardrobe, as well as
my purse, were at his service. He replied that he
thanked me very much, and that he had never met a
sailor who was not a gentleman; that he was very
much obliged, but that all he wanted was to send a
despatch to his government, or to the captain general,
announcing what had happened to his squadron. I
told him, of course, that there could be no objection
to that, and the despatch which he sent practically an
nounced the destruction of the Spanish squadron, and
what he had done. I informed him of the fate of the
Colon, and that telegram was sent to the Captain
General.2

That ended the battle of Santiago, on the 3d day
of July, 1898.

Admiral Schley, closed his story, thus:

1 would like to say, before concluding, that I was
very much impressed that day with the fact that the
officers and men who were engaged in that struggle
fulfilled, in the highest and very noblest degree, the
traditions of the American Navy.

Is there any wonder that the close of such a story as
that, by that sentiment, caused the listeners to break
out into hearty, vehement, and prolonged applause?

Not even Dewey's gavel, and command, could
prevent.

2 It was as follows (A. 505): "I went out at 9.30, and sustained
a very hot battle with the enemy. The defense was brilliant, but
it was impossible to fight against the hostile forces, which were
three times as large as ours. The Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and
Viscaya, all with fire on board, ran ashore and were then blown
up. The destroyers Pluton and Furor were sunk by shots from the
hostile guns. The Coldn, the Americans say, surrendered after run
ning aground. I estimate our losses at six hundred killed and
wounded. The rest of the crews have been taken prisoners, Villa-
mil was killed in the battle, I believe also Lazaga. Among the
wounded are Concas and Eulate. The Americans have allowed the
latter to retain his sword, because of his brilliant conduct. I must
state that the American sailors are treating us with all possible con
sideration. "CERVERA."

CHAPTER LIII

CAPTAIN FRANCIS A. COOK'S STORY OF THE BATTLE

THE testimony of Captain Francis A. Cook, the
captain of the Brooklyn, given before the Court of
Inquiry (I. 895) is of very great interest, and im
portance, and is as follows :

We were to the westward. The bearing of the en
trance from us was about N. E. by N.

The Spanish fleet came out south; and turned, as
they left the entrance, about four points southwest;
so that they turned in our direction.

As soon as I saw this fleet, and saw that they were
heading southwest, they seemed to be coming straight
for the interval between the Texas and Brooklyn, we
being headed for the fleet, about northeast. I went
into the conning tower and directed the helmsman,
told him what I wanted to do — to keep straight for
the head of the fleet.

They wavered a little, sometimes turned one way,
and sometimes another. We shifted the helm once
or twice, but a very little indeed; and, finally, when
we were getting up fairly close — between 2,000 yards
and 1,500 yards, I should judge — it seemed to me
clear that they wanted to pass between the Texas and
the Brooklyn.

The Texas was well on our starboard, and she was
heading to the northward and eastward (how much
I do not know) ; but all the ships were carrying out
the instructions of the commander-in-chief, which
were to head for the entrance.

The Spanish ships were well to the westward. We
held to the northeast. When I saw that, I ported the
helm, perhaps halfway over. The fleet was still com-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 205

ing for this interval. I stepped out of the tower, and
on to the port hand side, to get a good look at the
Spanish fleet; to see just what they were going to do,
and as to our relative positions.

When I saw that they [the Spanish] had evidently
put their helms aport, and were turning to the west
ward, — we were then turning rapidly to starboard
with port helm, and had turned through, I think,
almost to eastward ; had ported the helm from about
northeast — as I saw the enemy turn westward, I gave
the order "Hard-a-port" to the helmsman; ran
through the opening between the shield and the con
ning tower, to the other [starboard] side, on purpose
to see our own fleet, and the relative positions of our
own fleet. The Texas was well on our starboard
hand.

Instantly, quicker than I can tell it, the commodore
called to me: "Cook, hard-a-port," or "Is your helm
hard-aport?" My answer was, "It is hard-a-port;
she is turning as rapidly as possible."

As I saw the Texas, I saw her port bow. I never
saw her starboard side; and changing her bearing
very rapidly, the Brooklyn turned very rapidly along
the port side of the Texas, until there was a clear open
ing between the [bow of] the Brooklyn and the stern
of the Texas.

We made a complete turn, and a very rapid turn,
with the helm hard-a-port, from previously "port,"
until we came around, and paralleled the Spanish fleet
on the other side; and then we had the Viscaya on
our starboard bow; and abaft beam was the
Oquendo, and then the Colon. At the time I thought
it was the Teresa; but I soon discovered this vessel
dropping out, and heading to the beach. Then we
passed on.

That [referring to the turn] was about the hottest
time in the action. There was no time for indecision,

206 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

and I don't think there was any. It was a critical
point, at a critical time.

I have always felt, in my own mind, from a study
of the position, that the chances would have been of
disaster, had we shifted the helm at such a time.

However, we got around there, and we had those
three vessels [Spanish] there; and I looked, and
could see nothing but smoke astern. Our vessels
seemed enveloped in this smoke.

We certainly were alone then. They were all firing
on the Brooklyn, when, almost immediately, — faster
than I can tell it, — I saw a large "white bone" in the
water, — that is the bow wave, — and through the
smoke I saw the bows of a vessel. I exclaimed,
"What's that?" and the navigator [Hodgson] who
was near me said: "That's the Massachusetts"
There was some question about the Massachusetts;
and I said, "That's the Oregon" I was perfectly
assured from that moment. She came up very
rapidly. She was making more speed than we were
at that time.

She passed in between the Texas and the Iowa, shot
into that opening. She came to the northward of the
Texas, and came out on our starboard quarter, and
about eight hundred yards from us. I mean a perpen
dicular distance between our courses. There was
never anything between the Brooklyn and the Spanish
ships.

/ gave that order, "Hard-a-port" on my own order;
there is no question about that. It was not after hav
ing heard the commodore.

There was a perfect understanding between us, and
never a question of any kind during the action.

CHAPTER LIV

CAPTAIN CLARK'S STORY OF THE BATTLE1

ONE would think that a judge advocate, whose duty
it was to place before the Court of Inquiry the true
facts of that eventful day, would, at the very outset,
have called upon Captain Clark and his officers to tell
what they knew about the battle of July 3, 1898.

The eyes of the whole naval world had been fixed
upon that gallant officer during his great voyage
around from the Pacific, and his ship, the Oregon,
had been most conspicuously efficient in that fight.

Captain Clark's statements imported absolute
verity, and no one could or would pretend to doubt
them in any particular. He had been "in it" from
start to finish, and knew all about it, and his absolute
impartiality could not be doubted.

And yet the truth seeking judge advocate left Clark
and the other officers of the Oregon out of the telling,
and left it to Admiral Schley to produce them as wit
nesses.

Up to the time of the inquiry, Clark had resisted
all efforts to persuade him to tell the great story, ex
cept in the official reports; and one who consults his
report of that battle will find it very meager and un
satisfactory, so far as details go.

Before the Court of Inquiry he testified as follows

(i. 1334):

When we discovered the Spanish ships coming out,
our fleet closed in at once to attack, each ship having
been ordered to keep her head directly towards the
harbor entrance. The Spaniards turned to the west
ward, breaking through our line, or crossing it, and
our ships swung off to the westward in pursuit. Both

1 Captain of the Oregon.

208 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

sides opened fire promptly, and a dense smoke soon
obscured the vessels, making it difficult to distinguish
them. The Oregon, however, ran between the Iowa
and Texas (the next ships to the westward in our
line), and soon afterwards we sighted the four
Spanish ships ahead, apparently uninjured at the time.
They had gained so much that I believed they had
been successful in their attempt to escape. It was
very soon evident, though, that we were gaining a
little, at least on one of them, which proved to be the
Maria Teresa, the flagship ; and I thought we should
bring her to close action, might be exposed to the
concentrated fire of all the ships.

Just then the smoke lifted, or broke away to our left,
and I discovered the Brooklyn. She was well forward
of our port beam, and broadside to the enemy's fleet.
Her course was a little divergent from ours, because
the Oregon was attempting to draw up on the Maria
Teresa. But the Brooklyn and Oregon maintained
this relative position, bow and quarter, to the end of
the battle, the Brooklyn steaming straight ahead, as
nearly as I could judge, and engaging all the Spanish
ships; the Oregon endeavoring to come to close action
with the sternmost one ; and when she was driven out
of action, and pointed to the beach, pushing on for the
next ahead; and so on, until the entire fleet was
driven ashore, burning or sinking (I. 1336) .

When the smoke lifted and I saw the Brooklyn on
her westerly course, she must have been engaged with
all four of the enemy's ships (I. 1338). / do not
know that they were all firing at her, but they could
have fired at her, they were all within range; and'
she was alongside of them — that is, broadside to-
them.

I never saw the Brooklyn until I came out of the
smoke and discovered her ahead. It made a deep im
pression on me to find her there. I felt that we should
mutually support and sustain each other; and I felt

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 209

that she needed a battle-ship; and that we were to be
there together at the battle.

The Iowa, when I first saw her, during the earlier
part of the engagement, was steaming in towards the
entrance to the harbor. Her position was a little to
the westward of the Oregon, and at first she seemed
to be advancing faster than the Oregon. It seemed to
me that she was gaining ground more towards the en
trance than we were, and I thought she would get in
there considerably ahead of the Oregon.

The smoke became very dense, and I lost sight of
her, but I could see the Spanish ships as they came
out, and turned to the westward. I knew that they
were turning sharply that way, and that I would not
get to the entrance in time to strike any of them, and
that therefore I must immediately haul to the west
ward. I put my helm a-starboard, and sheered off;
and then I saw the Iowa again. She had evidently
changed her course to the westward very sharply at
almost the same time [with me] ; and I was fearful
that she would collide with us, — that she would swing
too far. I therefore put my helm hard-a-starboard,
to clear her, and we went by her; and / saw no more
of her during the entire action.

I saw the Texas just after I passed the Iowa (I.
1338). Whether she was moving rapidly, or lying
in the water without any movement, or how she was
moving, I cannot recall, I was so concerned about
striking her. I was just clearing the Iowa when the
Texas was reported on the port bow, and I had no
time except to give one glance at her; and then give
the order uHard-a-port." Then I had to jump over to
the other side to see if I was going to clear the Iowa.
I was afraid my speed would not be sufficient to carry
me by; and yet / had to get past; and I really cannot
tell whether I saw the bow or stern of the Texas. I
just saw that large, great object loom up out of the

14

210 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

smoke, and I knew I had to give the order instantly,
to clear her. I knew, or thought I would swing
enough to clear her, but it might carry me into the
Iowa, which I had on my starboard beam, only about
a ship's length off."2

Captain Clark further testified (I. 1339, 1340) :
None of the Spanish vessels was run ashore or de
stroyed in the channel, as provided in the standing
squadron orders to close in and destroy the enemy in
the channel. The battle of July 3 was not completed
in accordance with any squadron orders previously
issued*

I remember a signal, made by Commodore Schley
from the Brooklyn, "Follow flag," because I ordered
it repeated. We did close up. I thought it was "Fol
low flag." It may have been "Close up." My
memory is distinct in this, — that it was made imme
diately after we came out of the smoke and discovered
the Spanish fleet ahead of us. On our first discovery
of the Brooklyn this signal was flying, or it was re
ported to me immediately after that time.

Lieutenant Eberle's (of the Oregon) picture of the
end of the battle, will bear repetition here. He said :

The bugle had sounded "Cease firing," and the last
shot of July 3 had been fired. That was a moment
to die for. Suddenly the sound of heavy guns was re-

2 The Iowa's navigator (Lieutenant Commander Scheutze) testified
(I. 778): "She [the Oregon} passed, I should say, about 150 to 200
feet [from the Iowa]" (I. 779).

From this description of the situation it is evident that it was
only by the most consummate seamanship and coolest judgment
displayed by Captain Clark that a collision between those ships was
avoided. The calm skill and judgment that Clark displayed in
bringing the Oregon safely through the perils of her voyage from
the Pacific to the Atlantic coast were most signally displayed in ex
tricating her from this new danger.

'This statement of Captain Clark explodes the theory that Samp
son prescribed die plan of battle, and that he was therefore entitled
to the credit of it.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 211

placed by the strains of "The Star Spangled Banner"
from the band. On our forward deck 550 men,
mostly bare to the waist, and begrimed with powder
and coal dust, were embracing each other and cheer
ing with the fervor and joy which mark the out-pour
ing of the hearts of men who knew how to look into
the face of death.

There were rousing cheers for our beloved captain,
and the tender words he spoke to the crew caused
many a heart to soften.

Amid ringing cheers the Brooklyn signaled: "Con
gratulations upon the glorious victory," and her
cheers were returned with enthusiasm. The Oregon's
Fourth of July reception by the fleet off Santiago and
Commodore Schley's signal, "Welcome back, brave
Oregon" were something to be cherished.

CHAPTER LV

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HODGSON'S STORY OF THE
BATTLE

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER ALBON C. HODGSON, the
navigator of the Brooklyn, was a star witness pro
duced by the judge advocate. He was smarting under
a feeling into which he had worked himself,
prompted, no doubt, by the officials of the Navy De
partment, that Commodore Schley had done him an
injustice. He got dreadfully mixed up about that
matter, (as will hereafter be shown), but he was an
honorable officer, and loyal to the truth as he saw it.

It will be well, for the better understanding of the
non-professional reader, to explain in a general way
the position and duties of the navigator in battle and
on other occasions when any general function is going
on.

Up to a very late period the officer who is now
styled "Navigator," was called the "Master."
Among his other duties he is charged with the task
of taking the observations and finding the ship's posi
tion on the chart, and, under direction of the captain,
to navigate her from port to port.

When all hands are called, he proceeds — on board
a modern ship of war, which is nowadays always a
steamer — to the bridge and relieves the "Officer of
the Deck," who, up to that moment, has had charge.

On the first Sunday of each month it is the custom
to hold what is called "General Muster," at which all
the officers and crew are assembled on the quarterdeck.
"The Articles for the Government of the Navy" are
read, after which all the names of the men are called;
and each passes in review before the captain and
officers.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 213

This general muster is commonly, and was on that
d of July, held at 9.30 A. M. ; and this explains why
~r. Hodgson happened to be on the bridge that
morning when Cervera's fleet was seen to be coming
out of Santiago Bay at 9.35.

From this station on the bridge he could see every
move of all the ships, whether friends or foes, and his
ringing battle cry: "Tell the commodore the Spanish
ships are coming out," transformed the solemn "mus
ter" instantly into a seeming chaos, with officers and
men rushing to their respective stations. The seem
ing chaos soon resolved itself into the most perfect
battle order and array, with every officer and man
at his proper station, with a solemn silence reigning
supreme, only to be broken by the captain's order to
fire the first gun at the foe, whose report turned that
silence into pandemonium.

When Mr. Hodgson was asked, on cross-examina
tion, to "give the work that the Brooklyn did in that
battle from its commencement until the surrender of
the Colon'' he testified (I. 617) :

The Brooklyn did all that she could do. She got
into action as soon as speed could carry her, and we
began firing as soon as the first gun on port bow would
bear; and we kept firing the port battery until we
turned around with port helm. During the arc the
guns of the after turret were fired until we brought
all the starboard battery to bear. We got around as
quickly as we could, with the port helm, and we
almost paralleled the course of the leading Spanish
vessel.

When we got around the smoke was very dense,
and nothing could be seen in the rear of us.

The three Spanish vessels that were engaged [by
the Brooklyn'} were the Fiscaya, the Colon, and the
Oquendo. The Fiscaya was 2500 yards on our star
board bow, the Colon perhaps a little forward of our

2i4 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

starboard beam, and the Oquendo was abaft the star
board beam.

^ We continued in that direction, and I remarked to
Captain Cook that it seemed rather lonely for us out
there. He was inside the conning tower, and asked,
"Why?" And I replied, "We were alone after the
three Spanish vessels, and it seemed that it would de
volve upon us to knock them out." At that time, as
I said, the smoke was so dense that I could see nothing
to the rear, and I supposed that the Brooklyn was
steaming ahead of the slower battle-ships. Captain
Cook stepped out of the conning tower, and as he
stepped out he exclaimed to me, "Why, what's that off
our starboard quarter?" I looked in that direction
and saw the heavy bow wave formed by a ship, and
next the bow looming up, and said immediately:
"That must be the Massachusetts"*

Captain Cook said, "It cannot be the Massachu
setts, for she has gone to Guantanamo for coal."
Then I said, "It must be the Oregon" and he said,
"God bless the Oregon" And I said, "Yes, I'm very
glad to see her." The Oregon was at that time, I
should say, about four hundred or five hundred yards
off our starboard quarter, and we continued in that
relative position until the Brooklyn's speed began to
increase as we gradually got up more steam; and
probably during the battle we drew further ahead.
She never was that close to us again, that I remember.

The Oquendo very shortly fell out and went ashore,
and the Colon drew ahead and went inshore of the
Fiscaya. I remember very well the time that the
•Fiscaya blanketed her from our fire, and the chase

1 It is proper to explain here that the Massachusetts had
been next in line between the Texas and Iowa, but had
gone away to Guantanamo, at 4 o'clock that morning, for
coal ; and Mr. Hodgson had not observed her absence from
her usual place in the blockade.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 215

was continued in that direction. Off Asseradores the
Viscaya ported her helm and ran ashore.

The Colon at that time had gained speed, and was
inshore, I suppose, ahead about seven miles.

After passing the Viscaya the men were allowed to
come out of the turrets a few at a time, to get a breath
of fresh air and something to eat, although the guns
were kept manned, and everything ready.

The gaining on the Colon was very slow; in fact,
she gained on us, apparently, at first. We began
gradually to gain. My recollection is that the com
modore told someone to signal over to the Oregon, to
utry one of his railroad trains." At any rate, shortly
afterwards the Oregon fired one of her thirteen-inch
shells, which fell short. Then we tried with an eight-
inch shell, and that fell short. We were signaling to
the Oregon, and she to us, the fall of the shots. Both
continued occasionally feeling for the range^ until I
remember seeing one of the thirteen-inch shells from
the Oregon fall ahead of her, from our view of the
Colon, and one of our eight-inch shells apparently fell
inshore of her.

At that time the Colon put her helm hard-a-port.
Previously, during the chase, she was porting her
helm once or twice, apparently seeking for a soft spot;
but at this time she made a rank sheer, with the port
helm, fired her lee gun, and hauled down her flag.

/ pulled out my watch and looked at it, and it was
exactly /./5-

We then ceased firing, slowed down, and Captain
Cook was ordered to go on board to make terms, or
tell the terms to the commanding officer of the Colon.

The Oregon of course came up, and other ships
gradually drew up off the Rio Tarquino, about fifty
miles to the westward of the entrance to Santiago de
Cuba.

The fight was then over.

216 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

The Colon's captain had run her high and dry on
the shore. She had not been injured by our shot or
shell, and she was safe on the shore, where she should
have been suffered to remain until it was found that
she was uninjured. It will be remembered that the
commander-in-chief, after sending Schley in the
Brooklyn to fight the new foe that had been reported
as coming from the eastward, had remained behind
to secure the prize.

Whose was the fault or bad judgment, cannot be
known, under which the Colon was prematurely
hauled off the shore into deep water, where it was soon
discovered that she was sinking. An effort was made
to push her back, but it was too late, and she turned
over, sank in deep water, and was lost. All subse
quent efforts to raise her were vain. There she lies,
where she met her doom.

CHAPTER LVI

SCHLEY'S AND SAMPSON'S ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THE
VICTORY

AFTER parting from the Austrian ship of war while
on his way to the entrance of the harbor Commodore
Schley prepared and, as soon as possible, sent to the
cable office at Siboney, by his flag lieutenant, James
H. Sears, a despatch to the Secretary of the Navy,
announcing the victory.

When Sears reached Siboney he found there Samp
son's flag lieutenant, Sidney A. Staunton, sending, in
Sampson's name, an announcement of the victory.

For convenience of reference and contrast, these
two despatches are here printed in parallel columns :

SCHLEY'S ANNOUNCE- SAMPSON'S ANNOUNCE

MENT. MENT.

SANTIAGO, July 3, 1898. SANTIAGO, July 3, 1898.

Spanish squadron came out of The fleet under my command

Santiago harbor this morning, offers the nation, as a Fourth of

and were all destroyed in a run- ^^f' the wh°le °f Cer"

ning fight to the westward of ^7 'attempted to escape at 9.30

about three and one-half hours. thig morning. At 2 iast snip,

Very few casualties in our fleet. the Cristobal Colon, had run

Ellis, chief yeoman, killed, and ashore seventy-five miles west

one man wounded on the Brook- of Santiago, and hauled down

lyn. Reports from other ships her colors. The Infanta Maria

not in yet. The commander-in- Teresa, Oquendo, and Viscaya

chief superintending transfer of -were forced ashore, burned and

prisoners from Cristobal Colon, blown up, within twenty miles

which surrendered to Brooklyn Of Santiago. The Furor and

and Oregon at 1.15. Victory Pluton were destroyed within

complete. Details later. four miles of the port.

SCHLEY. SAMPSON.

The contrast between these two despatches is re
markable.

One reading that of Schley will be struck with the

218 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

entire absence of any self-exaltation, or even reference
to himself. Neither of the personal pronouns "I,"
or "My" is to be found in it, and he would fail, in
reading it, to learn more than the fact that the
Spaniards had come out of Santiago that morning and
had all been destroyed in the running fight that
ensued.

One would certainly suppose, from reading Samp
son's despatch, that he had been leading in the battle,
and had actually commanded in the fight; and be left
in entire ignorance of the fact that he had not been in
the battle at all ; or of the other fact that Schley had,
as the "senior officer on the spot," been actually in
command.

The late Secretary of the Navy (John D. Long),
in his book lately published, entitled, "The New
American Navy" (Vol. ii. p. 42), says: "Sampson
has been criticised for this despatch. He did not
write it. It was written by the officer he sent to tele
graph the news; but he assumed it, for he shirked no
responsibility. The personal pronoun "I" is not in it.

This last statement is true. The personal pronoun
"I" is not in it, but the equally, and in this case more,
personal pronoun "My," is in it; and, whether so in
tended or not, the despatch conveys the false impres
sion that Sampson had been in actual command in the
battle.

That assistant chief of staff (Staunton) who wrote
it (as alleged by Mr. Long) no doubt had in his mind
and memory Caesar's famous triplet, "Feni, Fedl,
Vid" and Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry's an
nouncement of his victory on Lake Erie: "We have
met the enemy, and they are ours," and thought, no
doubt, that he was framing a despatch that would ring
down the ages with equal brilliancy. But he only
succeeded in placing his chief in a false position, from
which there has been no escape. Secretary Long
further says: "It [the despatch] is exceedingly like

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 219

General Sherman's telegram on the capture of
Savannah."

It is exceedingly unlikely that Lieutenant Staunton
had ever read Sherman's despatch, for, if he had, it is
not probable that he would have repeated it in this
instance. As well might he have repeated Perry's
famous couplet. He might have tried to frame some
thing that was quite as original, for it cannot be
doubted that Staunton thought himself quite as com
petent as the heroes named, to startle the world with
a brilliant announcement of the great victory that had
been that day achieved, — but in which his chief and
he had borne no part!

The despatches of Caesar, Perry, and Sherman
expressed the exact truth; and if Sampson's despatch
had been similarly based, while there might have been
differences of opinion as to the good taste of the lan
guage employed, it would have created no false im
pression.

All that it was necessary to do was to announce the
plain truth about the matter, and there could have
been no adverse criticism.

Sampson's despatch is never mentioned by, or in the
presence of, his friends without explanations or apolo
gies; but there can be nothing of the sort necessary
for that of Schley.

Staunton, being Sears' senior, would not allow the
latter to send Schley's announcement. The Navy De
partment has never published it, and when it was
offered to the Court of Inquiry the majority would
not permit it to go upon the record of the court's pro
ceedings.

As a part of the res gestae, it was clearly admissible
and proper.

CHAPTER LVII

SCHLEY'S PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE BATTLE

DURING the night of July 3 Schley wrote, and on the
morning of the 4th sent to the commander-in-chief a
report of the events of the day as follows :

"FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN, OFF SANTIAGO

DE CUBA, July 3d, 1898.

"SiR: — I have the honor to make the following
preliminary report of the engagement this morning.

"i. At 9.30 o'clock Admiral Cervera, with the
Infanta Maria Teresa, Fiscaya, Almirante Oquendo,
and Cristobal Colon, with two torpedo-boat destroy
ers, attempted to escape from Santiago harbor.

"Signal was at once made for 'close action,' which
was promptly responded to by the Brooklyn, Indiana,
Oregon, Iowa, Gloucester, and Vixen.

"The squadron, after leaving the harbor, stood to
the westward, but engaged at close range (from 1 100
to 3000 yards) ; and in about twenty minutes the
Oquendo, and Fiscaya^ were set on fire by the shells
of our squadron, and were forced to run ashore,
where they burned and blew up later in the night.

"Of the destroyers, one was sunk, and the other
was set on fire by our shells, and burned on the beach.

"2. The flagship Infanta Maria Teresa, with Ad
miral Cervera, and the Colon were engaged in a run
ning fight with the Brooklyn, Oregon, Texas, and
Iowa for some twenty-five minutes, when the Spanish
flagship was set on fire, the Spanish being obliged to
beach her.2

"The Brooklyn and Oregon continued the chase

1This last should be the Infanta Maria Teresa. — J. P.

2 This paragraph is all wrong; it was the Viscaya, not the flagship.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 221

and fight, gradually drawing away from the other
ships, until 1.15 p. M., when the Colon was beached,
and struck her colors to the Brooklyn and Oregon.

"3. The Brooklyn was exposed for some twenty
minutes to the fire of the four Spanish ships, until the
other vessels of our squadron could get into good
range.

"I cannot speak with too much praise of the con
duct of the officers and crews of the vessels engaged;
their spirit and enthusiasm were such as I have rarely
before seen in action.

"4. I would especially mention Captain Philip,
Captain Evans, Captain Taylor, Captain Cook, and
Captain Clark, for exceedingly meritorious conduct
on the occasion. Their ships were handled superbly,
and their officers and men responded nobly.

"Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, command
ing the Gloucester, and Lieutenant Sharp command
ing the Vixen, acted with conspicuous gallantry, and
although not able to engage the heavier ships, they
were close in on the battle line.

"5. Admiral Cervera and his officers, with about
1 200 men, were captured, and he informed me that
his loss in killed was about 450.

"Our casualties were one killed and one wounded,
(both) on board the Brooklyn. No one else was hurt
in the squadron, although this ship was struck twenty
times.

"6. In order to make a complete and detailed re
port, I would suggest that you direct that the com
manding officers of vessels of the First Squadron send
copies of their reports on the engagement to me.
"Very respectfully,
"W. S. SCHLEY,

"Commodore U. S. Navy,

"Commander Second Squadron.
"THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
"U. S. Naval Forces,
"North Atlantic Station."

222 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

It is noteworthy that the pronoun "I" only appears
thrice in the foregoing report, and then in connection
with others than himself. The pronoun "My" does
not appear at all.

Schley testified (I. 1529) : "I carried that report
to the commander-in-chief, and went back on board
of my ship. He signaled for me to come on board
again, which I did. He then handed the report back
to me. There was nobody in the cabin but him and
myself at the time.

"He handed it back to me, with the statement that
he was the commander-in-chief, and that I had
omitted a very important detail, which was that the
New York was present."

Schley on July 6 made a second report (A. 517),
concerning which he further testified: "I felt at that
time that the victory, as I said, was big enough for
all. I made this last 'out of generosity' ; and because
I knew that if the New York had been present they
would have done as good work as everybody else, I
referred all throughout this to 'your command,' and
his appearance, and so on, in complimentary terms."

There can be no doubt that Commodore Schley
made a mistake when he consented to receive back
that preliminary report. It stated exactly the truth,
gave full credit to every ship, officer, and man that
had been in the battle, and assumed no credit to him
self. The facts spoke for him with a forceful elo
quence that any claim he could have made would
have only weakened.

Receiving it back and writing the other in the terms
he employed was a most amiable display of generosity,
which, when occasion required, was sure to be — and
was — quoted against him.

Sampson did all he could for himself and his flag
ship New York when he said in his official report of
the battle (A. 507) : "She [the New York] was not
at any time within the range of the heavy Spanish

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 223

ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the
undivided fire from the fort in passing the harbor en
trance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers,
thought at the moment to be attempting to escape
from the Gloucester."

That preliminary report of Commodore Schley has
never been printed by the Navy Department, and the
majority of the Court of Inquiry refused to permit it
to be made part of its record. In the judgment of
lawyers, it was clearly admissible as part of the res
gestae (attending circumstances) .

Lieutenant Sears also, in the judgment of the
writer, made a mistake in not sending Schley's an
nouncement of the victory, notwithstanding Stanton's
objections. Sears was but obeying Schley's orders,
and with Sampson "forty miles away" Schley was un
doubtedly, as "senior officer on the spot," in command
off Santiago. Stanton had no right to countermand
Schley's order at any time.

Commodore Watson sent a similar announcement
(A. 505), and no fault was found with him. How
could there be?

CHAPTER LVIII

THE NOTES OF THE BATTLE TAKEN ON BOARD THE

"VIXEN"

IN addition to the accounts of the battle of Santiago
given in the official reports made by the commanding
officers of the ships engaged, and in the already
quoted testimony of Admiral Schley, Captains Cook
and Clark, and Lieutenant Commander Hodgson,
there was one account written during the progress of
the fight that has never been given to the public by the
Navy Department, to which attention will now be
called.

The Fixen, commanded by Lieutenant Alexander
Sharp, Jr., occupied, when that morning the Spanish
fleet was discovered to be coming out, the extreme
westerly end of the semicircle of the blockade. She
was about two miles from the shore and about three
miles from the entrance. The Fixen, like the
Gloucester, which occupied the extreme easterly end
of the semicircle, was a frail craft — a converted
yacht — and when the Spaniards came out that morn
ing and turned to the westward Lieutenant Sharp saw
that she had no place among those thunderers, just as
Wainwright did in the Gloucester. So knowing that
it was his plain duty, as Wainwright said, to "look
after the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers," that at
that time it was thought would be found running
along the starboard side of the fighting ships, ready
to dash out against our vessels when opportunity
offered — Sharp very properly put the helm of his
little craft uhard-a-port," and ran down to the south
ward, out of the line of battle, but still under fire ; and
then, turning to the westward, steered a parallel
course to that of the combatants, ready for any duty
he might be called upon to perform.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 225

There can be no doubt in the minds of those who
know Sharp that, if those Spanish torpedo-boat de
stroyers had ever got that far to the westward, the
Vixen's commander would have shown that he and
she well deserved their names — Sharp and Vixen.

Having no fighting to do, Sharp thought that the
next best service he could perform would be to have
notes taken of what the fighting vessels did as the
battle progressed, and accordingly such notes "were
written by Paymaster Doherty, and the times and in
cidents given by Lieutenant Harlow, the executive
officer."

Lieutenant Harlow, before the court, described the
method pursued:

"Mr. Doherty sat with pad before him and the
watch in his hand. I, with glasses, carefully watched
the fighting ships. Whenever I saw anything worth
noting I called to Doherty, 'Mark time,' which he
would do; and then wrote what I told him to write."

It may be doubted if there ever was a more truth
ful and impartial account of a battle written than
that. There was no dream of controversy about any
of the incidents related, and no possible inducement
to relate anything but uthe truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth."

Within a few hours after the battle ended Sharp
caused manifold typewritten copies of the notes to be
made, and the "ribbon copy" was attached to the log
book of the Vixen, where it still remains. The notes
thus became an official statement of the facts to which
they relate.

On July 5, at Guantanamo, Sharp took one of these
manifold copies on board the Brooklyn to Commo
dore Schley, who was so pleased with the notes that
he sent them to the ship's printer and caused numer
ous copies to be printed and distributed to his officers
and men as a faithful and accurate pen-picture of the
battle.
15

226 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Those notes are the only impartial account written
by officers at the exact instant of the events ; they are
a record made by unbiased eye-witnesses who were
under no temptation or influence to color or conceal
facts, either in their own interest or for their self-
exaltation, or that of any other officer or vessel.

Every vessel engaged, as long as she was in sight
from the Vixen, has full mention of the parts taken by
such vessel; and what these officers thus set down
would be accepted by any tribunal as the nearest pos
sible approach to the exact truth.

On July 6 Lieutenant Sharp wrote his official re
port, addressed to Admiral Sampson, of the part
taken in the battle by the Vixen. His report is type
written, and in it he says: "I enclose a copy of notes
taken during the chase, by my orders, at the sugges
tion of Lieutenant Harlow. The times taken after
10.30 are accurate; those taken before that time were
estimated, and may be in error a few minutes."

Now, when Sharp wrote that report to Admiral
Sampson he had still in his possession several of the
manifold typewritten copies that had been made; and
one would think he would have enclosed one of those,
but the purported copy that appears to have been en
closed is in long hand, written on the stiff official
paper used in the navy. It was written by a man
named Wainwright, who was the yeoman of the
Vixeny and it differs in very many and important par
ticulars from the copy attached to the log-book.

When the Court of Inquiry was about to begin its
sessions Wainwright was serving on board the sur
veying steamer Ranger, which was at Panama. Ad
miral Schley's counsel made request, in the usual
form, that Wainwright should be subpoenaed before
the court, which request was made in ample time to
secure his attendance. But whether by accident
(which the writer very much doubts) or design

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 227

(which the writer may be pardoned for believing)
Wainwright was not brought before the court. He
was the only person who could have fully explained
how the notes came to be so changed.

When the character of these changes is consid
ered — that every one of them which relates to the
Brooklyn's doings is made less favorable to her, and
not one more favorable ; the unsailor-like expressions
that are absent in the original, but contained in the
purported copy; the suppression of all that occurred
between 1.15 p. M. (the time of the Colon's surren
der) and 2.23 (the time the New York arrived near
her, off Rio Tarquino), made evidently in the interest
of the flagship New York, and which corresponds to
a similar suppression in the notes taken on board the
latter vessel, and attached to her log-book; the altera
tion in the log-book of the New York, made at the
request of Lieutenant Marble nearly two years after
the battle (to be hereinafter more particularly re
ferred to), which last alteration was made apparently
at the instance and request of Sampson's chief of staff,
Captain French E. Chadwick, and certainly with his
approval — the paternity and purpose of all is evi
dently the same, and is sufficiently well indicated.

In all these changes and suppressions one palpable
purpose is to place the New York nearer to that battle
than she really was. The other was to belittle the
part taken by the Brooklyn.

For convenience of comparison, those notes and the
purported copy that was sent to Admiral Sampson in
Sharp's official report are printed in parallel columns;
and some comments will be made in passing. It may
be noted that both Sharp and Harlow testified before
the court that the notes attached to the Vixen's log
book are exactly correct.

228 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

NOTES TAKEN ON ABOARD THE U. S. S. VIXEN,
JULY 3, 1898.

(From copy attached to the
"Vixen's" log-book.)

What follows is a copy of
notes taken during the engage
ment with Admiral Cervera's
fleet, and is an accurate state
ment of such incidents as ap
peared important, as viewed
from the Vixen. Bearings and
distances are approximate, and
are generally relative to the po
sitions of the Vixen. The coast
pilot, Eduardo Nunez, was fre
quently consulted; and where
there was an uncertainty as to
the correctness of his estimates,
the opinion of several officers
was taken, and as nearly as pos
sible a fair estimate was arrived
at.

At 9.45 — Quartermaster re
ported a tug coming out of the
harbor. Upon examination it
was discovered to be a Spanish
cruiser, flying a large Spanish
flag, with a smaller flag at the
masthead, which was taken to
be an admiral's flag, as it was
on the leading ship.

(The Vixen at this time was
lying about two miles off shore,
and four miles to westward of
Morro Castle; and from this
time to the end was never out
of sight of the chase, and was a
close witness to the destruction
of the three armored cruisers.)1

Word was immediately sent
to the commanding officer; all
hands were called to quarters;
full speed ahead was ordered;
and the helm put to port, to
stand further off shore and leave
the line of fire of the Brooklyn
unobstructed.2

(As sent by Lieutenant Sharp to

Admiral Sampson.)
These notes were written
about ii A. M., and were drawn
from the recollection of events
transpiring prior to 10.30.

At 9.45 A. M. — Reported tug
coming out of harbor. Mr.
Harlow examined it through
glass, and discovered it to be *
Spanish cruiser, flying what
was probably an admiral's flag.

Notified commanding officer ;
called all hands to quarters;
and stood to southward.

1 The omission from the other notes of the part here put in paren
thesis is very significant.

2 Why leave out of the other account this about leaving the line of
"fire of the Brooklyn unobstructed" ?

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 229

The Brooklyn had hoisted a
signal that the enemy were at
tempting to escape; and the
Vixen, noticing that the leading
ship was turning to the west
ward, hoisted signal that the
enemy was attempting to escape
to the westward.

(The fleet, which at that time
had resumed their day block
ading stations, began rapidly to
close in towards the Morro, con
centrating a terrific fire upon the
escaping fleet, though at long
range. There was no doubt at
all to the fact that the enemy
was coming out; but there
were several anxious moments
as to his intentions. Whether
he would disperse and attempt
to break through the lines, or
keep his vessels together.)3

The leading vessel had about
changed course to the west,
when the second vessel ap
peared, followed shortly by the
Cristobal Colon.

It was easy to identify this
ship from the fact that her
mast is placed between the two
smoke-stacks. The first two
were not so easy to identify, as
the Fiscaya, Oquendo and Maria
Teresa are practically identical
in appearance. The fleet, mean
while, were closing in towards
the Morro, and when the fourth
vessel appeared and turned to
the westward, it became ap
parent that Admiral Cervera
had carefully reconnoitered the
field, and selected the west as
the weakest part of the block
ade, as the strong easterly cur
rent had drifted the heaviest
ships considerably to the east
ward of their customary posi
tions.4

Brooklyn hoisted signal 250.

The leading vessel had about
changed course to west, when
the second vessel appeared, fol
lowed shortly afterwards by the
Colon.

The first two vessels were evi
dently the Fiscaya and Oquendo,
or Maria Teresa. Fleet closing
in, and opening fire.

"Why omit this in parentheses?

4 What is here said about Cervera having reconnoitered is im
portant and probable. It is not surprising that the revisers left
that out.

230 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

The western arm of the
blockading circle chanced to
be defended by the Vixen and
Brooklyn. The Brooklyn headed
to the northward, apparently in
tending to intercept the head of
the enemy's column. Simulta
neously with the appearance of
the leading ship of the enemy's
column, the western battery
opened fire, apparently direct
ing it upon the eastern and cen
tral ships of the blockading
squadron.

At 10 A. M. — The Brooklyn
was the nearest vessel to, and
was engaging, the two leading
ships.

These two ships were quite
close together, with an interval
of perhaps three-quarters of a
mile between the second ship
and the Colon.

At 10.05 — The Brooklyn be
gan to turn up with the port
helm, and made a complete turn
to the eastward, continuing
around so that, when again
heading the west, the two lead
ing enemy's ships bore well on
her starboard bow, and the
Colon on her starboard quarter,
with the fourth vessel coming up
rapidly astern.

The Vixen at this time was
well to the westward of the
leading ship, and was steering a
parallel course.

For the next fifteen minutes
the Brooklyn received and re
turned the fire of the two lead
ing enemy's ships, with an oc
casional shot from the Colon.

The first two shots from the
enemy's leading ship were evi-

About 10 A. M. leading
enemy's vessel had headed to
west, full speed, followed by the
others. Brooklyn at 10 was
nearest vessel, and standing to
north, engaged two leading
ships.

At this time two leading ships
were quite close together, with
an interval of perhaps three-
fourths of a mile between second
ship and Colon.

About 10.05 the Brooklyn be
gan to turn with port helm,
and made a complete turn to
eastward, coming around so that
when again heading west the
two leading enemy's ships bore
well on her starboard bow, and
the Colon on her starboard
quarter.6

For the next fifteen minutes,
the Brooklyn sustained and re
turned the fire of the two lead
ing ships with an occasional
shot from the Colon.

The Vixen steered courses of
various time intervals of south,

5 The substitution of the word "coming" for "continuing" is sig
nificant. It was subsequently charged that the Brooklyn had stood
to the southward two thousand yards or more before turning west.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 231

southwest-by-south, and about
10.15 was going, full speed, W.
% S. (steering compass). The
shells that went over the
Brooklyn struck close ahead,
astern, and on starboard beam,
of Vixen; and several passed
directly over, a piece of burst
ing shell going through the
flag at the mainmast-head.
10.30 — Entirely omitted.7

dently aimed at the Vixen, as
they passed directly over her,
striking the water a hundred
yards or so beyond.

At 10.30 the chase was well
formed, with the positions as fol
lows: Enemy's ships were in
column between Cabanas and
Guayacabon, with the Brooklyn
steering a parallel course about
a mile distant from them; and
the Oregon southeast of them
about two miles distant. The
other vessels of the squadron
were obscured by smoke.8

NOTES TAKEN BY LIEUTENANT HARLOW DURING THE
ENGAGEMENT WITH ADMIRAL CERVERA'S FLEET ON
JULY 3, i898.8

At 10.32 the Colon and lead
ing enemy's ships were close to
gether, just clear of the .Brook
lyn's bow, as viewed from the
Vixen; the Colon evidently
gaining in speed, and closing up.

At this time it was apparent
that the vessel that had been
leading was disabled and on fire,

10.32 — Colon and first boat
close together, just clear of
Brooklyn's bow. Colon evi
dently passing ahead.

The first ship that came out of
harbor stopped off Juan Gon-
zales, undoubtedly on fire.

6 Up to this time the Brooklyn, Oregon and Vixen were the only
ships of our squadron mentioned.

7 The omission of the whole paragraph 10.30 was made for ob
vious reasons:

It is the only statement given of the positions of the whole fleet
at that instant. It contains the statement that (after the loop was
complete) the Brooklyn was "steering a parallel course, about a
mile distant from" the Spaniards. And it shows that only the
Brooklyn and Oregon were visible; the other of our vessels were
obscured by smoke.

8 These notes are accurate, as viewed from the Vixen. The
watch used was at practically the same reading as the deck clock
of the Brooklyn.

Accuracy of position is not claimed for any vessel. Position and
bearings are relative only.

Incidents recounted are accurate.

232 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

as she dropped rapidly astern.
She apparently was headed for
the shore off Juan Gonzales.
The Oregon was forging rapidly
ahead, engaging the fourth
ship as she passed.

Two smaller vessels, probably
the torpedo-boat destroyers — the
Furor and Pluton — were to the
westward of Cabanas, engaged
by the Iowa and Texas, and ap
parently on fire; but the lead
ing vessels had gone too far to
the westward to be able to dis
tinguish cither of them accur
ately.

The Indiana was in sight a
little to the westward of Morro.

At 10.34 — The Colon was still
gaining and reserving her fire.

At this moment the only
United States vessels in sight
from the Vixen were the Brook
lyn and Oregon; the Texas
in the rear of the Oregon, fol
lowed closely by the Iowa, about
five or six miles distant. The
Indiana was apparently about
four miles astern of the Iowa.

Oregon forging ahead, and
firing ahead.

Enemy's destroyers to west
ward of Cabanas, evidently en
gaged by Iowa and Texas, and
apparently on fire.

Indiana a little to the west
ward of Morro.

At 10.34 — Colon still gain
ing. Ship which led before,
rapidly falling behind; and
two on fire near Juan Gonzales.
Colon reserving fire.

Colon commenced firing again
at 10.37. No other United
States vessels in sight. Texas
and Iowa in rear of Oregon, five
or six miles. Distance between
Iowa and Indiana about four.
Colon slacking up.

At 10.37 — The Colon and
other enemy's vessels opened fire
again.

The second vessel was just
clear of the Brooklyn, and about
five miles distant from the
Vixen. The Oregon was gain
ing rapidly. The Colon was
apparently using nothing but
smokeless powder.

The firing of the enemy was
very high, many of their shots
falling close ahead, astern, and
around the Vixen, one piece of
shell going through the flag at
the mainmast.

At 10.46 — The Brooklyn forged
ahead, and the Oregon fired her
1 3 -inch forward gun at the
leading vessels of the chase.

At 10.47 — The Texas was in

At 10.40 — Second vessel just
clear of stern of Brooklyn.
Vixen distant about five miles.
Oregon gaining rapidly. Colon
using only smokeless powder.

At 10.46 — Brooklyn forged
ahead from our point of view,
Oregon fired 13 -inch from for
ward gun.

10.47 Texas considerably

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 233

lead of the Iowa and gaining
rapidly.

The firing of the Brooklyn at
this time was both steady and
deadly, shells from her guns ap
parently striking or bursting
alongside or striking the enemy.

At 10.49 — The Texas passed
Juan Gonzales, and what was
apparently the Indiana was off
-Cabanas at the same time.

At 10.50 — The Vixen veered in
close, heading about N. N. W.

The Texas was gaining rap
idly. The Iowa appeared off
Juan Gonzales.

A small vessel, evidently a
yacht, appeared off Guayacabon,
hotly engaging some of the
enemy's ships.

At 10.54 — I* was apparent
that another of the enemy's ves
sels was on fire, and headed for
the beach, with a heavy list to
port. This vessel proved to be
the Viscaya; and she was evi
dently making for the reef at
Asserederos.

At n.oi — She ported, evidently
heading east, as if seeking for
the entrance to Asserederos.

The Texas and Vixen directed
their fire on this vessel until
11.07, when, as her colors were
evidently down, the order was
given to cease firing.

ahead of Iowa and gaining rap
idly.8

10.48 — Shell from Brooklyn
burst apparently alongside of
second vessel.

Texas passed Juan Gonzales
at 10.49 ; Indiana off Cabanas
at 10.49.

Vixen at 10.50 veered in
shore, heading about north-
northwest.

At 10.53 — Texas gaining.
Yacht and Indiana off Guaya
cabon.

At 10.54 Viscaya (?) evi
dently on fire and heading for
the beach, with a heavy list to
port quarter (sic).10

At 10.56 — Viscaya heading
for Asserederos. Texas com
ing up five miles distant. Vis
caya at n, with colors flying,
nearly ashore at Asserederos.

At 11.01 — Viscaya ported
helm, and headed about east.
Texas firing forward gun.
Iowa and New York close off
shore, and torpedo boat astern
of New York, about one mile.11

"Leaving out the statement about the firing of the Brooklyn is
very significant.

10 No sailor wrote that sentence. "Heavy list to port quarter" is
absurd. The proper expression, "heavy list to port," is as used in the
original.

11 In this revised 11.01, first mention is made of the New York.
But she "fades away suddenly, like the grass," and appears no more
in either of the notes, until 11.42, in the revised, and 11.45 m the
original, in which last mention is first made of her.

234 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

At 11.09 — There was a sud
den burst of smoke from her
after end, and she apparently
was sinking, and all ships re
served their fire on passing the
doomed vessel, now hard and
fast ashore on Asserederos reef.

At 1 1. 1 6 — The vessels in sight
from the Vixen were the Brook
lyn, Oregon, Texas, Iowa and
Indiana. The Indiana at least
ten (10) miles from the Colon.

The impression on board the
Vixen was that the vessel ashore
at Asserederos was the admiral's
flagship.

At 11.25 — The Iowa evidently
had stopped. The after end of
the vessel ashore at Asserederos
was a sheet of flame.

From n.20 to 11.42 there was
a series of explosions on board of
her, which were apparently from
the ignition of loose charges
about the guns. They resembled
huge chrysanthemums with rib
bons of smoke, as the burning-
powder grains fell from the end
of the petals.

At 11.45 — The chase had re
solved itself into the Colon, close
inshore, distant about seven miles
from the Vixen; the Oregon,
about one point on the starboard
bow, distant about one mile and
a half; the Brooklyn, one point
on the port bow, distant about
three miles; and the Texas, on
the starboard quarter, distant

At 11.04 — Vis cay a star
boarded, and stood close in
shore.

At 11.05 — Vixen opened fire
on Vis cay a, and at 11.07 ner c°l~
ors came down, and orders
were given on board Vixen to
cease firing.

At 11.09 — Sudden burst of fire
from her, and probably sinking.

At 11.15 — Texas and other
ships reserved their fire.

Iowa gaining on Massa
chusetts™

Vessels in sight at 11.16, Iowa
and Indiana. Indiana at least
ten miles from Colon. Vessel
ashore at Asserederos probably
flagship.

At 1 1. 20 — Iowa evidently had
stopped.

At 11.24 — Flames were seen
bursting from the Viscaya.

At 11.26— The Viscaya ex
ploded, followed by another ex
plosion, probably magazine,
with large sheet of flame.

Other explosions at 11.33.30;
11.35.15; 11.36.15; and 11.41.

At 11.42 — The position of the
ships as seen from the Vixen
was as follows: The Colon
close inshore, distant about
seven miles from the Vixen; the
Oregon, about one point on
starboard bow, distant about
i% miles; the Brooklyn, one
point on starboard bow, distant
about 3 miles; the Texas, on
starboard quarter, distant about
i mile; Iowa, two points on
starboard quarter, distant about

12 The Massachusetts had gone to Guantanamo that morning, and
was not in the battle. She was "forty miles away."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 235

about one mile; the Iowa was
two points on the starboard
quarter, distant about eight
miles; and the New York, one
point on starboard quarter, dis
tant about ten miles. These last
two vessels were apparently off
Boca del Rio, but they were too
far off to identify either of them
with certainty, in thin haze of
smoke that was left behind the
leading ships.

No other vessels were in sight.
The smoke from the ships de
stroyed at Juan Gonzales and to
the eastward could be seen, but
their hulls could not.

At 12 M. — Their positions were
practically the same, except that
each had changed positions rela
tive to the Vixen. When the
Vixen was abreast of Cevilla,
thirty miles west of Santiago, the
Texas bore three points on the
starboard quarter, a little less
than a mile distant. The Oregon
and Brooklyn, one point on the
starboard and port bows, respec
tively, distant about four and five
miles, respectively; while the
Colon bore two points to star
board box, distant fully ten
miles.

According to the official pilot
on board the Vixen, the latter
vessel was off a point called
Bayamita. It might be said here
that all localities and estimates of
distances were referred to him in
connection with the opinions of
four or five officers of the
Vixen.

At 12.05 — The New York was
in line with the burning ship

8 miles. New York, one point
on starboard quarter, distant
about 10 miles ; the two latter
apparently off Boca del Rio. No
other vessels in sight.

Smoke of vessels destroyed off
Juan Gonzales in sight; but
hulls invisible.13

At 11.52 — Another explosion
occurred on board the Viscaya.1*

Position at noon practically
the same, except Texas gaining
rapidly. Vixen abreast of Ce
villa, 30 miles west of Santiago.
Texas bearing three points on
starboard quarter, distant i mile.
Oregon and Brooklyn one point
on starboard and port bows re
spectively, distant 4 and 5
miles. Colon, two points on
starboard bow, distant about 10
miles, close under fourth hill
(see sketch), Bayamita.

Vixen shifted Nos. ^ and i
pounder guns upon their mounts
at 12.03, No. 3 i pounder being
disabled.

[No mention of consulting
pilot and officers.]15

At 12.05 — New York was in
line with the burning ship at

13 In the original the New York and Iowa were "too far off to be
identified with certainty." The revision leaves out the uncer
tainty.

"This helps out the certainty.

16 Why leave out this about consulting the pilot and officers
as to distances and localities?

236 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

(Viscaya) at Asserederos, distant
about ten miles.

At 12.25 — The Texas was on
the starboard quarter; New
York two points on the starboard
quarter and evidently gaining.
The Oregon was a half point on
starboard bow ; the Brooklyn one
point on the port bow; the
Colon one point on the star
board bow, still distant about
ten miles.

The Oregon fired a shot at
12.20, which fell short. The
Colon at this time was about hull
down from the Vixen.

During the next half hour
there were occasional shots fired
from the Oregon and Brooklyn,
many of which apparently struck
near the chase.

At 12.50 — The Texas was one
point forward of the starboard
beam, and gaining steadily.

At 1.15 — The Oregon and
Brooklyn headed in shore about
four points.18

Asserederos, about 9 miles dis
tant.

At 12.15 — Texas was on star
board quarter; Vixen heading
west by south, (p. c) ; New
York two points on starboard
quarter, and evidently gaining.
Oregon one-half point on star
board bow; (Brooklyn, one point
on port bow, distant 9 miles ;
Colon, one point on starboard
bow distant 10 miles,)10 half
way between third and fourth
hills. Oregon started firing at
12.20, her shot falling short.
Fired only one shell from 13 -inch
gun.

At 12.23 — Oregon fired again ;
shot struck a little ahead of
Colon, and appeared ,to pass
over her. Colon is almost hull
down from the Vixen. Brooklyn
started firing at 12.26; struck
very short; about two-thirds the
distance to Colon. Second shot
at 12.26.30, about three-fourths
distance to Colon; third shot at
12.27.15, about four-fifths dis
tance to Colon; fourth shot
about five-sixths of distance.17

At 12.29.30 — Oregon fired
again ; shot went over. There
were thirteen seconds between
the flash of the Brooklyn's shot
and the time the shell struck
the water.

At 12.50— The Texas bore
one point forward of the star
board beam.

At 1.15 — The Brooklyn and
Oregon headed in about four
points.

16 These distances are absurd. The Brooklyn never was within one
mile of the Coldn.

"The precision of the above 12.30 is remarkable.

11 This was the time that at which the Colon hauled down her flag
and, like her consorts, "put for the shore."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 237

At 1.23 — The Texas hoisted
the signal "Enemy has surren
dered."

This signal was repeated to the
New York, but not acknowledged.
The Colon was distinguished by
the aid of glasses, lying close in
shore, and, according to the pilot,
lying off a point called Rio Tar-
quino. Opinion was divided on
the Vixen as to whether a white
flag was displayed on the
Colon or whether it was steam
escaping from the steam pipe
forward. This subsequently
proved to be steam.

At 2 — A boat from the Brook
lyn, or the Oregon, was seen to
go alongside the Colon.

At 2.25 — The Vixen stopped off
Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of
the Brooklyn and Oregon. The
New York arrived from three to
five minutes later, and intercepted
the boat returning from the
Coldn.

^ In all these observations the
time was accurately noted, but
the watch used was five minutes
slow of the deck clock, which
agreed very nearly with the times
indicated by the bells on other
vessels.

At 1.23— The Texas hoisted
signal, "Enemy has surren
dered."19

The Colon lying at Rio Tar
quino.

Boat from Brooklyn went
alongside Colon's starboard side
at 2 o'clock.20

As a matter of fact, allowing for difference of time,
the New York arrived at 2.23, or an hour and eight
minutes after the surrender. Inasmuch as Admiral
Sampson in his report insists (A. 507) that the New

19 The New York was evidently too far away to read the signal.
Therefore, why, thought the reviser, make any mention of the re
peating of the signal? It might be embarrassing later on.

20 The revised notes end here. It will be observed that no men
tion of events occurring after 1.15 is made in the revised notes. That
clause showing that "the Vixen stopped off Rio Torquino, in the
vicinity of the Brooklyn and Oregon, and that the New York ar
rived from three to five minutes later," at 2.25, was a most embarass-
ing one. If allowed to remain it settled the fact, beyond dispute or
cavil, that the New York did not arrive near the Coldn for an hour
and twelve minutes after the latter surrendered.

238 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

York "toward the end of the chase was making
knots," and Captain Chadwick wrote a second report
(A. 522) to show that she was going "not less than
17 knots," by giving her the latter speed she must
have been 19.26 knots (or 22.2 miles) away at the
time the Colon surrendered. As the facts were incon
trovertible, suppresslo veri was the only escape from
them.

CHAPTER LIX

REAR ADMIRAL SAMPSON'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE

THE report of the commander-in-chief (A. 505)
dated July 15, 1898, is a remarkable document, and
the most significant of its features is the evident pur
pose of whoever wrote it to belittle the part played in
the combat by the Brooklyn.

The commander-in-chief says (A. 507) : "The
initial speed of the Spanish vessels carried them rap
idly past the blockading vessels, and the battle devel
oped into a chase, in which the Brooklyn and the
Texas had, at the start, the advantage of position.
The Brooklyn maintained this lead. The Oregon,
steaming with amazing speed from the beginning of
the action, took first place." Again (A. 510) : "The
fine speed of the Oregon enabled her to take a front
position in the chase."

It was so easy for the commander-in-chief to state
the facts exactly as they were, because he knew from
the report of Captain Clark that the latter had said
(A. 526) : "We soon passed all our ships, except the
Brooklyn, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore
Schley."

Captain Clark's report is so significant that I ven
ture to make a larger quotation from it. He says (A.
526) : "As soon as it was evident that the enemy's
ships were trying to break through and escape to the
westward, we went ahead at full speed, with the de
termination of carrying out to the utmost your order;
'If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and
engage as soon as possible; and endeavor to sink his
vessels, or force them to run ashore.'

"We soon passed all of our ships except the
Brooklyn, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore

240 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Schlcy. At first we used only our main battery, but
when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats
were following their ships we used our rapid fire guns,
as well as the 6-inch, upon them with telling effect.
As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships,
she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We
raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead,
using our starboard guns as they were brought to
bear, and before we had her fairly abeam she too was
making for the beach. The two remaining vessels
were now some distance ahead, but our speed had in
creased to sixteen knots, and our fire, added to that of
the Brooklyn, soon sent another, the Viscaya, to the
shore in flames.

uThe Brooklyn signaled, ''Oregon, well done!
Only the Cristobal Colon was left, and for a time it
seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened
with our forward turret guns, and the Brooklyn fol
lowed, she began to edge in towards the coast, and her
capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the
beach her flag came down, and the Brooklyn signalled,
'Cease firing,' following it with: 'Congratulations
for the grand victory ; thanks for your splendid assist

ance.' "

A large part of the report of the commander-in-
chief is devoted to laudation of the method of block
ade that had been pursued during the month before
the battle, and he claims that "this complete and most
important victory was the successful finish of several
weeks of arduous and close blockade."

This is <(non sequitur." It is difficult to see what
the effort to keep an enemy in port has to do with
beating him to absolute destruction after he has come
out. If Cervera's fleet had escaped when they came
out that Sunday morning, could either Schley or
Sampson have pleaded that closeness of the blockade
in justification? Manifestly not.

It may well be doubted whether it was good judg-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 241

ment on the part of the commander-in-chief, after
having sent the Massachusetts away to Guantanamo
for coal that morning, to withdraw the fast cruiser
New York and two other vessels (the Hist and Erics
son, the latter being his only torpedo-boat destroyer)
to enable him to go "en grande tenue" to Altares,
where he was to land with his staff, and go up to Gen
eral Shafter's headquarters. This especially in view
of the fact that the movements of columns of smoke
in the harbor on July 2 (the previous day) had been so
marked as to excite Schley's attention to such a degree
as made him think it proper to send word (as he did)
to the commander-in-chief, calling his attention to the
matter (Schley, I. 1385; Sears, I. 972; Harlow, I.
1362).

It was a mere accident that the battle-ship Indiana
was not left without her captain (Taylor) in that
day's battle.

It has already been stated that, before starting for
Siboney, Captain Chadwick, the chief of staff, sig
naled Captain Taylor, saying that the admiral wished
to know if he (Taylor) would not go with him to
General Shafter's headquarters, and that Taylor de
clined, because of something that was going on on
board the Indiana that required his presence.

Suppose that Taylor had gone, and that the Span
iards had deferred their exit for two short hours. In
that event Sampson and his party would have been on
shore, astride of horses or mules, part way up to
Shafter's headquarters, and when Cervera came out
the New York and Indiana would each have been left
in command of their respective executive officers.

The roar of the battle would have put upon Lieu
tenant Commander Potter, the executive officer of the
New York, the decision of the question whether to
remain at Altares until he could get his admiral and
captain back on board, or, leaving them behind, go at
once to the assistance of his brethren in the fight.
16

242 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

There can be no doubt that Potter would have
promptly chosen the latter course, as would have been
his plain duty, and have done his best to speed the
New York into the fight.

In that case, could she have reached the scene, both
the New York and Indiana would have been fought
under command of their respective executive officers,
instead of their absent captains.

And then of course it would have been in order for
Captains Taylor and Chadwick to claim the credit for
fighting them, and to criticise and find fault with
everything that those executive officers had done —
without any criticism — during the past month or
more before the battle ; and even to make insinuations
as to their courage, in order to deprive them of the
credit of fighting their ships successfully.

If this would not have been proper in Taylor and
Chadwick, with respect to their respective seconds in
command, why not?

Anyone can see the absurdity of the question, and
the proper answer to be given.

In the famous battle between the Confederate iron
clad Virginia (as the Confederates called her) or
Merrimac (as we called her) and our wooden ships,
the Cumberland and Congress, the captains of both
the latter ships were ten miles away, sitting as mem
bers of a court of inquiry at the time the fight began.

Their absence left their respective executive of
ficers — Lieutenant George U. Morris in the Cumber
land and Lieutenant Joseph Smith in the Congress —
in command of those ships respectively.

Every naval officer knows the names and deeds of
Morris and Smith on that day, and the whole world
rang in praise of their gallantry; and history records
it. But who knows who their captains were? The
latter were very gallant and capable officers, and as
soon as the Merrimac was seen to be about to make
the attack they took horse, galloping at full speed to

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 243

Newport News, off which their ships were lying. If
they could have gotten there in time we know that
they would have done their full duty in command, but
as it was, through no fault of theirs, they were not
able to be in it. They therefore claimed no part of
the credit due to "Joe Smith" (as his brethren have
always affectionately remembered him), of the Con
gress, and George U. Morris, of the Cumberland.

Captain (afterwards Rear Admiral) William Rad-
ford commanded the Cumberland, and in his report
said: "I was on board the Roanoke, by order of the
Secretary of the Navy, as member of a court of in
quiry when the Merrimac came out. I immediately
procured a horse and proceeded with all despatch to
Newport News, where I arrived only in time to see
the Cumberland sunk.1

"Though I could not reach the Cumberland before
the action was over, I have the satisfaction of report
ing that she was fought as long as her guns were
above water. Everyone on board must have done his
duty nobly.

"I send, with this, the report of Lieutenant George
U. Morris of the action, he being, in my absence, the
commanding officer."

When old Commodore Smith, the father of Lieu
tenant "Joe" Smith, heard that the Congress had been
surrendered, he exclaimed : "Then Joe's dead."
And so he was.

1 This was exactly Sampson's experience and course.

CHAPTER LX

THE LOOP (SO-CALLED) MADE BY THE "BROOKLYN"

THAT incident of the battle has been the subject of
much inquiry and unfavorable criticism and comment
on the part of Schley's detractors. Even a President
of the United States joined in this, and, in his
memorandum on Schley's appeal to him, says of the
"loop"; "It seriously marred the Brooklyn's other
wise excellent record; being, in fact, the one grave
mistake made by any American ship that day."

The author is not going to make any apologies or
excuses for the uloop," but on the contrary will ex
plain and show clearly that, in the situation that con
fronted the Brooklyn at that moment when Captain
Cook — without direction from Schley — ordered the
helm of the ship "hard-a-port," to make the turn, it
was not only the right thing to do, but the only proper
thing; and that to have turned the other way, under
starboard helm, would have been "the one grave mis
take" ; not only an act of folly, but might, and prob
ably would, have exerted a disastrous effect upon the
fortune of the day; and would probably have re
sulted, not only in the destruction of the Brooklyn, but
in the escape of the Colon and Fiscaya.

It was merely a tactical move, and must be rightly
judged solely by its results.

When in a battle between two prize-fighters one
"knocks the other out," it makes no difference whether
the victor struck the decisive blow with his right fist
or his left; or whether at a critical moment he turned
to the right (starboard) or left (port), or towards
or from his adversary, the better to deliver the knock
out blow.

The on-lookers who were not in the fight may have

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 245

and may express their opinions about it — that's easy
enough ; but the man who knocked the other out gets,
because he deserves, the credit of the victory. In this
case Cook and Schley get no credit for the result, but
only criticism of the method by which that result was
accomplished.

The Brooklyn and the Spanish ships were ap
proaching each other on practically opposite courses,
each steaming at the rate of twelve knotes an hour;
which, for both, was twenty-four knots, or a knot in
two and one-half minutes, and the Teresa (Cervera's
flagship), was only eleven hundred yards away, or, in
time, one minute, forty seconds.

The other Spanish ships were following her at dis
tance (about four hundred yards) from each other,
except the Colon, which was pursuing a course much
inside the others, in the hope to escape — that being
the plan agreed upon.

That the Brooklyn must promptly turn about and
pursue an opposite course admits of no doubt, because
in another two minutes the two leading Spanish ships
would pass her, and she would be between them and
our other ships, thus, as it is termed, "blanketing their
fire."

Turn, therefore, she must, and the only question
was whether the turn should be under port helm, to
starboard (right), or under starboard helm, to port
(left).

The credit (or blame) of beginning the turn under
port helm undoubtedly belongs to Captain Cook. He
first gave the order to his helmsman (Anderson)
"Port." The commodore, Captain Cook, and the
navigator (Hodgson )all agree about that. Captain
Cook testified before the Court of Inquiry: "I gave
the order ; it was not after having heard the commo
dore."

That it met with the approval of Commodore
Schley is also a fact that nobody denies, or wishes to

246 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

deny. He could have given the order "starboard"
instead of "port," if he had thought proper; but he
approved and confirmed Cook's order, and assumed
responsibility for it, and any results that might have
followed.

No one has as yet even suggested that Captain
Cook committed any impropriety, either of action or
motive, in so doing, or insinuated that he was afraid
of getting into too close proximity "to the enemy" in
giving the order "Port." It was done In the exercise
of his best judgment. All who were there approved
of it then, and approve of it now.

To ask from either Cook or Schley reasons influ
encing his mind at the instant it was done would be
futile. "A situation, and not a theory" confronted
them, and there was no time for theorizing, reasoning,
or calculation of chances. They were both profes
sional men of the highest ability, skill, and judgment
and long experience in dealing with the emergencies
of the sea-life and in the handling of ships, and par
ticularly of the Brooklyn. They both seemed to reach
the same conclusion as to the proper way in which to
turn almost at the same instant, because, as Captain
Cook testified: "I gave the order 'Hard-a-port,' to
the helmsman instantly, quicker than 1 can tell it.
The commodore called to me, 'Cook, hard-a-port,'
or 'Is your helm hard-a-port?' My answer was, 'It is
hard-a-port; she is turning as rapidly as possible.' '
The nautical instinct of self-preservation (by which
is meant preservation of their ship) asserted itself
in the .mind of both at the same moment.

It was quite certain that one or the other of the
Spanish ships would ram the Brooklyn, if possible to
do so, and their movements had only a few moments
previously caused Schley to say to Cook: "Look out;
they're going to ram."

Another thing was probably in the mind of both.
Each knew that the enemy's ships were provided with

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 247

self-acting torpedoes that were effective within a
radius of about six hundred yards, and that in about
another minute and a half the Brooklyn would be
within that radius.

In the judgment of both the turn under port helm
meant immunity from torpedo attack, or clanger of
being rammed, for, as Cook testified (I. 898) : "If
she had turned with starboard, instead of port helm,
and the Spaniards had continued on their course south
west, straight for us [the Brooklyn'], it would have
made ramming possible; yes, certainly." (At the
point F in last diagram.)

Cervera's chief of staff (Captain Concas y Palau),
in Chapter IX. p. 68, of his book, reprinted by the
Navy Department says: "The admiral [Cervera]
proceeded to give us instructions for the battle. When
we came out, the Teresa was to engage her [the
Brooklyn] in battle, endeavoring to ram her while
the rest of the ships, headed by the Fiscaya, without
delaying to succor the Teresa, were to pass in column,
between her and the coast and endeavor to escape."

It would have been fatuous, and of the highest de
gree of foolhardiness, to have run the risk of either
under the circumstances.

The following diagram illustrates the turn as it was
actually made, the positions after it was completed,
and the Brooklyn and the four Spanish ships running
on parallel courses to the westward. It also shows the
movements of the Spanish ships before they ran
ashore.

The testimony about this turn or "loop" is as
follows :

Captain Cook (I. 895) : "When I saw the enemy
turn westward I gave the order, 'Hard-a-port.'
Quicker than I can tell it, the commodore called to
me: 'Cook, hard-a-port,' or 'Is your helm hard-a-
port?' My answer was, 'It is hard-a-port; she is
turning as rapidly as possible.' '

248 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

"We made a complete turn, and a very quick turn,
until we came around and paralleled the Spanish fleet
on the other side ; and then we had the Fiscaya on our
starboard bow, and about a-beam was the Oquendo;
and then the Colon"

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson testified (I.
571) : "The Teresa falling off, she got abaft our
port beam, and the helm of the Brooklyn was ported
immediately after that; and we were swinging with
a port helm [to right] ; I heard the commodore sing
out, 'Hard-a-port,' or words to that effect, and Cap
tain Cook sang out to him, 'The helm is a-port.' '

Lieutenant Harlow, in the notes taken by him on
board the Vixen, said: "The Brooklyn at 10 A. M.
was the nearest to, and engaging, the two leading
ships. The two ships were quite close together, with
an interval of perhaps three-fourths of a mile be
tween the second ship and the Colon.

"At 10.05 tne Brooklyn began to turn with the
port helm, and made a complete turn to the eastward,
continuing around so that when again heading west the
enemy's two leading ships bore well on her starboard
bow and the Colon on her starboard quarter, with the
fourth vessel coming up rapidly astern. For the next
fifteen minutes the Brooklyn received and returned the
fire of the enemy's two leading ships, with an occa
sional shot from the Colon"

Intimations have been made that the Brooklyn was
run off on a southerly course two thousand yards (a
nautical mile) before she was brought on a course
parallel to that of the Spaniards.

Captain Taylor (of the Indiana) and his marine
officer (Captain Dawson) were the only two officers
who made that statement before the Court of Inquiry.
Inasmuch as their ship was not less than six miles
away from the Brooklyn at the time the turn was
made, and Taylor's attention was probably engrossed
(certainly ought to have been) by the movements of

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 249

the Spanish ships, his testimony as to what the Brook
lyn was doing would not be very reliable.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson testified (I.
620) : "Any witness who made the statement that the
Brooklyn ran two thousand yards to the south from
the Spanish line of battle, though he might have been
stating what he thought was true, was absolutely mis
taken."

Captain Cook, in reply to a question by the court,
testified (I. 904), in answer to the question, was the
helm of the Brooklyn steadied or cased, at any time
during the turn : "No, no, no, not until she was
around and parallel with the Spanish ships; it was
not even eased."

And the helmsman Anderson, who was produced
by the judge advocate, in reply to the question by the
court, Was the Brooklyn's helm eased or righted from
the time it was first put a-port until she was put on her
westerly course? replied: "No, sir." And Anderson
also testified (I. 1604) : "I understand it has been
stated that she went to the southward and stood on a
southerly course, which is incorrect."

And the finding of the court (I. 1829) put a
quietus on that untruth, which finding was: "The
Brooklyn turned to starboard, with her helm hard-a-
port, and contiued to turn until she headed to the
westward, parallel to the course of the Spanish ships."

In the face of such testimony and that finding of
the court, Mr. John D. Long, formerly Secretary of
the Navy (at p. 36, Vol. ii. of his book lately pub
lished) has had the hardihood to say: "The Brook
lyn began to turn away from the battle line until her
stern was presented to the hostile cruisers. Having
gone to the southward a distance not fully established,
but ranging between eight hundred and two thousand
yards, the Brooklyn turned and ran parallel with the
Spanish ships." And again (at p. 41 ) he says: "Far
out to sea, the Brooklyn, which had been doing mag-

250 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

nifkent work with her battery, after the loop was
made . . ."

For making just such untruthful insinuations in his
(so-called) "Naval History," one Edgar Stanton
Maclay was dismissed in disgrace, by order of Presi
dent Roosevelt, from the service of the United States.
His book was condemned by the Congress of the
United States, and its use in the naval or military
academies was prohibited.

Mr. Maclay did not have the above testimony and
finding to show him his error, and he was undoubtedly
deceived by just such statements as that of Captain
Taylor. Long reviewed all this testimony, and ap
proved the finding of the court.

If Maclay was justly treated, what treatment does
Long deserve?

'

DIAGRAM V. — " The plan of the battle, as given by Captain
Mahan, is here reproduced."

CHAPTER LXI

THE LOOP (CONTINUED) — ITS PROPRIETY ILLUS
TRATED IN THE BATTLE BETWEEN UNITED STATES

FRIGATE "UNITED STATES" AND THE BRITISH
FRIGATE "MACEDONIAN"

IT was clearly the duty of Commodore Schley and
Captain Cook not to take unnecessary risks in per
forming the duty of that moment.

If a ship has guns that will enable her captain to
keep out of the range of the enemy's guns and tor
pedoes, and knock that enemy to pieces without "get
ting her into dangerous proximity" to that enemy, it
would be the worst sort of foolhardiness if, for mere
purposes of individual display, he should go within
range of the guns and torpedoes of that enemy. He
would simply be a vainglorious fool to do so.

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, United States ^ Navy
(who is one of the best authorities on such subjects),
in the May, 1904, number of Scribner's Magazine, in
an article, "The War of 1812," well illustrates the
truth of the last statements in a critical description of
the battle between the United States Frigate United
States, commanded by Captain Stephen Decatur (who
was, as Gleaves says, "the most brilliant sailor officer
the navy of the United States has ever produced"}.
and the British frigate Macedonian, commanded by
Captain Garden, resulting in the capture of the latter
ship with very little loss to the former.

The plan of the battle, as given by Captain Mahan,
is here reproduced. Diagram V.

At 8.30 A. M. the two ships were approaching each
other exactly as the Brooklyn and the Spanish ships
were just before the "loop" — that is to say, each had
the other on the port bow.

252 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Mahan says (p. 604) : "The United States was
fully fifty per cent, stronger than the Macedonian in
artillery power."

The United States at that time put her helm "hard-
a-port" (just as the Brooklyn did), thus turning away
from instead of towards her enemy (just as the Brook
lyn did). Or to use the elegantly expressed insinua
tion of Ex-Secretary Long regarding the Brooklyn's
actions at the Battle of Santiago (Vol. ii, p. 36 of his
book), "Thus began to turn away from the battle
line, until her stern was presented to the hostile
cruiser." After a little time she a second time turned
"away from her foe," again "presenting her stern to
the hostile cruiser" ; and she, a third time, ran further
away from her foe.

Mahan of this maneuvering, says (p. 608) that
"the action of the United States puzzled the British
extremely. Her first wearing [turning away from the
Macedonian] was interpreted as running away."]

Three cheers were given [by the British] , as though
victorious in repelling an attack.2

"The handling of the United States was thoroughly
skillful. Though he probably knew himself superior
in force, Captain Decatur's object necessarily should
be to take his opponent at the least possible injury to
his own ship.

"In general principle the great French Admiral
Courville correctly said : 'The best victories are those
which cost least in blood, timber, and iron."

"Captain Carden, of the Macedonian, had no hesi
tation as to the need of getting near [the United
States]. To avoid this was therefore not only fitting,
but the bounden duty of the American captain.

"His business was not merely to make a brilliant
display of courage and efficiency, but to do the utmost

1That is what Schley's critics have insinuated and professed to
believe.

2 We have no report of any cheers by the Spanish on July 3,

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 253

injury to the opponent at the least harm to his own
ship and men."

This battle is also described by Mr. Theodore
Roosevelt, in his book entitled - - and he

therein gives a diagram which shows these turnings
from the English ship, but not to so marked a degree.
And thus these two great naval authorities agree in
commending the course pursued by Decatur.

Tested by these sound and sensible principles, thus
stated by our most able critic, Mahan, and Roosevelt,
Cook and Schley, in making that turn as they did, did
exactly what was right to be done — what Captain
Decatur twice did in one battle, and what Mahan says
"was thoroughly skillful."

Decatur brought the captured Macedonian into
New York, where he was received by his fellow-coun
trymen (just as Schley has been) with universal and
hearty praise.

What a pity it was that there was not some Maclay
or Long to make insinuations against him for turning
three times away from his foe !

The criticism of the "loop" has been indulged in by
a President of the United States, who said: "Had
the Brooklyn turned to the westward, that is, in the
same direction that the Spanish ships were going, in
stead of the contrary direction, she would undoubtedly
have been in a more dangerous proximity to them.
But it would have been more dangerous to them as
well as for her. This kind of danger must not be too
nicely weighed by those whose duty it is to do and
dare for the honor of the flag. Moreover, the danger
certainly was not as great as that which, in that self
same moment, menaced Wainwright's fragile craft as
he drove forward against the foe."

The innuendo of the last statements and the com
parison with Wainwright were not necessary to a judi
cial determination.

254 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Comparisons are always odious, and one who
makes them should be sure of his parallelism.

The President says that he had examined all the
official reports of every kind in reference to the San
tiago campaign. He could not have examined with
any great care or comprehension the reports made by
Captain Wainwright and his executive officer, Lieu
tenant Huse (A. 540-1), wherein Wainwright said:
"It was the plain duty of the Gloucester to look after
the destroyers, and she was held back, gaining steam,
until they appeared in the entrance. The Indiana
poured in a hot fire upon the destroyers from all her
secondary batteries, but Captain Taylor's signal,
'Gunboats close in,' gave security that we would not
be fired upon by our own ships."

Lieutenant Huse says (A. 541) : "In the belief
that the two torpedo destroyers known to be in the
harbor would come out, you directed me to slow down
and wait for them, keeping up a deliberate fire on the
cruisers from the port battery.

"Presently signal was made from the Indiana,
'Gunboats will advance.' After this signal it ap
peared that the fight between this ship and the ap
parently uninjured destroyers was a thing apart from
the battle in which the larger ships were engaged."
In this he was mistaken.

Captain Taylor, of the Indiana, says (A. 530,
531) : "Our secondary battery guns were directed
principally on the destroyers, as were the six-inch
guns. The destroyers were sunk through the agency
of our guns and those of the Gloucester, which vessel
came up and engaged them close aboard. At about
10.15 we devoted our especial attention to prevent the
escape of the destroyers, which appeared to be more
than a match for the Gloucester, she being the only
small vessel near, to engage them. They were soon
seen to blow up, apparently struck by our six-inch and
six-ponders."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 255

Captain Evans, of the Iowa, in his report of the
battle (A. 537) says: "About ten o'clock the
enemy's torpedo boat destroyers Furor and Pluton
were observed to leave the harbor and to be following
the Spanish squadron. At the time they were discov
ered (and, in fact, most of the time they were under
fire) they were at a distance varying from 4500 to
4000 yards. As soon as they were discovered the
secondary battery of this ship was turned upon them.
About 10.25 tne fire °f tms vessel, together with that
of the Gloucester and another small vessel, proved so
disastrous that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers
(Pluton) was so damaged that she was run upon the
rocks." After his characterise fashion, Evans
ignores the fire of the other battle-ships.

The log-book of the Texas contains the following :
"Four ships came out; besides these there were two
torpedo-boat destroyers. These two were compelled
to run ashore by this ship and the Gloucester."

From the log-book of the Oregon the following is
taken: "Shortly after the beginning of the engage
ment one torpedo destroyer was seen to steam in
towards the beach, and the other was blown up by a
shot from the after six-inch gun of this ship."

In his report (A. 526) Captain Clark says:
"When it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo-
boats were following their ships, we used our rapid-
fire guns, as well as the six-inch, upon them with tell
ing effect."

In the notes taken on board the Vixen appears the
following: "10.32, — Two small vessels, probably
the torpedo-boat destroyers, the Pluton and Furor,
were to the westward of Cabanas, engaged by the
Iowa and Texas;" and "10.50. — A small vessel, evi
dently a yacht, appeared off Guyacabon, hotly engag
ing some of the enemy's ships."

Now, the author does not wish or purpose to de
tract in the slightest degree from the gallantry, ability,

256 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

and skill displayed by Captain Wainwright of the
Gloucester, and his officers and crew, on that occasion.
But Wainwright was not the foolhardy man that the
President seems to think Cook and Schley ought to
have been. Wainwright knew that he might have a
highly important duty to perform, — which was to
protect the battle-ships against the attacks of those
torpedo boats, — and he therefore, as in their official
reports he and Huse say he did, "held his ship back,
gaining steam," and waiting for the proper time when
trie signal from the Indiana and the support of the
powerful batteries of the Indiana, Iowa, Texas, and
Oregon warranted his advance. Then, and not till
then, he went in with a dashing gallantry never ex
celled in any naval battle except perhaps that of Nel
son in the Captain in the Battle of St. Vincent. There
is, however, this difference between the two cases:
Wainwright's gallantry was displayed in obedience to
signal; Nelson's was without — in fact contrary to, —
orders.

Any comparison between the situation of the
Gloucester, supported, as she was, by four battle-ships
and another small vessel, and directed to go in by the
signal of his superior officer, and the situation of the
Brooklyn at the time of making that turn, fighting, as
Captain Clark says, those four Spanish ships alone,
is far-fetched and absurd, no matter who makes the
comparison.

If Wainwright had been foolhardy enough to
attack the Spanish cruisers, and the Gloucester had
been sunk, as she certainly would have been, it would
have been no appreciable consequence to the result;
but the loss of the Brooklyn at that time would have
been a most serious and probably fatal calamity, so
far as the capture or destruction of the Fiscaya and
Colon was concerned.

One more quotation and we will have done with
this subject.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 257

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, the navigator of
the Brooklyn, wrote to Admiral Schley concerning
that turn (I. 592) : "It proved to be a strategical
move of the greatest importance, and the result of the
battle proved its wisdom. And the successful issue of
the turn, the gallant closing in of the Brooklyn upon
the fleeing enemy, the bulldog tenacity with which she
held on, her magnificent fighting and glorious scars,
will always attest your leadership and bravery."

Captain Cook was promoted five numbers for his
conduct in the battle of Santiago (as were all the
other captains of ships engaged).

Cook began the "loop." Schley merely approved
of it. If there was anything wrong about it, why
should Cook be promoted, and Schley not only not
promoted, but condemned?

In this connection let me add my approval of the
praise so gallantly and justly earned by Lieutenant
Commander Richard Wainwright, commander of the
Gloucester in that battle. He comes of fighting naval
stock, and he proved himself worthy his lineage.

And I deem it but just to quote what he said of his
executive officer, Lieutenant Harry McL. P. Huse,
in his report (A. 40), which is as follows: "The
escape of the Gloucester was due mainly to the accu
racy and rapidity of her fire. The efficiency of this
fire, as well as that of the ships generally, was largely
due to the intelligent and unremitting efforts of the
executive officer, lieutenant Harry P. Huse. The re
sult is more to his credit, when it is considered that a
large proporition of the officers and men were un
trained when the Gloucester was commissioned.
Throughout the action he was on the bridge and car
ried out my orders with great coolness."

Such praise is worthy all the publicity that can be
given to it.

The majority of the Court of Inquiry expressed the

'7

258 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

opinion that "by commencing the engagement on July
3 with the port battery, and turning the Brooklyn
around with port helm, Commodore Schley caused her
to lose distance and position with the Spanish vessels,
especially with the Fiscaya and Colon."

Let us see about that. This is the situation after
the turn, as told by an absolutely impartial witness :

Lieutenant Harlow, of the Fixen, testified (I.
I33°) : "It was not until after the Fiscaya had gone
on shore at Asserederos that it was apparent to any
body on board the Fixen that there had been any
fighting by any ship except the Brooklyn, a little by
the Oregon, and a little by the Texas, except that fire
which was concentrated on the Morro as the ships
came out. From my positive knowledge, I saw the
Brooklyn receiving and returning the fire, almost the
entire fire, of the two leading ships, with an occasional
shot from the Colon. I was in a position to see the
flash, and immediately afterwards, or shortly after
wards, the fall of the projectiles; and the proportion
between the flash and the fall showed that a large
proportion fell about the Brooklyn. I made a note at
the time, and remember distincly that it was evident
that the Colon was using smokeless powder; so I was
not able to detect the fall of as many shells from the
Colon as I was from the two leading ships. I have
very good reason for believing that the projectiles
which set on fire the Fiscaya, and compelled her to
turn inshore, came entirely from the Brooklyn; and
that there was at that time no other ship within range
of the Fiscaya.

"As I have said before, I repeat now, from my
point of view (calmly, and carefully watching), the
Brooklyn was receiving the bulk of the fire from the
two leading ships, with occasional shots from the
third."

Captain Clark, of the Oregon, testified (I. 1336) :
"I never saw the Brooklyn until I came out of the

SCHLEY, SAMPSON .AND CERVERA 259

smoke and saw her ahead. She must have been en
gaged with all four of the enemy's ships."

"Lose distance and position with the Spanish
vessels!"

Those poor Spaniards, with her shells bursting all
about them, burning, sinking, and fleeing to the shore,
didn't think the Brooklyn had lost any distance or
position, and it was preposterous for the majority of
the court to make that finding.

CHAPTER LXII

THE ALLEGED DANGER OF COLLISION BETWEEN THE
"BROOKLYN" AND "TEXAS"

LET us now consider the matter of the alleged danger
of collision between the Brooklyn and the Texas.
There was no reference in any of the official or news
paper reports of the battle as to the possibility or
danger of such a collision.

Strong effort has, however, been made by Schley's
detractors to make it appear that in turning about
("making the loop") the Brooklyn ran into great
danger of such collision with the Texas.

The sole foundation for this story was an article
printed in the Century Magazine for May, 1899, by
Captain John W. Philip, who commanded the Texas
in the battle.

He described this incident of the battle thus : "The
smoke from our guns began to hang so heavily and
densely over the ships that, for a few minutes, we
could see nothing. We might as well have had a
blanket over our heads. Suddenly, a whiff of breeze
and a lull in the firing lifted the pall, and there, bear
ing towards us and across our bows, turning on her
port helm, with big waves curling over her bows and
great clouds of black smoke pouring from her funnels,
was the Brooklyn. She looked as big as half a dozen
Great Easterns, and seemed so near that it took my
breath away. 'Back both engines hard!' went down
the tube to the astonished engineers, and in a twin
kling the old ship was racing against herself. The col
lision which seemed imminent, even if it was not, was
averted, and, as the big cruiser glided past, all of us
on the bridge gave a sigh of relief."

Philip had died before the Court of Inquiry was

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 261

held, and when that magazine article was mentioned
by Schley's counsel before the court, the judge advo
cate promptly objected to all reference to it, and it
was ruled out by the court.

But the President and Ex-Secretary Long (in his
book) having both cited it to support a conclusion ad
verse to Schley, in having endangered the Texas, it is
thought proper to insert the foregoing citation from
the article.

It will be observed that Philip does not say that
there was danger of a collision, but merely that "it
seemed imminent, even if it was not." The statement
regarding the menace to the Texas' safety was never
made until this magazine article appeared, and Cap
tain Cook testified (I. 896) : "I didn't hear anything
about it until long afterwards." That is, long after
the battle. The testimony to support the statement
that the Texas had been endangered, was as follows :

Thomas M. Dieuwaide, a newspaper correspond
ent, — produced as a witness by the judge advo
cate, — was on the bridge of the Texas, at the time,
and testified (I. 398) :

"I saw the Brooklyn ten or fifteen minutes after the
battle began. When I first saw her she was off the
port bow of the Texas. I would not like to make any
estimate of the distance, — how far away; she seemed
very close to me. She was going seaward, and it was
her stern that I saw."

From Dieuwaide's statement there was absolutely
no possibility of collision, unless the Brooklyn should
stop, reverse, get a sternway on, and back into the
Texas.

Dieuwaide continued: "I have an entry in my
notes, 'Stop both engines; helm hard-a-starboard,'
and another, 'It was the Brooklyn; close shave.7 '

It seems incredible that Philip, who was a fine sea
man and had had a large experience in the manage
ment of the large steamships of the Pacific Mail

262 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Steamship Company for several years, should have
done anything so unseamanlike as to put the helm of
the Texas hard-a-starboard to avoid a collision with
the Brooklyn, if the latter was crossing the bows of
the Texas from starboard to port. If he did so, he
must have been "rattled," and that I cannot believe.

Dieuwaide must have got that order "starboard"
wrong as to the time when it was given. It would
have been necessary, shortly before that, for Captain
Philip to give that order "starboard"; but not with
reference to the Brooklyn.

It is worthy of note that Dieuwaide, as soon as pos
sible that afternoon of July 3, cabled to his news
agency an account of the battle (which was printed in
the New York Sun), in which he said not a word
about the turn of the Brooklyn or of danger of col
lision with the Texas.

Commander Heilner (navigator of the Texas dur
ing the battle) testified (I. 127) : "When the second
of the enemy's ships followed the first to the west
ward, he [Captain Philip] put our helm a-starboard.
I had made several reports to him about the Brook
lyn, — that is, about her signals, — of which he said:
'Never mind' ; and also the way I thought the Brook
lyn was standing up to the fight, as I said, very nicely.
The captain said : 'Oh, cracky ! never mind the Brook
lyn. You look out for this ship.' The Brooklyn was
then about on our port beam. I said: 'All right,
Captain; I will look at the Bro okly n no more' ; and
I turned my back and looked over on the starboard
beam at those ships coming out. After we slewed
[turned] around and got to the westward, I suggested
to give her a little port helm, to get closer in ; and he
did."

This conflicts with Dieuwaide, and the next sen
tence more so.

"Right after he gave her this port helm, he sang
out through sight holes, to the men at the engine room

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 263

indicators, to 'slow'; then 'stop.' I said, 'Captain,
they will all get away from us.' He did not answer
me, but immediately said, 'Back.' I then said: 'My
Lord, Captain, we are out of the fight.' He then
said : 'Look at the Brooklyn.'

"I turned around, and right ahead of us this big
gray ship loomed out of the smoke. For a second, I
think, my heart was in my mouth; but I saw at once
that she had a heavy sheer, — or, rather, that she was
steaming with a heavy helm, and she sheered by us.
When I saw her she was practically ahead of us, —
that is, the first I saw of her. As soon as the Brook
lyn cleared us we rang to go ahead. Just before this
turn of the Brooklyn, the Iowa and the Oregon were
both close to us on our starboard beam."

The testimony given by others than those on board
the Texas, was, on the other hand, as follows :

Captain Francis A. Cook (of the Brooklyn) said
(I. 895) : "We ported our helm from about north
east. The Texas was well on our starboard [right]
hand. As I saw her, I saw her port bow. I never
saw the starboard bow of the Texas. And, changing
her bearing very rapidly, the Brooklyn turned [her
bow] along the port side of the Texas until there was
a clear space between the Brooklyn's bow and the
stern of the Texas."

At this point of the testimony Admiral Dewey in
terposed with the following question :

Q. May I interrupt you there? How near did you
pass to the Texas?

A. In my estimate, at the time, the thought of col
lision ne'uer entered my head. I never for a moment
had any idea of solicitude in that respect. We -passed,
I should judge, about four hundred yards. I had
handled that ship under all circumstances, and had
gotten so that I could judge distances pretty correctly;
and my impression was, at the time, that we were
about our distance that we sailed in squadron; but

264 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

collision never entered my head, and I didn't hear
anything about it until long afterwards. She turned
perfectly clear of the Texas."

If Cook had seen the starboard side of the Texas he
could not but have known that there was danger of
collision, and would immediately have whistled to the
Texas his purpose to cross her bow.

The "Rules of the Road" enacted by Congress, as
adopted by all maritime nations for the prevention of
collisions at sea, provide :

Art. 1 6. If two ships under steam are crossing so
as to involve risk of collision, the ship that has the
other on her own starboard side shall keep out of the
way of the other. And

Art. 20. Where, by the above rules, one of two
ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep
her course.

The Texas, in the situation, would have had
the Brooklyn on her (Texas) starboard side;
ond thus the Brooklyn (apart from the fact that
she was the flagship, and could go where she
pleased) would have clearly had the right of way,
and it was the duty of the Texas to keep out of the
way.

Lieutenant Sears (I. 1007) when asked by the
court: "At the time the Brooklyn turned to star
board, was her distance more or less than what is
known as 'distance,' when ships are in column?" re
plied : "It was not far from that distance." And on
page 974 he said: "When the order was given,
'Hard-a-port,' I looked to the next vessel in our fleet,
the Texas; and in my judgment we were completely
clear of her. As we turned, we passed well clear of
her."

And on page 1008 he was questioned and answered
as follows:

Q. Do you know whether the Brooklyn crossed
the bows of the Texas?

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 265

A. She did not.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who called the
attention of both the commodore and Captain Cook,
to the Texas, testified (I. 572) : "The Brooklyn
swung well clear of the Texas, and came around with
helm 'hard-a-port.'

Q. (By the judge advocate) : I want to ask you
how near was the Texas to the Brooklyn when she
crossed the bow of the Texas, and you spoke to Com
modore Schley about it? How near were the two
vessels ?

A. Well, I suppose, sir, about 250 to 300 yards.
The witness then read from notes: "We quickly
put our helm a-port, and wore round to starboard,
passing well inside the Texas" and added: "This
was the account written by me the day after the
battle."

Lieutenant Harlow, who was on the bridge of the
Vixen taking notes, in reply to the court's question
(I. 1333) : "If you saw the Texas while the Brook
lyn was turning to starboard on July 3, how near were
those two ships?" answered: "At no time were they
sufficiently near to give me any idea of collision."
And (I. 1331) : "I saw the Texas at the time of the
'loop.' She was to the eastward. The Brooklyn
made the 'loop' and started to the westward, and I
don't think the other vessels had started in to the
westward."

Lieutenant Commander Nicholson (who as navi
gator of the Oregon had been on her magnificent voy
age 'round from the Pacific) was asked: Q. When
you passed under the stern of the Texas can you esti
mate the distance between the Brooklyn and Texas
about that time? and replied (I. mi) : "Well, I
thought she was a mile, or mile and a half, away, I
never saw her [the Texas~\ when she was any closer
than then to the Brooklyn. I never saw the Brooklyn

266 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

anywhere near the Texas" And (I. 1 1 15 ) : "I did
not see them come anywheres near each other."

Admiral Schley testified (I. 1338) : "I never saw
the starboard side of the Texas at all. We were never
across her bow. I saw only her port side, and she
never approached any position that was within six
hundred yards of the Brooklyn. She was so distant
that it never entered my head at all as a menace or
danger."

It would seem quite clear from all this testimony
that the turn (or "loop") of the Brooklyn did not in
any way, or to any degree, menace the Texas with
collision; and that the two vessels were never nearer
each other than four hundred yards, — if so near.

That the captain of the Texas, for an instant only,
thought a collision possible, there is no doubt.
Whence his apprehension?

In his book "James Lawrence," Lieutenant Com
mander Cleaves says :

"The affair with the Leopard had effectually con
demned the Chesapeake and sealed her untoward
reputation, for, as is well known, to seamen a ship
becomes endowed with human virtues or human
thoughts. To them she ceases to be a mere inanimate
thing of wood or iron, for in their eyes she is a living
organism, and as such acquires a reputation for good
or evil; and in a short time establishes a permanent
reputation.

"The Chesapeake was considered the most unlucky
ship in the navy, and from the time she was launched
until Barren's bullet, at Bladensburg twenty years
later, slew the most brilliant sailor officer the navy of
the United States has ever produced, she seemed to
exercise a baleful influence upon everyone connected
with her.

"Like Oedipus in the fable, she was pursued by a
malignant fate from which it seemed impossible to
escape."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 267

Captain Philip was personally as brave a man as
ever trod a deck, but affected possibly by the feeling
Cleaves has so well stated, he might have regarded
the Texas as "a hoodooed" ship. She had been un
fortunate from the start. She was built from plans
brought from England, had some trouble at her
launching, and had mysteriously sunk while lying at
the wharf at the Navy Yard, Brooklyn.

Philip, in that Century article, tells of an interview
he had had with a woman in the Navy Yard, just be
fore he sailed. She, in bidding him good-by, said
that she was the last person who had shaken hands
with the captain of the ill-fated Huron, which was
wrecked on the coast of North Caroline a few hours
after leaving port.

Speaking (in the magazine) of the turning of the
Brooklyn, he says : "It was the one time in the battle
when I thought for a second that I should have to give
in to that woman in Brooklyn who shook hands with
me just before the Texas sailed." And he adds: "I
always did want to fool that woman."

Philip, a short time before his death, said to the
author, when asked if there really was danger of col
lision, "No; not at all. But when I saw that great
ship coming out through that pall of smoke with her
batteries a sheet of flame, belching fire from her three
great smokestacks and all her guns, she looked as big
as a mountain ; and for an instant my heart was in
my mouth, and I gave the order to back immediately;
but countermanded it."

Captain Cook has told the author that Philip made
the same statement, in substance, to him.

CHAPTER LXIII

THE PERSONAL CONDUCT OF COMMODORE SCHLEY
DURING THE BATTLE

IN taking up the matter of the personal conduct of
Commodore Schley at the Battle of Santiago, it seems
almost an insult to the gallant commodore even to
allude to that subject; but there have been so many
insinuations and suggestions made, even by those in
high places, that it will be well to give the testimony
of those who saw him during the progress of the
battle; and who, consequently, know whereof they
speak.

Lieutenant Templin M. Potts (suggestive name),
who was the officer who for some reason was
unable to get the ranges right on the day of
the reconnaissance ( May 31) while navigator of
the Massachusetts (as hereinbefore stated), having
intimated that during that reconnaissance the com
modore had betrayed some nervousness or excite
ment, Potts' captain (now Rear Admiral) Higginson
was requested to "describe definitely the bearing of
Commodore Schley at the time."

He replied: "His bearing was that of a com-
mander-in-chief. I don't know what you mean."

Of the commodore's conduct during the battle with
Cervera's fleet, July 3, the subjoined testimony calls
for little or no comment.

Captain Cook (I. 899) testified:

Q. (By judge advocate) : What was the conduct
and bearing of Commodore Schley while under fire
on such occasions as you have had opportunity of ob
serving?

A. I have always regarded him as an enthusiasti
cally brave and patriotic officer; never in any other
light.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 269

Q. (By the Court) : Please state what was the
conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley during the
battle of July 3d. The answer to the question pre
viously given by you does not refer specifically to this
date.

A. I cannot imagine any conduct in battle more
admirable. He was cool, brave, and enthusiastic,
from the beginning to the end of the battle."

Q. (I. 992) : Was Commodore Schley's position
upon the Brooklyn on the day of the battle one of
danger?

A. Yes. As much so as that of anyone's on board
the Brooklyn. He was in the open all the time.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson, who was labor
ing under a feeling that Commodore Schley had not
been just to him, and was close to the commodore all
through the action, testified (I. 619) : "The bearing
and manner of Commodore Schley during the engage
ment of July 3 were the bearing and manner that you
would expect an officer of his rank and station in the
service to have. That is all I should say. It was the
natural manner of a commander-in-chief of the naval
forces on that occasion. His position was a point of
danger. He was always in full view of the enemy's
ships."

Lieutenant Edward Simpson (I. 1255) testified:
"I very often heard the commodore's voice, cheering
us on to fire rapidly. 'Give it to them, boys,' and ex
pressions of that sort. As the Fiscaya's fire slackened,
I heard the commodore's voice giving the order, 'Fire
deliberately, boys.' As the Fiscaya turned and
headed inshore, the Oregon fired one of her big bow
guns. I heard the commodore say: 'He has raked
her, and she is on fire. Signal to the Oregon to cease
firing.' I saw Ensign McCauley climbing up on top
of my turret with a wig-wag flag, and I could hear the
flapping of the flag.

"I saw the commodore (I. 1256) several times dur-

270 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

ing the action. The principal time I recall seeing him
was just when the Fiscaya was about two points for
ward of our starboard beam. I then saw the commo
dore standing leaning against the turret, in the most
natural position, with his glasses on his arm and his
hand up to his chin. I was about ten feet from him.
His bearing was that of a brave man, self-possessed,
alert to his duties, and encouraging his officers and
men in their duties."

Major Paul St. Clair Murphy, of the Marines (I.
1301) : "I saw Commodore Schley on three or four
occasions during the battle. His manner and conduct
impressed me, as they seemed to impress everyone on
board the Brooklyn — it was that of a brave and reso
lute officer. It inspired the utmost enthusiasm
thoughout the ship."

Captain T. S. Borden, of the Marines (I. 1541) :
"I saw the commodore during the battle; once imme
diately after the 'loop' was made; twenty minutes
been destroyed, except the Fiscaya and the Colon.
His bearing was everything that the crew expected,
and the officers; and everything that could be ex
pected."

Lieutenant Edward McCauley (I. 1037) : "The
conduct and bearing of Commodore Schley on the day
of the battle were perfectly cool and steady. He
made encouraging remarks to the officers and crew.
'Give them hell, bullies.' Said that several times."

Lieutenant J. P. J. Ryan (I. 1139) : "I saw Com
modore Schley all the time. His manner and bearing
were admirable, I think. He was on the fighting side
of the ship all the time; was exposed all the time."

Carpenter George H. Warford (I. 1134): "I
saw Commodore Schley several times during the bat
tle. His bearing was that of a brave and fearless
officer. I heard him encourage the men. Heard him
say: 'Give them hell, bullies.' 'Well done, bullies.' '

Passed Assistant Surgeon C. M. De Valin (I.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 271

1117): "I saw Commodore Schley during the whole
time of the battle, and his manner and bearing were
all that could be desired or expected. He seemed to
know what he was about, and doing what he wished
to do, in complete command of the situation."

Gunner F. T. Applegate (I. 1391) : "Saw Com
modore Schley several times during the battle, and
spoke to him. He seemed to be cool, calm, and col
lected, and wanted to inspire confidence."

Orderly Lennis J. Cronin (I. 1237) : "His man
ner was such that it inspired the men under him with
confidence."

Chief-Boatswain William L. Hill (I. 1276):
"The Viscaya was putting up the best fight of any of
them Spanish ships there. She fought well; and
them big shells were going over us, and a great many
people ducked. The shells sounded like half a dozen
railroad trains under way; made the same kind of a
'Chuck, chuck, chuck,' and down would go a head;
but Commodore Schley's head never bent." [Loud
applause broke out from the spectators in the court
room.] "He was as calm and collected as he is at
this moment. He called me to him constantly, as the
different events occurred, and said, 'Do the bullies
below know this ?' Do they know this or that ship has
gone ashore? and his whole idea seemed to be that he
wanted the people below to know as much about it as
those of us who were on deck."

In the face of such testimony as was given by these
officers and men before the Court of Inquiry, its find
ing on this subject was tame and cold. That finding
was as follows, viz. :

"His [Commodore Schley's] conduct during the
battle of July 3 was self-possessed; and he encour
aged, in his own person, his subordinate officers and
men to fight courageously."

The majority of that court was not going to display
any enthusiasm in praising the commodore.

272 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

That finding, however, disposes of and refutes all
the base insinuations, by whomsoever made, that any
of Schley's actions or orders during that battle, in
cluding the turn or "loop," were prompted by any
feeling, influence, or motive other than a purpose to
do the best possible thing in the performance of the
duties of the hour.

With that finding, and the unanimous testimony of
all who knew (from Captain Cook down to a plain
marine orderly), given before the Court of Inquiry,
it was criminally ridiculous for any of the officials to
pretend or believe otherwise. No one has had the
manliness to make any charge directly or in the open,
It has only been base insinuation — from the highest
to the lowest of those in official station who have dealt
with the matter.

CHAPTER LXIV

UNDER WHOSE COMMAND WAS THE BATTLE OF
SANTIAGO FOUGHT AND WON?

INASMUCH as much time and effort have been made
to place the honor of command at the battle of July 3
where it does not belong — obviously denying it to its
proper officer — a summary of evidence touching upon
this point will determine the matter.

As has been already stated, on the morning of July
3, 1908, the log-book of the New York, Admiral
Sampson's Flagship, records (I. Ex. A. 107) :

"At 8.50 started at full speed under three boilers,
for Altares (Siboney), accompanied by the Hist and
Ericsson, after making signal1 to the rest of the fleet,
to disregard movements of the commander-in-chief."

Mr. John D. Long, then Secretary of the Navy, in
his letter of February 6, 1899, to the Senate, in re
sponse to the resolution of the Senate of January 230!,

before cited (p. ), failed to make any reference

to, or mention of, that signal as having been made
by Admiral Sampson that morning.

This failure may have been through ignorance on
the part of the secretary. But Captains Evans and
Taylor were not ignorant that that signal had been
made, and it was clearly their duty, as members of the
board of compilers of the despatches and reports re
ferring to the events of that day, to make mention of
that signal. Evans and Taylor were clearly, and
should have so felt themselves, bound in honor to in-

1 This was the same signal that the commander-in-chief had made
"to the rest of the fleet" on April 22, 1898, as told by Rear Admiral
Robley D. Evans in his book, "A Sailor's Log," p. 412; and referred
to hereinbefore.

18

274 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

form the secretary, and, through him, the Senate
about it.

The secretary's letter mentions several other unim
portant signals, and it requires considerable credulity
to believe that he was innocently kept in ignorance
of that particularly important one, and innocently
failed to make mention of it.

It is also a most significant fact that neither Ad
miral Sampson nor his chief of staff (Captain French
E. Chadwick) and captain of his flagship New York,
made any mention in their respective reports of the
making of that signal.

It is difficult to see how any fair report can be made
of the events of that day if the making of that signal
is omitted therefrom.

But Admiral Schley, in his letter to the Senate of
February 18 (Ex. Doc. D. 171), having mentioned
it, of course it had to be explained away, if possible.
Therefore Mr. Secretary Long, in his letter to the
Senate of March 8, undertook to do so thus (Ex. Doc.
D. 174) : "Admiral Schley's mention of the signal
made by Admiral Sampson, at 8.45 A. M., July 3,
'Disregard movement of the commander-in-chief and
his mention of the movement of the commander-in-
chief towards Siboney, is followed by an incorrect in
ference, to wit, 'This left me senior officer present,
and necessarily clothed me with the responsibilities of
command.' '

It is proper to give the secretary's reasoning, which
is as follows: "The signal mentioned is one which
is frequently made in squadron" (which is true),
"and is never held in any sense a relinquishment of
command" (which may or may not be true, according
to circumstances).

"It is made where, for any reason, the flagship
leaves its assigned position in formation, as was the
case when the New York left her habitual blockading
station that morning of July 3. At such times it is

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 275

made to avoid confusion, which would result if other
vessels, fixing their positions by reference to the flag
ship, were to move with her. Without further sig
nal the responsibility of command would not be
shifted until the senior officer had gone out of signal
distance."

This last statement is correct, for it is undoubtedly
true that the senior officer cannot relieve himself of
the responsibility of the command that rests upon
him and impose that responsibility upon his junior
merely by making that signal. But if he goes beyond
signal distance, the senior left behind becomes, with
or without the signal, ipso facto clothed with that
responsibility.

To the secretary, reply may be made that the flag
ship might have on that morning moved all about
the blockade without disturbing the formation of the
blockading fleet, since every vessel had her assigned
position, fixed not at all by any reference to the posi
tion of the flagship, but with reference to the Morro
at the entrance to the harbor. And Sampson's order
of blockade provides that, if any vessel is "with
drawn for other duty, the blockading vessels on either
side will cover the angle thus left vacant."

The source of the secretary's inspiration will be
apparent to anyone who reads the comments on that
signal submitted by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans,
to the President (I. 1931) in the President's memo
randum on Schley's appeal to him. But Evans in
practice differed from Evans in theory. On the
afternoon of April 22, 1898, Admiral Sampson, as
Evans states ("A Sailor's Log," p. 412) "left his
place in column, flying the signal, 'Disregard move
ments of the commander-in-chief.' I, as next in rank
to Sampson, hoisted the guard flag; and, as senior
officer present, held the fleet to its course direct for
the Morro Castle at the entrance of the harbor of,
Havana."

276 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

But all theories and opinions are vain in the face
of the Naval Regulations on the subject. These are
as follows and are quoted from "Regulations for the
Government of the Navy" (in force July 3, 1898).

"Art. 53. By the force of naval law and regula
tions made in conformity therewith, the following
principles are established, and exist as essentials of all
military service, without which there can be neither
command, discipline, nor responsibility.

"i. Officers entrusted with the command of war
or naval vessels, or with the command or direction
of any military duty, whatever their rank, while
properly in such command or direction have full
command authority and precedence over all persons
of whatever rank serving in such vessel, station or
expedition; or in the execution of such duty. This
authority and precedence will descend to the officer
or person on whom such command or direction may
devolve by reason of the death, disability or absence
of the person otherwise in command or direction.

"2. In case of the death, disability or absence of
an officer in military command or direction, this com
mand and direction, with all its authority and pre
cedence, devolves and rests upon the line officer next
in rank who may be present and on duty with such
command.''

Art. 1 8, par, 4, prescribes that "at all times and
places not specifically provided for in these regula
tions, where the exercise of military authority for the
purpose of co-operation or otherwise is a necessity,
of which the responsible officer must be the judge,
the senior line officer on the spot shall assume com
mand, and direct the movements and efforts of all
persons in the navy present."

Art. 325. — The senior officer present shall dis
charge the duties of the flag officer in chief command,
as laid down in paragraphs [enumerating them, of
which Arts. 268, 270, and 271 refer to battle], and

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 277

authority for that purpose Is hereby conferred upon
him.

It is a question how far the flagship New York
went to the eastward that morning. As to this the
only positive and impartial evidence must be the log
entries made at the time, before any controversy had
arisen.

It is a significant fact that neither Sampson nor
Chadwick claims that the New York was within
signal distance of the ships actually engaged in
the battle. Sampson does say (A. 507) : "The
New York turned about and steamed for the
escaping fleet, flying the signal 'Close in towards
harbor entrance, attach vessels.' 'However, none of
the reports or entries made that day in any of the
log-books mentions having seen that signal, or of
any action taken with circumstances. The expres
sion means 'distance within which signals can be read
at the time they are made/ '

Captain Taylor's idea of the extreme distance with
in which signals can be read is shown by his sworn
testimony given in the prize case of the Panama.
The captain was endeavoring to show that his vessel
(the Indiana} was within "signal distance," in order
that she might share in the prize. Self-interest, then,
would prompt him not in understate the distance
within which signals can be read.

The captain was asked the question, "What would
you call the distance at which, under most favorable
circumstances, signals could be read?" His answer
was: "Under most favorable conditions of light,
clearness of atmosphere, and everything possible, up
to eight miles — under favorable circumstances."

Admiral Sampson, in his report, written July 15,
(A. 506), said: "The New York was about four
miles east of her blockading station, and seven miles
from the harbor entrance." If that statement were

278 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

correct, then her "full speed under three boilers" that
morning was only a trifle over five knots an hour.

But the log-book tells a different tale.

From that log-book it appears that, instead of
going four miles only, the New York actually went
9.5 miles east from her blockading station, or more
than twice as far as the admiral states, and, adopting
the rest of the admiral's statement, the New York
was I2j^ (nautical, or nearly 14.5 statute) miles
from the mouth of the harbor when Cervera came
out, or twice as far as the admiral estimated.

That log-book of the New York for the forenoon
of July 3 was most carefully written. There were
no alterations or interlineations in it. It was duly
signed by Lieutenant Frank Marble, the officer of the
watch, and the regulations (Art. 568) required that
it should be examined and signed by the navigator,
and submitted to the captain before i P. M. daily.
Whether that was done with the log-book of July
3 does not appear, although that of the previous day
bears the endorsement: "Examined and found cor
rect — John E. Roller, Lieutenant and Navigator."

Naturally, and probably, in writing the log for
that day they made the best case they truthfully could
for their ship.

That log shows that "at 8.50 the New York started
at full speed, under three boilers, for Altares
(Siboney), after making signal to the rest of the
fleet 'to disregard movements of the commander-in-
chief ; that she steamed ["at full speed"] 9.5 knots
[not 4] ; that the admiral, captain, and assistant
chief of staff prepared to land at Altares, to visit the
headquarters of the army; that, about 9.45, just be
fore reaching Altares, heard heavy firing off San
tiago, and observed smoke in the entrance. Imme
diately turned and stood back, at full speed."

That log-book remained (for two years less seven
days) as it was then written, or until June 20 ) 19 00.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 279

On the last mentioned day Lieutenant Marble
found himself on board U. S. S. Baltimore (then on
her way to the United States, bearing the flag of Rear
Admiral John C. Watson, who was returning at the
end of his two years' command of the Asiatic Fleet),
which vessel had arrived at Port Suez. On that day
Lieutenant Marble wrote to the Navy Department a
letter, of which a copy is as follows (I. Ap. A. 108) :

"U. S. S. 'BALTIMORE,
"SUEZ, June 20, 1900.

"Sir: — I have the honor to request that the follow
ing correction be made in the log of the U. S. S.
New York, for the forenoon watch of the 3d of July,
1898, which was signed by me, viz: The time at
which the New York turned to the westward in pur
suit of the Spanish fleet, then emerging from the har
bor of Santiago de Cuba, ought to be 9.37 A. M. in
stead of 9.45 A. M., as written in the log.

"My attention has only now been called to this
error, which I believe was wholly due to an oversight
in the first place. The time 9.37, as I now state it,
accords with my remembrance of the event, and with
the time at which we went to quarters for Sunday in
spection — 9.30 A. M., and the time — 9.35 A. M. —
at which, by general consensus of reports, the Spanish
fleet began to make their exit; and with the fact that
the New York turned immediately upon sighting the
first Spanish ship, which she did the instant the latter
was clear of the entrance. No one on board the New
York, so far as I have heard, noticed, in the excite
ment of the moment, the precise time by the clock
when her helm was first put over; and in writing the
log three or four hours later, I had to be guided by
the time of going to quarters, etc., as here stated.

"The difference of eight minutes may seem small,
but it is, of course, of considerable importance when
events are moving rapidly.

280 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

"I make this correction now, after nearly two years,
but merely because my attention has been called to
what I regard as an obvious (sic) error.

"I think it right to forward this letter through
Captain Chadwick, who commanded the New York
at that time, rather than through my present imme
diate superiors.

"Very respectfully,

"FRANK MARBLE,
"Lieutenant U. S. Navy.
"THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
"Washington, D. C."

(Endorsed) "Respectfully forwarded, requesting
that the change mentioned may be made. F. E.
CHADWICK, Captain U. S. Navy."

The department, on receipt of this letter, caused
the change to be made by a Mr. Taylor, by endors
ing on a copy of this letter the following: "Memo
randum, for Mr. Taylor. 'Make the correction
herein requested; and paste this sheet in the log-book
to indicate authority.' '

Mr. Taylor then made the alteration by striking
a red line across the 45 in the figures 9.45, and in
serting, in red, the figures 37, alongside.

It is not surprising that the young officer who wrote
the foregoing letter should have adopted the apoli-
getic tone displayed therein. He must have felt him
self to be standing on very doubtful ground indeed,
when he undertook to impeach the accuracy of his
own solemn statement, made over his own signature,
two years before, and, as he says, made only "three
or four hours after the events occurred."

How he could venture to call the alleged error
an "obvious error" rather puzzles one.

The lieutenant does not say who had called his
attention to this "obvious error," but the fact that
he sent the letter "through Captain Chadwick, rather

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 281

than through my immediate superiors" (which naval
regulations required), unmistakably points to the
source of the lieutenant's inspiration.

Lieutenant Marble, in the letter, says: "No one
on the New York, so far as I ever heard, noticed the
precise time by the clock, when her helm was put

over."

Nevertheless, attached to the log-book of that day
is a typewritten paper purporting to be a copy of
"Official Notes, taken on the Bridge of the U. S.
Flagship New York, on July 3, 1898, by Chief Yeo
man Fred J. Buenzle, U. S. Navy [admiral's writer].
Time by clock"

In the judgment of the writer these purported
"Notes" in several particulars bear internal evidence
that they probably do not correspond with the
originals.

A copy of the notes is as follows :

"9.50 A. M. — Reported to the admiral on the
bridge by the chief quartermaster, that the Cristobal
Colon was coming around Morro Point. Without
glasses could not distinguish what sort of a vessel
she was, being enshrouded in her own smoke, and
that of the guns of the west battery. The New York
had turned, and was speeding in the direction of the
Morro."

None of that sounds sailor-like. The words used
are too big. A sailor would say "Make out," and
not "distinguish," and "surrounded" instead of "en
shrouded." Mention is made of the Cristobal Colon,
and nothing is said about the other three vessels that
had come out before her. If those notes had been
properly taken, they should have stated the time when
the order to turn was given, just as the log-book
entry does, or, rather, did before it was changed.

These notes purport to make mention of events as
they occurred, and the last entry is as follows :

"At 1.15 P. M. — The Oregon fired a i3-in. shell

282 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

which fell very close to the Colon; and it was thought
that the latter had been struck, as thick black smoke
arose. This was a few moments before it was re
ported that she was heading for the beach."

With this last statement Buenzle's notes end. He
was interviewed by the author hereof, and he stated
that in his notes he had made mention of the time
when the New York arrived, and stopped near the
Colon, which, as he remembered, was 2.15 P. M.

Here, then, is a second instance of the suppressio
veri.

Connect with this the same suppression in the notes
taken on board the Vixen and the alteration in the
log-book of the New York by Lieutenant Marble.
All these omissions, alterations, and proposed cor
rections may have been accidental, but as they all
have apparently a common purpose, the suspicion will
arise that some one person must have inspired them
all; and that some one must have been acting with
intent to bring the New York, if possible, "within
signal distance" of the fighting ships. That is plainly
apparent.

Having shown (as we think) that Lieutenant Mar
ble's alteration was suggested by Captain Chadwick,
the fatherhood of all these alterations and omissions
seems sufficiently well indicated.

Exactly where the New York was located at the
time that battle began is settled by the following
affidavit. It may be premised that, inasmuch as the
statements, under oath, of a newspaper correspondent
(Mr. Thomas M. Dieuwaide) were, by the judge
advocate of the Court of Inquiry and apparently by
the majority of the court, considered sufficient to fix
the fact that the Brooklyn's turn endangered the
Texas, the statements made in this affidavit by an
other, and, so far as appears, equally reliable news
paper correspondent, ought to have equal effect. The
affidavit is as follows:

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 283

STATE OF ILLINOIS,
COUNTY OF COOK,

I, James O'Shaughnessy, being duly sworn, do
depose and say, that I am a citizen of the United
States, and of Chicago, in the County and State afore
said; and that, in the year of 1898, I was employed
as a reporter and correspondent of the Chicago
Chronicle. In that capacity I went to Cuba with the
military expedition that left Tampa, Florida, June
14, 1898. I landed at Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22,
1898, and remained in Cuba, watching the operations
of the army about Santiago until after the capitula
tion of that city, July 17, 1898. On July 2d I was
informed that Admiral Sampson was to come on shore
to confer with General Shafter.

On the following day, July ^d, I was at the beach
at Siboney, Cuba. While waiting there that morn
ing, I saw the U. S. Cruiser New York approach
from the direction of Morro Castle. It came directly
into the bight of Siboney, and approached nearer to
the shore that I had ever before observed approach
a large war ship in that bight. A launch was let
down into the water from the New York when it
stopped; and three officers from the New York en
tered the launch. While the launch was still along
side the New York, I heard the report of a heavy
gun coming from the direction of Morro Castle. Im
mediately there seemed to be a commotion among
those on the decks of the New York. The ladder
was quickly drawn up on the side of the New York.
The officers in the launch were gesticulating to some
body on the cruiser. The firing towards the mouth
of Santiago Harbor increased; and I could hear the
heavy guns booming at close intervals. The distance
was too great to hear any but the heavier guns. I
was afterwards informed it was the reports of the
twelve-inch and thirteen-inch guns only which were

284 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

audible at Siboney. After the ladder was drawn
up the New York began to move. It began to swing
round, moving slowly, as it had to turn around in the
bight, in which were a number of army transport
ships. On the western horizon the smoke of the
ships, which was plain enough at first, was becoming
less distinct, and the sound of the guns was fast be
coming fainter. A torpedo boat which had accom
panied the New York got around first, and was steam
ing away to the west. The New York was slower in
its movements as it brought its bow around to the
west, but when it was headed towards Morro Castle
it went away at a fast pace. The launch with the
three officers in it came to the temporary dock at
Siboney. I waited at the dock for their coming, and
talked with them for some time. Those officers who
were left in the launch seemed greatly chagrined
when they came on shore, and appeared as if they
were at a loss to know what to do. I questioned
them about the meaning of the fire, and the precipi
tate departure of the New York; but they were reti
cent, although at that time those thereabouts were
evidently in no doubt that a considerable sea fight
was going on then somewhere below the western
sky-line; and later in the day I learned of the de
struction of the ships of the Spanish fleet by those of
the United States Navy. That was, then, the ex
planation of the failure of Admiral Sampson to visit
General Shafter after having come to Siboney.

My reason for noticing this much was that it was
my intention and desire to talk with Admiral Samp
son when he came ashore, to obtain some statement
from him for the benefit of the paper I represented.

JAMES O'SHAUGHNESSY.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this yth July,
1899, FRANCIS J. HOULIHAN,

[SEAL] Notary Public.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 285

The above affidavit carries conviction on its face.
The occurrences stated are just what probably took
place. No more intelligent statement of the exact
facts could be made, and the New York must have
been pretty close to shore to enable him to see what
he says he saw going on alongside of her. And the
ship must have been stopped, or very nearly so, be
fore that boat would be lowered except as a matter
of great haste or emergency, of which there was none
at that time. The booming of those guns creating
commotion, furnished the occasion for haste.

The facts set forth in this chapter in conjunction
with the citations from the "Regulations for the Govr
ernment of the Navy" show plainly the correctness of
the opinion given to the President, by Admiral Clark,
of the Oregon (I. 1929) : "I considered Commodore
Schley in responsible command during this running
fight and chase, so far as I was concerned."

And also of the finding of Admiral Dewey, who,
as President of the Court of Inquiry, said (I. 1830) :

"Commodore Schley was the senior officer of our
squadron off Santiago when the Spanish squadron at
tempted to escape on the morning of July 3, 1898.
He was in absolute command, and is entitled to the
credit due to such commanding officer, for the
glorious victory which resulted in the total destruc
tion of the Spanish fleet."

In which all impartial and unprejudiced people
will concur.

CHAPTER LXV

THE PART IN THE BATTLE TAKEN BY THE FLAGSHIP

"NEW YORK"

For the purpose of determining what part the New
York took in the Battle of Santiago, the subjoined
extracts from reports and other sources are subjoined.

Admiral Sampson, in his report (A. 507) says:
"She [the New York] was not at any time within
the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only
part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire
from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and
to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, though at
the moment to be attempting to escape from the
Gloucester."

"The mills of the gods grind slowly, yet they grind
exceeding small."

Of course, as soon as the admiral descovered by
the firing off Santiago that the Spaniards were at
tempting to escape, he, and every officer and man of
the New York, did everything possible to get into
the battle. He well described the feelings of him
self, his officers and crew, when, in his Century ar
ticle, he said: "The first thought was, Oh, that we
had wings, not those of the dove, but of the eagle,
swooping down upon its prey."

One can imagine the galling bitterness of the
thoughts that must have possessed him, as (like Mil
ler of the Merrimac) he saw himself deprived of the
opportunity for which he had so long waited and
watched; and that opportunity given to another.

When the New York started back from Siboney
she hoisted the signal, "Close in towards harbor en
trance and attack vessels," but none of the squadron
seem to have seen it, because they were too far away

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 287

to the westward and surrounded with the smoke and
roar of battle, engaged in obeying the same signal,
and another, "Follow the flag," that had been hoisted
by Schley when the Spaniards turned to the westward.
In fact, all signals were superfluous that morning.
The cats had been watching the rat-hole too long not
to know exactly what to do without any signal.

Admiral Sampson says, as quoted above, that the
New York "was not at any time within the range of
the heavy Spanish ships." It is capable of mathemat
ical demonstration that she was never within 19.26
nautical miles of any one of them until they were
driven successively to the beach.

That part of the notes taken on board the Vixen
which was suppressed states that "the Vixen at 2.25
stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the neighborhood of the
Brooklyn and Oregon. The New York arrived from
three to five minutes later," or at 2.28 to 2.30.

As a matter of fact it was 2.23. And thus it is
shown, by entirely impartial testimony, that the New
York did not arrive for an hour and eight minutes
after the Colon surrendered. The suppression from
Buenzle's notes — taken on board the New York —
of all mention of events after 1.15 (the time of the
Colon's surrender) tends to corroborate the Vixen
notes.

Admiral Sampson in his report (A. 507) says:
"The New York gradually increased her speed, until
towards the end of the chase she was making i6l/>
knots."

Captain Chadwick in his official report (A. 521)
says : "The speed had rapidly increased, so that we
were going 16 knots at the end." But on July 29,
after nearly a month's consideration, he wrote (A.
522) : "As supplementary to my report dated July
4, of the action of the 3d, I beg to say that, at the
close of the chase of the Colon, our speed had in-

288 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

creased to not less than 17 knots, Instead of 16, as
mentioned in my ninth paragraph."

So that, accepting Captain Chadwick's statement
of her speed, she must have been 1.13x17 k.=9.2i
knots— 22.1 statute miles away from the Colon when
she hauled down her flag.

And that is as near as she got to any of the uheavy
ships" during the battle.

CHAPTER LXVI

WAS THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO A CAPTAIN'S FIGHT?

IN considering another phase of the great contro
versy arising from the events of that memorable July
3, it will be recalled that the President of the United
States himself has said that neither Sampson nor
Schley was in actual command on that day (against
which assertion we place the opinion of Commodore
Dewey and Rear Admiral Clark) and that it was
"a captains' fight."

The claim that the credit of a great victory is not
to be given to the admiral commanding, or other
"senior officer on the spot," but may be taken from
him and divided among two or more of the captains
commanding single ships, is no new thing in naval
history.

It is commonly supposed that Nelson was what is
ordinarily styled "the hero of the battles of the Nile
and Trafalgar" ; but J. Fennimore Cooper, the novel
ist and naval historian, in the preface to "The Tale
of Two Admirals," writing by the authority of the
late Commodore Charles Morris of the United States
Navy, says :

"It is now known that all the early accounts of the
maneuvering at the Nile, and of Nelson's reasoning
on the subject of anchoring inside and doubling on
his enemies, is pure fiction.

"Since that time naval officers of rank have written
on the subject, and stripped the Nile, Trafalgar, etc.,
of their poetry, and given the world plain, nautical,
and probable accounts of both those great achieve
ments. The truth was just as little like the previously
published accounts as well could be."

19

290 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

It was doubling on the French line that gave Nel
son so high a reputation as a tactitian.

The merit of the maneuver belonged exclusively to
one of his captains. As the fleet went without any
order, keeping as much to windward as the shoals
would permit, Nelson ordered the Vanguard hove to,
to take a pilot out of a fisherman.

"This enabled Foley, Hood, and one or two more
to pass that fast ship. It was at this critical moment
that the thought occurred to Foley (we think this
was the officer) to pass the head of the French line,
keep dead away, and anchor inside. Others followed,
completely placing their enemies between two fires."

Nelson's tactics are discussed by Fitchett (an emi
nent English writer) in his book, "Nelson and his
Captains." What he says is as follows:

"Nelson's tactics were merely perfect common
sense applied to the business of war. The official
'Fighting Instructions' of the Admiralty directed an
admiral, when engaging an enemy's fleet, to arrange
his line exactly parallel to the enemy's line, and to
pit ship against ship; so that a sea battle resolved
itself into so many sea duels. The essential idea was
to distribute the attacking force along the whole of
the enemy's line, not to combine it in overwhelming
preponderance against a portion of that line.

"Nelson inverted that process. The essential prin
ciple of all his battles was to double on part of the
enemy's line and crush it, leaving the surviving frag
ments to be destroyed in detail.

"All the traditions of the navy were against these
tactics, and, it may be added, the natural pride of the
British seaman was against it. 'One Englishman was
equal to two Frenchmen. Why invert these odds
and expend two Englishmen on one Frenchman?'
This was, in substance, the criticism of Saumarez, on
Nelson's tactics at the Nile.

"The terrible quality of Nelson's fighting was

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 291

found in the deadly skill with which he threw his
whole force on part only of his enemy's force, and
thus satisfied the first condition of victory — that of
being overwhelmingly superior in strength at the
point of attack. Nelson applied this new principle
to naval warfare on a scale and with a certainty and
swiftness that made his battles like thunderbolts, and
as destructive as thunderbolts."

All the critics of Nelson's tactics in those battles
have long been forgotten, but Nelson is still the
"Hero of the Nile," and he and that "noble fellow,
Collingwood" (as Nelson called him, as he carried
his ship into action at Trafalgar) , are still the heroes
of that battle, and will always continue to be.

Nelson and his deeds are, however, now a part
of history, so let us pass back to the matter under dis
cussion.

The Court of Inquiry refused to allow any testi
mony to be given as to the position of the New York
at the time the battle began.

The President of the United States therefore vio
lated all the rules of proper procedure in respect to
appeals when, upon Admiral Schley's appeal to him
from the findings of the court, and of their approval
by the Secretary of the Navy, he called in all the cap
tains in that fight except Cook (who was the only
one who knew whether the New York was within
signal distance of the Brooklyn) and took their state
ments and opinions upon that matter.

These officers were all Schley's subordinates; they
had all been witnesses before the court, and not one
of them was allowed to give any testimony as to the
position of the New York. If the court had per
mitted any such testimony the admiral's counsel were
prepared to show exactly where the New York was
when she started back towards the battle that morn
ing.

The affidavit of Mr. James O'Shaughnessy (here-

292 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

inbefore given) and other testimony of a like char
acter were ready.

The President also quoted from Philip's article
in the Century Magazine, giving statements from it
which were expressly excluded by the court, and he
also referred to a letter written by Philip to the
Secretary of the Navy, dated February 27, 1899,
which has never been published — a letter which
Schley has never seen, and which no tribunal having
regard for the plain practice and principles of legal
proceedings on appeal would have permitted to be
used.

It was grossly unfair to receive statements, opin
ions and documents outside the record, without giv
ing Schley opportunity to introduce evidence in reply.

Rear Admirals Evans and Taylor, in their state
ments quoted by the President, take the extraordinary
position that if Commodore Schley had made any
signals to them, they would not have heeded them,
inasmuch as they considered Admiral Sampson "to
be present and in command." And yet Captain Tay
lor (as he then was), with his admiral present (as he
says), did not hesitate to make signal to the Glou
cester, "Gunboats advance," a signal which Captain
Wainwright promptly obeyed, because made by the
"senior officer present." But if Admiral Sampson
was present, within signal distance, Captain Taylor
had no right whatever to make any signal to Wain
wright, and according to his statement above, Wain
wright should not have heeded it.

Notwithstanding these ex post facto assertions,
there can be no doubt that if Schley had made a signal
to any ship that day to do some particular thing, that
signal would have been promptly obeyed.

There was none of this ill feeling going at that
time, and Taylor was not the kind of officer to defy
or neglect a command from his superior officer during
the progress of a battle, on any such flimsy theory

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 293

as he advanced to the President. And the writer is
of the opinion that "Fighting Bob" would not have
done so either.

CHAPTER LXVII

PAUL JONES AND THE BATTLE OF THE LIMAN

EFFORTS to deprive the commanding officer who was
actually in the battle of the credit due the victor and
give it to another who was "not in it" have occurred
before.

Buell, in his book "Paul Jones, the Founder of the
American Navy," gives the following instructive in
stance, in his account of the "Battle of the Liman,"
between the Russians and the Turks, June 17, 1788.

Paul Jones, who had been apointed by the Empress
Catharine a rear admiral in the Russian Navy, was in
actual command of the Russian fleet on that occasion.
Field Marshal Potempkin (a military officer and one
of Catharine's personal favorites) was Jones' superior
officer, and as such was in titular command, though
not actually present. A great victory was secured by
Jones, for which Potemkin at first endeavored to
claim the credit. He suppressed Jones' report, and
endeavored to take the credit to himself.

Buell (Vol. i. p. 196) in a note says: "Kolnitz, a
harsh critic, but in the main well sustained by his au
thorities, says of this incident:

"Potemkin was at first thought captivated by the
idea Paul Jones had offered him, that of figuring as
the vicarious hero of a great naval battle and victory.
But on a second thought the Prince Marshal recon
sidered this ambition. It occurred to him that the
hero of a naval battle must be on board a ship actually
engaged in it.

"On land battles could be won by a pseudo-com
mander, who might choose the distance of his person
from the enemy. There is no limit to the rear of an
army in battle, but there is no rear whatever on board
a ship in battle."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 295

Mr. Ex-Secretary Long, in his book already re
ferred to, undertakes to settle this question of com
mand in Santiago affair, by saying: "Sampson was as
much in command as Grant was at Chattanooga,
although Grant's generals were doing the actual fight
ing at Lookout Mountain, and Missionary [JUT]
Ridge, where he could not possibly be."

Let us see about that. The perpetrator of such a
parallel should be sure of the facts; and an examina
tion — which Mr. Long evidently did not make —
of the facts of that battle will show that there is no
parallel whatever between the two cases. General
Grant had not gone off, out of controlling and com
municating distance of those generals, leaving them
in their ordinary encampments and positions, after di
recting them to "disregard [his] movements," as
Sampson had.

General Grant planned out the battle in all its main
details, assigning all the parts to be played by each
corps commander, and he then assumed a central posi
tion where he was in constant communication with the
center and both flanks of his army.

In Chapters XLIII. and XLIV. of his "Memoirs,"
the whole story of that battle is told by General Grant
himself; and one who reads that story will not fail
to see that, from the beginnig to the end of that three
days' contest, he had, and personally exercised, com
plete control of all the forces engaged. He tells how
he prearranged the battle, and began it. Sherman,
Thomas, Gordon Granger, Thomas J. Woods,
Hooker, Howard, and a host of other generals were
all assigned to their respective parts, and performed
them under Grant's eye; and he tells how he was
there through the whole of it, directing modifications
of his orders as emergencies arose.

Of his own positions during the battle he says (Vol.
ii. p. 72) : "Thomas and I were on the top of
Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our

296 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

line [of battle] a continuous one. It was in full view,
extending from the Tennessee River, where Sherman
had crossed, up Chickamauga River to the base of
Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the
Ridge, to the Chattanooga Valley; then along, paral
lel to the Ridge, a mile or more across the Valley, to
the mouth of Chattanooga Creek; thence up the slope
of Lookout Mountain to the foot of the palisade."

Again (p. 77) : "From the position I occupied I
could see column after column of Bragg's forces mov
ing against Sherman. Seeing the advance, repulse,
and second advance of J. E. Smith, from the position
I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to
reinforce him." Again (p. 80), speaking of Thomas
J. Wood's charge, he said: "I watched their pro
gress with intense interest." And (p. 81). "While
the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward,
General Thomas, with staff, General Gordon
Granger, commanding the corps making the assault,
and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from
which the entire field could be observed. The moment
the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel
defenses I ordered General Granger to his command,
and, mounting my horse, I rode to the front. General
Thomas left about the same time." And, at the close,
General Grant says: "The battle was fought as
ordered."

The above extracts show that if ever a general was
uin it," Grant, on that occasion, was the man. But if
he had gone off for any purpose out of possible com
munication with his army, without any expectation of
a battle, and Bragg had made an attack; or — as
Cervera did — had attempted a retreat from his posi
tions, the senior general left behind on the spot (it
was Sherman) would have been in command, and
entitled to the credit of whatever success had been
secured; and held responsible for defeat or failure.

CHAPTER LXVIII

SCHLEY'S GENEROSITY TOWARDS SAMPSON

SCHLEY'S preliminary report, which Sampson re
turned to him, has already been given in full (ante
pp.- -).

A few days later Schley sent to Sampson a second
report (A. 517), in which, in several places, expres
sions are used such as: "The great victory of the
squadron under your command."

Among other things, Schley in that report said : "I
congratulate you sincerely upon this great victory to
the squadron under your command [this is a very
equivocal sentence] ; and I am glad that I had an op
portunity to contribute in the least to a victory that
seems big enough for all of us."

Concerning this report, Admiral Schley testified (I.
1529) : "I felt that the victory, at that time, as I
have said, was big enough for all; and I made this
[report] out of generosity, and because I knew that if
the New York had been present they would have
done as good work as anybody else. I referred
throughout this, to 'your command' and his appear
ance, and so on, in complimentary terms. That was
the reason."

The writer may be pardoned in saying that, in his
opinion, the commodore made a mistake in couching
his second report in the equivocal language employed,
which may be so read as to convey the impression that
Admiral Schley therein states, that Admiral Sampson
was in command. Sampson in his report says that
he was "not in range of any of the heavier fighting
ships," — that is, he was not in the fight. Assertions
that are contrary to the facts, however complimentary
they may have been intended to be, carry no weight.

298 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

A few days after the battle the newspapers from
the United States containing the accounts of it
reached the fleet. Many of these accounts, written by
correspondents who had been uin it," and had seen the
whole of it, almost without exception printed Schley's
name in large head-lines, as the "Hero of the Battle."

Further influenced by his generous feelings, without
suggestion or any other motive, Schley cabled (with
out Sampson's knowledge) to the Navy Department
the following:

"OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA,

July 10, 1898.

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Washington, D. C. :

"I feel some mortification that the newspaper
accounts of July 6 have attributed the victory on July
3 almost entirely to me. The victory was secured by
the force under the command of the commander-in-
chief of naval force on N. A. Station, and to him the
honor is due. The end of the line held by the Brook
lyn and Vixen was heavily assailed, and had the
honor, with the Oregon, being in the battle from the
beginning to the end; and I do not for a moment
doubt that proper credit will be given all persons and
all ships in the official report of the combat.

"SCHLEY."

The commodore then wrote the following letter to
Sampson :

"U. S. FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,
OFF SANTIAGO, July 10, 1898.

"MY DEAR ADMIRAL :

"I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a cipher
telegram which I sent to-day to the Secretary of the
Navy, with a view to correcting the accounts in the
newspapers of July 6, which attribute the victory of
July 3 to me.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 299

"2. My official report indicates very clearly what
my views are upon the subject, and I beg to say that,
so long as I am serving under your orders, I shall do
my duty loyally, fully, and without reserve.

"Very respectfully,

UW. S. SCHLEY,
"Commodore U. S. N.

"COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

"North Atlantic Fleet."

Concerning these two papers, Admiral Schley testi
fied (I. 1533): "I took that letter, and that de
spatch, on board the New York to Admiral Sampson.
The admiral accepted it, and stated to me that he
thought it was very generous on my part."

"Very generous," it certainly was; and anyone
familiar with the parts played by -the two officers in
that battle will agree with Admiral Sampson's state
ment. It may well be doubted if there ever was such
self-abnegation displayed, for the benefit of another,
by any navy or military officer before that time. All
Sampson's supporters, from Secretary Long down,
should have united in so accepting Schley's action.
But instead, the despatch was divorced from the letter
(which was what the majority of the Court of In
quiry professed to think "unfair," in the Hodgson
matter) , and was sent, by the Secretary of the Navy,
to the Senate (Ex. Doc. C. p. 135), to be considered
uas a pertinent fact." by that body, in secret session.

CHAPTER LXIX

SAMPSON'S CONDUCT TOWARDS SCHLEY

ON that same tenth day of July Admiral Sampson
received from the Secretary of the Navy a despatch
asking "if he had any recommendations regarding
promotions of officers to make."

To this Sampson replied by cable (Ex. Doc. C. p.
13. No. 36), making many such recommendations.

Concerning Commodore Schley, he said: "I pre
fer leaving any question of reward for Commodore
Schley to the department. Think his conduct during
the time when Schley commanded the east [.s*c] side
of Cuba, which I assume is well known to the depart
ment, should be considered."

This last clause, beginning "Think his conduct."
etc., is geographically absurd, in so far as it speaks of
Schley's having commanded the "east side of Cuba."
If there is any east side of Cuba, it has not yet been
discovered or placed on any map or chart. There is
a little sneering insinuation in that last clause, that one
would think Sampson, with his thanks given to Schley
so shortly before, for the despatch and letter set forth
in the last chapter, would not have made. He had
never before criticised Schley's conduct, either to
him or to the Navy Department.

On that same tenth of July Sampson signed and
sent to the Secretary of the Navy a letter which was
evidently intended (though not so worded) to be re
garded as confidential, (Ex. Doc. C. p. 135, No. 35) :
It begins, "My dear Mr. Secretary."

In this letter, after recommending promotion for
many other officers, he says (p. 136) : "With regard
to Commodore Schley, I much prefer that the depart
ment should decide his case. I am unwilling to fully

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 301

express my own opinion. His conduct when he first
assumed command on the south coast [he gets his
geography correct] of Cuba, I assume to be as well
known to the department as to myself. If he had left
his station off Santiago de Cuba at that time, he
would probably have been court-martialed, so plain
was his duty.

"Were I alone in this opinion, I would certainly
doubt my judgment; but, so far as I know, this opin
ion is confirmed by that of other commanding officers
here, acquainted with the circumstances.

"This represensible conduct I cannot separate from
his other conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do
him ample justice on this occasion."

The picture here presented, of the commander-in-
chief listening to the opinions expressed by Commo
dore Schley's subordinates in order to fortify, or per
haps form, his own, is most extraordinary, and is con
trary to all naval ideas of propriety and custom.

It was a well-established rule of the service that a
junior is never allowed to express opinions upon the
conduct of his senior in the service. Thus, opinions
that no naval court would have permitted appear to
have been solicited (or at least permitted) by the
commander-in-chief, and made use of by him to preju
dice the question of Schley's promotion.

On that same tenth of July a prominent officer of
that squadron (whose statement imports absolute
verity among his brother officers) went on board the
flagship New York, and was ushered into the cabin of
the admiral without formality. He found there
Admiral Sampson and Captain Chadwick, the chief
of staff; and he heard Admiral Sampson say to Chad-
wick: "There's no use talking, Chadwick, I can't,
and I won't, send any such letter as that about Com
modore Schley to the department. I would never be
able to justify myself before my brother officers if I
did." Or words to that effect.

302 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

What letter they were discussing the officer did not
know, but the letter of which the above quotations
form a part was the only letter relating to Commo
dore Schley that was sent that day; and the letter,
whatever it was, must have been one prepared by the
staff, without previous direction by the admiral, be
cause, if he had ordered it he would not have objected
to it.

In the judgment of the writer hereof, the letter
bears internal evidence that Sampson never wrote the
body of it. He was a very clear-headed writer, knew
exactly what he meant, and how to express himself
clearly.

CHAPTER LXX

THE NAVIGATORS' CHART OF THE BATTLE

Two months after the battle, on September 2, 1898,
Admiral Sampson convened a board of officers, com
posed of the navigators of the different ships that had
participated, "to plot the positions of the ships of
Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United
States' fleet in the battle of July 3, 1898, off Santiago
de Cuba."

The board took more than two months to perform
the duty imposed upon it, and on October 8 made a
report, which report, and accompanying chart, will be
found in A. 593.

The report says : uThe board submits this report,
with a feeling that, under the circumstances, it is as
nearly correct as is possible so long after the engage

ment."

Before the Court of Inquiry this chart came early
under review in the cross-examination of one of its
makers, Commander Heilner. He testified (I.
141): "I never signed that chart as correct."
Thereupon the assistant judge advocate said: "If the
purpose of these inquiries is to show the incorrectness
of that chart, we will save time by conceding it at
once. We never supposed it to be correct."

Lieutenant Commander Wainwright (who was the
senior member of board of navigators) testified (I.
672-3) : "So far as I know, none of the members of
the board was satisfied with all the positions. We
did not consider them accurate positions. We were
not satisfied with the positions as they were; but, in
order to get all the navigators to sign, we took those
as the probable positions. It was not the best we
could do to satisfy any of us, it was the best we could

304 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

do, under the circumstances, to get all the navigators
to sign the report. I think none of the seven was sat
isfied, except the navigator of the Brooklyn, and I
don't know that he was. None of the navigators was
satisfied; nevertheless, all of them signed that
report."

He was asked the question :

Q. Then all signed a report putting the Brooklyn
at a certain position, and the Texas at a certain posi
tion on that chart; and yet there was not a man of
them who was satisfied with the position they plotted?

A. That is correct as far as I know. I doubt very
much if Mr. Schuetze, the navigator of the Iowa,
was satisfied with any of the positions of the Iowa (I.
676).

Lieutenant Scheutze testified (I. 778) : "I pro
tested against signing the report, as being inaccurate;
but I was finally persuaded, principally by Lieutenant-
Commander Wainwright, the senior member of the
board, that that was the best we could do, even if we
stayed there until doomsday, and that I had better
sign it; and I signed it under protest. Measured with
reference to the time stated in the report, she [Iowa']
is making there 16 or 18 knots. In my opinion she
made about 9^ to 10 knots."1

Every officer signing that report, whose evidence
could be had, stigmatized that chart as incorrect and
unsatisfactory to all the signers. It well merited what
Mr. Rayner said of it, in his argument:

"Now, this navigators' chart is a most wonderful
thing. It is a thing of joy forever. It is like the
obliterated epitaph on an antiquated tombstone. Here
are half a dozen navigators, who meet together for
the purpose of giving to the country a chart of the
Battle of Santiago; and, after two months of unceas
ing toil and unremitting labor, they compose a chart
which might as well be a chart of the Battle of Salamis

1Her captain, Evans, stated her speed as 9% knots. (I. 384.)

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 305

or the Battle of Thermopylae, or of the field of
Waterloo. It appears that every navigator was try
ing to put his ship in a different position from where
his ship really was.

"They were all trying to compose a chart that did
not represent the situation at all; and, as a disgrace
ful failure, this chart is undoubtedly a magnificent

success."

The Navy Department has never withdrawn that
chart, — which it knows to be a chart that has been
pronounced by its makers to be totally inaccurate and
wrong, — and the ex-Secretary of the Navy, Mr. John
D. Long, knowing its false character, and that it had
been repudiated by the officers who made it as false,
has since reprinted it in his book; and, so far as he
thereby can, has sent it down to the future as correct
and true.

Mr. Long may think it to be in the interest of truth
and fair history to send down to posterity a false chart
of that great battle, but honorable minds will not so
regard it. If anyone were to put before a club as true,
a plan or statement that he knew to be false, there can
be no doubt that the club would promptly and prop
erly expel him, as having been guilty of a dishonor
able act.

20

CHAPTER LXXI

THE ALLEGED CONTROVERSY WITH LIEUTENAMT
HODGSON DURING THE BATTLE

9

IN its effort to find something which might throw dis
credit upon Admiral Schley, the judge advocate,
under instructions of the Navy Department, formu
lated the Tenth Article of the Precept, as follows :

"roth. — The circumstances leading to, and the in
cidents and results of, a controversy with Lieutenant
Albon C. Hodgson, U. S. Navy, who, on July 3d,
1898, during the Battle of Santiago, was Navigator
of the Brooklyn; also the colloquy at that time be
tween Commodore Schley and Lieutenant Hodgson;
and the ensuing correspondence between them on the
subject; and the propriety of the conduct of Com
modore Schley in the premises."

In this article, as in all others, the Precept assumes
that there had been a controversy and a colloquy; and
does not leave it to the court to find as to the fact.

The basis of that Article 10 was the following:
The New York Sun having printed an offensive edi
torial relative to a colloquy alleged (on the authority
of Lieutenant Hodgson, as it asserted) to have oc
curred between the two officers during the height of
the battle, about or immediately before the turn of
the Brooklyn was made, Admiral Schley wrote to
Lieutenant Hodgson as follows (I. 589) :

"WASHINGTON, June 6, 1899.
"DEAR HODGSON:

"I enclose you an editorial of the New York Sun,
and would ask you to write me your denial of this
oft-repeated calumny.

"I know full well that you never made any such

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 307

authorization of this grotesque lie, but I desire to
place you in a proper position before the country, as
well as myself. This vicious and malignant vitupera
tion ought to cease, and, in justice to you and myself,
I think something authoritative ought to be said.
"Very sincerely yours,

"W. S. SCHLEY."

It is not worth while copying the Sun's editorial.
After reading it, Lieutenant Hodgson replied to Com
modore Schley, on June 8, 1899, by a long letter full
of vituperation of persons not named, concerning cer
tain statements relative to the turn of the Brooklyn,
in the battle of July 3, 1898, alleged to have been
made or insinuated. As to the statement, Hodgson
said: "You can imagine that no one would acknowl
edge the paternity of such a bastard."

He further said: "Mr. Dieuwaide [the Sun's re
porter] came to visit me some days ago, about the
conversation quoted as having taken place, and he
wished to know from me if it was correct. I told him
that to the best of my recollection it was substantially
correct, though garbled and incomplete ; but that the
inference the Sun wished to have drawn from it, and
the stand his paper had taken, was damnably and in
famously false.

"I do not believe that anyone whose opinion is at
all worth considering, will be at all influenced by the
scurrilous and infamous lies that appear from time to
time in the Sun; but I am willing to do anything in
my power, that may be agreeable to you, that will
cause the editor of this paper to be shown up as an
unprincipled blackguard."

This was pretty strong language, and the admiral
thought that letter hardly the thing to publish; and
so, on June 10, wrote again to Hodgson, saying,
among other things (I. 594) : "The Sun's effort has
been to promote the notion that you and I had a con-

3o8 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

troversy at a critical moment; and this is unjust to
you, and to me. What I desire is simply your denial
to me that any such colloquy occurred.

"There is much in your letter that I should not like
to use, as it would provoke an assault upon you,
which I am unwilling should happen; and what I
want to show is simply that this dialogue did not
occur; and that shown, the whole flimsy canard falls
to the ground. Make your letter as short as
possible."

To this Hodgson replied (I. 595) :

"JUNE n, 1899.
"DEAR ADMIRAL SCHLEY:

"The colloquy published in the Sun, and alleged
to have taken place between you and me on the day of
the battle of Santiago de Cuba, never occurred. I re
turn, herewith, the newspaper clipping containing the
colloquy referred to.

"Very respectfully,

"A. C. HODGSON,

"Lieut. Commd'r."

The reported colloquy, alleged to have taken place
between the commodore and his navigator in the heat
of the battle, set forth in the clipping returned, as
stated by Hodgson, was as follows (I. 594) :

SCHLEY. Hard-a-port.

HODGSON. You mean starboard.

SCHLEY. No, I don't. We are near enough to
them [the Spaniards] already.

HODGSON. But we will cut down the Texas.

SCHLEY. Damn the Texas! Let her look out for
herself.

Hodgson enclosed that letter and clipping in the
same envelope with another, of which follows a copy
(1-5,95):

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 309

"JUNE n, 1899.
"DEAR ADMIRAL SCHLEY:

"I send you, herewith, a categorical denial of the
colloquy published in the New York Sun, for such use
as you may desire.

"From my last letter you will gather my recollec
tion of what occurred the day of the battle regarding
the turn. I wish you to have a clear idea of what I
told the Sun reporter the day he came to see me ; and
what grounds the Sun had for publishing the editorial
of June i st. The reporter asked me if there was any
foundation for the article as published in the Sun. I
told him that I could not recollect exactly what was
said, but that he had published a very garbled and
misleading account of whatever might have happened;
for, of course, I had never answered you in any such
manner as had appeared in print; nor had there been
any argument or difference between us, the very idea
of which was absurd.

"I told him that, when the turn was to be made, I
had suggested the proximity of the Texas; and the
probable danger of getting mixed up with her, if we
turned to starboard; and you said the Texas would
have to look out for herself. This is all the grounds
the Sun has for saying that I am authority for that
printed colloquy as being absolutely correct. I write
you this, so that you may know just what I have said
to anyone connected with a paper. As I wrote in my
last letter, I have frequently explained on other
grounds than interfering with the fire of our fleet; but
not since I knew that you had given that reason. I
trust this will be satisfactory, but still hold myself in
readiness to do anything in my power that you may
desire.

"Very respectfully and sincerely,

"A. C. HODGSON."

To this Admiral Schley replied :

3io SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

"JUNE 12, 1899.
"DEAR HODGSON:

"Thank you for your prompt answer, relating to
the colloquy. Your statement that it never occurred
is absolutely true, for you are too good an officer and
too gallant a man to have committed the impropriety
charged in the New York Sun."

Schley then published the categorical denial, as was
evidently intended, and permitted by that clause of
the last letter from Hodgson, which says: "I send
you a categorical denial, for such use as you may de
sire." Publication of the denial was what it was
asked for and given, and it is plain that Hodgson did
not expect, or intend, and certainly did not ask, that
both letters should be published. That was clearly
an afterthought.

On the very day on which Admiral Schley's ac
knowledgment of the categorical denial was sent to
Hodgson (July 12), the Navy Department ordered
Hodgson to appear before Captain French E. Chad-
wick, at Boston (I. 627), in relation to this matter.
He so appeared, and made a statement, which he and
Chadwick signed, as follows :

"U. S. S. 'NEW YORK/

"BOSTON, June 17, 1899.

"SiR: I have to report the following as the state
ment of Lieutenant Commander Hodgson of the
conversation between Rear Admiral Schley and him
self during the action of July 3, 1898.

"He states as follows: 'As we were approaching
the Spanish ships I heard Admiral Schley say "Port,"
or "Starboard," several times to Captain Cook in the
conning tower. I had been on the bridge above, and
was just coming down to report the positions of the
ships, when I heard the admiral say, "Hard-a-port."

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 311

The Maria Teresa was then hauling abaft our port
beam. The Brooklyn was heading about northeast.

" 'I told the admiral, or at least suggested to him,
that the Texas was very close on our starboard hand,
and that turning to starboard would bring us too close
to her. I don't know that I used the word "collision."
I did not say: "You mean starboard." I intended
him to understand there was danger of running into
the Texas. He said: "All right; the Texas must
look out for that," or words to that effect; I cannot
repeat verbatim.

" 'When I knew he was going to turn to starboard,
I suggested backing the starboard engine, in order to
make a smaller circle, and give the Texas a wider
berth; but he decided against that as decreasing the
speed of the turn.

" 'He did not say, that I know of, "We are near
enough to them [the Spaniards] already." The only
thing I gathered from what he said was that, if he
turned to port, we should get so close that we would
expose ourselves to torpedo attack. I supposed he
meant torpedo boats, and replied to him that I had
not seen them.'

"Lieutenant Commander Hodgson states that he
did not intend to convey, in his note of denial sent at
request of Admiral Schley, and published in the
Washington Post, the idea that no such colloquy took
place.

"He states, regarding this, as follows: 'Admiral
Schley wrote me, enclosing an article from the New
York Sun (of June i) asking me to write a denial of
what he phrased as "an oft-repeated calumny." He
said he had no recollection of any such conversation.
I wrote a lengthy letter of explanation, giving my
recollection of the conversation as nearly as possible.

" 'Admiral Schley wrote me saying, "There is
much in your letter that I should not like to use, as it
would provoke assault upon you, which I would not

312 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

like to happen. What I want to show is that the dia
logue did not occur."

" 'I then wrote a denial of the colloquy, certainly
not intending to say [but that is exactly what he did
say] that no such colloquy occurred; but that it did
not occur as printed. I at the same time sent with this
an explanatory letter, explaining to Admiral Schley
that the letter of denial was a denial of the dialogue
as it appeared in the Sun; and that I had told the
Sun correspondent that the substance of the conver
sation was correct. In writing the letter I wished to
refute the fact of any controversy existing at a critical
stage of the battle. It (the letter) was a denial of the
words as they stood in the published article ; a denial
of their literal correctness, and not a denial of the sub
stantial correctness of the statement.'

"Lieutenant Commander Hodgson appends his sig
nature as a voucher for the accuracy with which the
foregoing is given.

"Very respectfully,

"F. E. CHADWICK,

"Captain U. S. Navy.
"A. C. HODGSON,
"Lieut. Comdr., U. S. N.

"To THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY."

The alleged Colloquy, and what Hodgson has said
about it at different times, will now be stated in par
allel columns.

THE ALLEGED COLLOQUY HODGSON'S STATEMENT

1. SCHLEY. Hard-a-port. i. Before the court: "He either

said 'Hard-a-port/ or 'Is
your helm hard-a-port ?' "

2. HODGSON. You mean star- 2. Before Chadwick (I. 625) :

board "I did not say 'You mean

starboard.' "

2. Before the court (I. 625) : "I
did not say, 'You mean
starboard.' "

3. SCHLEY. No, I don't. We 3. Before Chadwick (I. 626) :

are too near them already. "He did not say, that I

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 313

4. HODGSON. But we
down the Texas.

will cut

SCHLEY. Damn the Texas!
let her look out for herself.

know of: 'We are near
enough to them already.' "
Before the court (I. 624) : "I
never said that he said:
'We are near enough to
them already.' I did not
tell the Sun man that Ad
miral Schley had ever said:
'We are too close to the
Spaniards.' I never told
him that. That's not true
either. We never had such
a colloquy as that."

4. Before the court (I. 624) : "I

never said, 'We will cut
down the Texas.' I never
said that."

Before Chadwick (I. 627) :
"I don't know that I used
the word 'collision.' "

5. Before Chadwick (I. 627) :

"I intended him to under
stand that there was danger
of running into the Texas.
He said: 'All right; the
Texas must lookout for
herself,' or words to that
effect. I cannot repeat
verbatim."

Before the court (I. 626) : "I
did not tell the Sun man
that the admiral had said
'Damn the Texas' Prob
ably I never mentioned
'Damn the Texas,' in any of
my letters."

To Schley (I. 626) : "I told
Dieuwaide [the Sun's re
porter] (I. 595) that I
could not recollect exactly
what was said. That you
[Schley] had said, 'The
Texas would have to look
out for herself.'"

That interview between the Sun's reporter and
Hodgson was in June, 1899, at which time he said, to
Dieuwaide, that he "couldn't recollect exactly what
was said"; and to Chadwick: "I cannot repeat ver
batim." And yet, more than two years later, and

3 H SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

three years and more after the battle, he could come
before the court and repeat "verbatim" (I. 571) the
language alleged to have been used by Schley, as:
"Damn the Texas! She must look out for herself,"
or words to that effect. "He [the Texas] will take
care of that," and he said, "I don't propose to go in
any closer and subject myself to torpedo attack."

Fair-minded people will be, as they ought to be,
very doubtful as to placing reliance upon such a
memory as that.

Hodgson's alleged grievance was that the admiral
did not publish both of those letters of June 1 1, 1899.
If Hodgson had intended that, he should have written
the "categorical denial," and the explanation of it, in
the same letter; or have written Schley that both
letters (or neither) must be published.

And if the "categorical denial" was not true, he
should not have written it. There can be no doubt
about that, for no man has any right to put his name
to an untruthful statement.

Hodgson well said to the court, concerning his ad
missions and denials, and of the part he took in this
whole business (I. 625) : "It was a little hair-split
ting that I [he] indulged in at this time"; or, as he
also luminously said: "Admiral Schley understood
me as denying the verbal accuracy of a dialogue
which was a fictitious concoction of the imagination of
the editor of the Sun, 'or some of his reporters.' '

This "fictitious concoction of the imagination of the
editor of the Sun or of some of his reporters," he, then
to the court affirmed to be "a substantially correct
statement."

The ordinary mind will be puzzled to understand
how "a fictitious concoction of the editor's imagina
tion" (and for which "concoction" he desired that the
editor should be shown up "as an unprincipled black
guard") could possibly be "substantially correct."

The majority of the court found, as a fact, that:

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 315

"About the time the Brooklyn began her turn to star
board a conversation regarding the proximity of the
Texas took place between Commodore Schley and
.Lieutenant Hodgson." But the court does not say
what the alleged conversation was, nor does it state
that the alleged colloquy occurred.

If Mr. Hodgson had thought that either Commo
dore Schley or Captain Cook did not see the Texas,
or any other vessel whose proximity seemed to him
(Hodgson) an element of possible danger, it was
clearly his duty, as the navigator, to call their atten
tion to it. But there his duty ended. Captain Cook
testified (I. 900) : "After the helm was put hard-a-
port, he [Hodgson] came across to me, and said,
'Captain, do you see the Texas?' As she was the
nearest ship at that time, I was looking directly at her.
Just about then, we were pretty well clear of her — I
mean opening out her stern. I said, 'Oh, yes' and he
told me that entirely satisfied him, and walked away."

Admiral Schley testified (I. 1388) : "During the
turn Mr. Hodgson very properly made some allu
sion to 'look out,' perhaps for the Texas; I do not
recollect what it was; but there was never any col
loquy between us. First, He was too good an officer
to have transgressed one of the plainest duties of an
officer at that time; second, if he had undertaken it
I would not have permitted it for a second. As I say,
that is fiction; there was no colloquy."

To have done more than Captain Cook says he did
would have been an impertinence on the part of Mr.
Hodgson. He would never have ventured to in
struct either the commodore or captain. And if he
had said to either what the alleged colloquy states, he
would have got back a reply containing language
more forcible and unforgettable than the impatient re
mark which he asserted that the commodore used in
reference to the Texas.

As to the question of whether there was a colloquy

316 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

or not, we have only the evidence of Lieutenant Com
mander Hodgson that it occurred. There is not a
word of evidence to corroborate him, and he denied
twice, — once in his letter to Schley, and again in the
statement made, over his own signature, before Cap
tain Chadwick, — that it occurred. Admiral Schley
says there never was any colloquy. So, without im
peaching the truthfulness of either, the proof that it
occurred fails. Why should Hodgson — self-contra
dicting — be believed rather than Schley? There can
be no pretense that Admiral Schley had any purpose
to be unfair to Lieutenant Commander Hodgson.

The author wishes to say that he believes Lieuten
ant Commander Hodgson to be an honorable man,
but that his mind, from one cause or another, seems
to have become (as a marine witness once, before a
court martial, expressed it) "so obfusticated" as to
that supposititious colloquy that, as is shown, his
various statements were all contradictory.

The most appropriate comment upon the whole
matter is: "Parturiunt monies, nascetur rediculus

mus."

CHAPTER LXXII

THE COURT OF INQUIRY

No such court of inquiry as that which passed upon
this notable controversy was ever before held. As the
author, in opening his argument before it, said: "I
doubt if the naval history of the world presents, or
ever has presented, a case of the important character
of that in which we have so long been engaged. I
doubt if a tribunal more exalted in the character of
the officers who composed it has ever sat in judgment
upon a brother officer's acts.

"I doubt if any man, with the lifelong character
and standing and conduct of Admiral Schley, was
ever before called upon to ask an investigation of his
conduct as the victorious commander of a fleet.
There never has been a case, so far as my knowledge
and search into naval history has shown me, wherein
the man who, without controversy, was completely
victorious, and did his whole duty, has felt himself
compelled to ask an inquiry as to that conduct, before
his brother officers. I say 'compelled' ; not by the
Navy Department; not by any charge made by any
officer against him, — for no officer has had the
temerity to say, over his own signature, a word
against the conduct of Admiral Schley in the Battle of
Santiago; or in the conduct of the Flying Squadron.
So, I say that the situation is exceptional, without a
parallel in all naval history, in all its aspects.

"There are no accusers here. There is nobody on
trial. No charges have been preferred. And yet we
cannot have failed to see, as we have progressed, that
the case has been conducted as though Commodore
Schley were on trial. We are compelled to consider
the case in that aspect — as a trial."

318 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

A large room in one of the buildings at the Navy
Yard in the City of Washington was fitted for the
sessions of the court. Ample accommodations for
several hundred people were provided, and hardly a
day passed that there were present fewer than three
hundred well-dressed, intelligent ladies and gentlemen
from all parts of the country. Fully fifty, if not more,
correspondents of the principal newspapers in all
parts of the land were in attendance, and their re
ports were, with a few exceptions, fair and as full as
could be expected; and the great dailies printed
almost verbatim report of the proceedings.

The military clubs, not only in the United States
and Canada, but in Europe, were kept fully informed
of the progress of the inquiry; and the foreign club
men (accustomed, as they had been, to see their vic
torious commanders rewarded with the highest
honors) looked on with usad and wondering eyes" at
the spectacle of the victor practically on trial for hav
ing secured that victory. It was ua spectacle to make
the gods weep."

The acoustics were perfect ; every word spoken by
the Court, witnesses, and counsel could be distinctly
heard by all, and the order among the spectators
(which was most courteously maintained by Captain
Henry W. Carpenter, of the Marine Corps, as ser-
geant-at-arms, and his subordinates,) secured to
everyone the greatest comfort attainable on such oc
casions.

The audiences were largely drawn from Washing
ton and Baltimore, and almost entirely in sympathy
with Admiral Schley, who was, from first to last, "the
observed of all observers." He, before the morn
ing sessions began, at recess, and after the adjourn
ments for the day, was compelled to hold a sort of
levee, with scores of lovely women of all ages from
"sweet sixteen" to old age, and distinguished men

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 319

pressing to shake his hand and speak words of sympa
thetic kindness and respectful admiration.

To maintain the solemn decorum of such a court
was almost an impossibility. The feeling was too in
tense, and applause was frequent, in spite of Dewey's
gavel, and warning against it.

The court, as originally composed, consisted of the
Admiral of the Navy, as president; and Rear Admi
rals Lewis A. Kimberly and Andrew E. K. Benham,
members. Before it met, Rear Admiral Kimberly
asked to be excused, on ccount of ill-health, and Rear
Admiral Henry L. Howison was appointed in his
place. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy,
Captain Samuel C. Lemly, was appointed judge advo
cate, with Edwin P. Hanna, Esq., as his assistant.

When the court met, on September 12, 1901,
Admiral Schley introduced, as his counsel, Hon. Jere
miah M. Wilson, of Washington, D. C. ; Hon. Isador
Rayner, the Attorney General of the State of Mary
land; and Captain James Parker (the author) of
Perth Amboy, New Jersey.

Admiral Schley, having objected to Rear Admiral
Howison as a member, that officer was excused; and
Rear Admiral Francis M. Ramsay was appointed in
his stead. Admiral Schley had been serving abroad
as commander-in-chief of the South Atlantic Squad
ron, and neither he nor either of his counsel knew that
Rear Admiral Benham, as a member of a board, had
already decided the important question of who was in
actual command in the Battle of Santiago. If we had
known that, Admiral Benham would have been ob
jected to as a member of the court, and would prob
ably have been excused.

In the opinion of the writer, Benham, knowing that
he had made up and officially stated his opinion as
to that question, ought not to have served as a mem
ber of that court — without, at least, informing Schley
of that fact.

320 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

There was a semi-tragical interruption of the course
of proceedings, when, on the sixth day, the senior
counsel, Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson, suddenly died, at
his hotel. He was a lawyer of wide renown, and of
the highest professional and personal character, and
his death was a great shock and a great loss. In re
spect to his memory the court adjourned over the day
of his funeral, and all attended in a body; the counsel
being among the pall-bearers.

For the information of non-professional readers,
an explanation of the functions and methods of naval
courts will not be inappropriate.

A court of inquiry (as its name implies), is a tri
bunal of three officers, whose duty it is to examine into
all the facts and circumstances connected with the
matters referred to it; to bring out the whole truth
without regard to the result as to anyone; to express
its opinions upon the facts, if required by the Precept;
and to recommend what, if anything, further should
be done in the premises.

Elicitation of the truth, and the whole truth, is its
fundamental duty.

Its findings are authenticated by the signature of
the president and the judge advocate, but such signa
tures do not show that the president or any particular
member concurs in such finding. A majority of the
court determines all preliminary matters, such as
questions of evidence and proceedings, arising during
the investigation ; and the findings.

Any of the members may dissent in writing, but it
does not follow that such member concurs merely be
cause he does not formally dissent; and no one has
the right to assume that a finding is unanimous (as
has been done in this case) merely because there is no
such dissent.

It is clearly the duty of the judge advocate to sum
mon before the court all who know, and can testify to,
any of the facts bearing upon the matters to be in-

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 321

quired into; and he has no right whatever to keep
back anything pertinent to such inquiry; or fail to
present any witness having knowledge of those facts.

The judge advocate early announced (I. 25) :
"The conduct of Rear Admiral Schley is in question,
not only at the Battle of Santiago, but in the whole
Santiago campaign; but I might as well say here that
the question of Admiral Sampson's conduct on those
occasions is not before the court in any way."

A court martial, on the other hand, is a tribunal
composed of not more than thirteen, or fewer than
five officers, organized to try an officer or enlisted
man, upon charges that have been preferred against
him by proper authority; and to determine his guilt
or innocence of those charges. All the members of
the court are sworn to secrecy, and must sign the find
ings, whether they concur in them or not; and so it
may happen that seven members out of the thirteen
(except in cases involving the punishment of death, in
which cases three- fourths must concur) may find a
judgment, and the other six may not concur; but the
finding will appear to have been unanimous.

It soon became evident, from the methods of pro-
ceedure adopted by the judge advocate, that the court,
so far as he could control, was not to be a court of
inquiry, but, in fact, a court martial. Instead of sum
moning all the witnesses who knew, or were supposed
to know anything about the matters to be inquired
into, in order that all the facts might be presented to
the court, as it was his duty to do, only those witnesses,
with a few exceptions, were summoned by the judge
advocate who were known or believed to be unfavor
able to Admiral Schley, and who could be relied upon
to discolor or conceal such facts as might be favorable
to him.

Such important and impartial officers and eye-wit
nesses as Captain Clark of the Oregon, his navigator,

21

322 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Lieutenant (now Captain) Nicholson, Lieutenants
Eberle and Ackerman, of that ship; and Lieutenant
Harlow, of the Vixen, who had taken, from the bridge
of that vessel, notes of all the incidents of the battle ;
and all the officers of the Brooklyn, except Captain
Cook, and Lieutenants Hodgson, her navigator, and
Lieutenant Doyle, were left to be summoned by
Admiral Schley. Lieutenant Doyle was subpoenaed
only because the judge advocate hoped to be able to
give a sinister appearance to an alteration which
Doyle had made in the log-book of the Brooklyn, but
which hope proved vain, for Doyle explained and
showed it to be entirely innocent and proper. And it
was not pretended that Admiral Schley had any
knowledge of or connection with it.

That log-book had been written by a man named
Mason, who, having served out his enlistment as an
apprentice, had gone into business in Pittsburg.
Lemly had him brought on from Pittsburg, and had
carefully examined him with respect to that alteration.
Mason produced to him a copy of the log as he had at
first written it ; and made such explanations as showed
its exact character, and how the alteration came
about; and, with full knowledge that the alteration
was proper, Lemly sent Mason back to Pittsburg,
with instructions to say nothing to anyone about the
matter. Mason was, however, loyal to his old com
mander, and came over to Schley's counsel, and told
them what had occurred. We sent him back to
Pittsburg, with the statement that he would be called
if we should need him. We afterwards found it
proper to summon him.

This conduct on the part of the judge advocate was
a plain effort to suppress evidence in the case, and, as
everybody knows, the "supressio veri" is more cul
pable, than the "suggestio falsi" and both are an
effort to work a fraud, The former is manly a»d

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 323

works in the light, the latter is cowardly and works in
the dark.

Lieutenant Commander Hodgson was no doubt
expected by his testimony to give a sinister character
to the "loop" or turn of the Brooklyn; but, if that
was the hope, he proved a most undesirable witness
to that end. After his testimony had been given, the
judge advocate must have understood, better than he
had ever done before, the disappointment of Balak,
the son of Zipper, which brought forth his reproach
to Balaam the son of Beor: "What hast thou done
unto me ? I took thee to curse mine enemies ; and, be
hold, thou hast blessed them altogether."

As to that turn, Hodgson proved to be a first-class
witness for Schley.

CHAPTER LXXIII

WHY DID SCHLEY ASK FOR A COURT OF INQUIRY?

FOR more than three years Admiral Schley had been
subjected to all sorts of malicious misrepresentation
and insinuation and had been viciously attacked by
certain newspapers. But to all this he gave no heed
until when, about July i, 1901, a highly respectable
publishing house issued a third volume of a book (the
first two volumes of which had been published some
years before) entitled, uThe History of the Navy,"
by Edgar Stanton Maclay.1

The statements made in this third volume which
extended the scope of the history so as to include the
war with Spain were of so defamatory a character,
that the admiral felt impelled to address to the Navy
Department a letter in which, after characterizing
the statements of the book as they deserved, he said:

"I have refrained heretofore from all comments
upon the innuendoes of enemies muttered or mur
mured in secret, and therefore with safety to them
selves. I think the time has now come to take such
action as may bring this entire matter under discussion
under the clearer and calmer review of my brothers
in arms; and, to this end, I ask such action at the
hands of the department as it may deem best to accom
plish this purpose."

Maclay was an employee of the Government of the
United States, and in the preface to this third volume

1 It is proper to state that as soon as the publishers learned of
the false character of Maclay's book, it was withdrawn from sale
and suppressed as far as possible; and Maclay was, by order of
the President of the United States, dismissed from the service of the
Government, and the use of his third volume in the naval and mili
tary academies was prohibited by the Congress of the United
States.

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 325

he stated, in effect, that he had submitted the volume
to several of the higher officers of the navy, and also
to the Secretary of the Navy, and that what he had
written met with their approbation.

It will be observed that Admiral Schley asked that
the department should "take such action as may bring
this entire matter under clearer and calmer review
of [his] brothers in arms."

This certainly, as the admiral intended and ex
pected, involved all who were connected with Schley
in any way during the time that elapsed between May
1 8, when the Flying Squadron, under Schley's com
mand, came under the orders of Admiral Sampson,
and the end of the Battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898.

The Navy Department, by its Precept of July 26,
1901, ordered a court of inquiry; but instead of di
recting an investigation "of the whole matter," con
fined the court to an investigation of the "conduct of
said Schley during the recent war with Spain, and in
connection with the events thereof"; and set forth
ten specifications of matters to be investigated.

One who reads that Precept cannot fail to see that
the object which Judge Advocate Lemly, who drew
it, had in view, was an indictment of Admiral Schley,
to prove and sustain which every possible effort was
to be directed. And this purpose was relentlessly
pursued.

When Schley, on July 27, wrote to the department,
suggesting that Paragraph 5 of the Precept be
modified so as to omit the department's expression
of opinion, and thus leave the court free to express
its own opinion in that matter, he was informed that
the "Precept treats certain matters as established,
such as the fact that you disobeyed orders."

The paragraph which Admiral Schley wished
omitted was as follows :

"The circumstances attending and the reasons for
the disobedience by Commodore Schley of the or-

326 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

ders of the Department contained in its dispatch
dated May 25, 1898; and the propriety of his con
duct in the premises."

Here was a proposed inquiry in which the question
whether there had been a disobedience of orders was
as much a matter of inquiry as any other fact alleged
or not. Whether there had been such disobedience of
orders was not left to the court to say; it could only
express opinion whether or not the commodore had
"willfully disobeyed the orders, or was justified in
disobeying them."

There were other assumptions of fact, just as flag
rantly wrong, in a matter of inquiry.

CHAPTER LXXIV

CONCLUSION — A CONTRAST

IN the foregoing pages I have endeavored to bear in
mind the maxim : "Nothing extenuate, nor set
down ought in malice."

I have given authority and document for every
statement made, except those about what occurred
in the cabin of the flagship New York, May 26
(about Schley's remaining off Cienfuegos), and
again on July 10, in the interview between Sampson
and his chief of staff (Chadwick), relative to the
letter of Sampson about Commodore Schley. Au
thority for these, which will be indubitable, can be
produced if circumstances require.

The signal book of the flagship New York (printed
as an exhibit to the proceedings of the Court of In
quiry) shows that the following signals were made
on the afternoon of July 3 by Commodore Schley to
Admiral Sampson:

"2 P. M. — We have gained a great victory. De
tails will be communicated."

To this the only reply was: "Report your casual

ties."

2.43 p. M. — "This is a great day for our country."

To this there was no reply.

In the great Battle of St. Vincent (between the
British fleet, commanded by Admiral Sir John Jervis,
and the Spanish fleet, under Admiral Don Jose de
Cordova), Nelson, who was only a commodore, vio
lated and disregarded the order of battle that had
been given by the admiral and was being executed
by him, in plain view of the enemy.

Nelson's action resulted in a great success, in which
he and Collingwood and others of the captains of
Nelson's division displayed great ability.

328 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

Nelson, instead of tacking, wore ship, and thus
"turned her stern towards the enemy, and increased
her distance from the enemy by at least her tactical
diameter," whatever that was. But once about, Nel
son and his supporters attacked the head of the Span
ish fleet and destroyed it. Exactly as was done by
the Brooklyn and Oregon.

If someone in high station had been criticising
Nelson's action on that day, he would no doubt have
said of the "loop" made by Nelson's ship: "It
seriously marred the Captain's otherwise excellent
record; being in fact the one grave mistake made by
any British ship that day."

But grim old Sir John Jervis took a different view,
and acted differently.

Mahan (p. 335 ) says : "He signalled to the Excel
lent [Collingsworth's ship] to tack and follow Nel
son; and the Victory, Jervis' flagship passed the
Captain, Nelson's flagship, and cheered, as did every
ship in the fleet."

Brenton, the naval historian of the combat (Vol.
i, p. 313) says: _

"When the firing ceased, Nelson went on board
the flagship Victory!' (He carried with him the
sword of the Spanish rear admiral, which had been
surrendered to him personally.) "He was received
on the quarterdeck by the fine old admiral," (a most
unusual compliment, because admirals do not come
out of their cabins to receive subordinates), "who
took him in his arms, and said he could not sufficiently
thank him ; and insisted that Nelson should keep the
sword of the Spanish rear admiral which he had so
bravely won."

Captain Alfred T. Mahan, our great naval his
torian writer and critic, in his "Life of Nelson" (p.
340) says: "The commander-in-chief had come out
to greet him upon the quarterdeck of the flagship — a
compliment naval officers will appreciate — had there

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 329

embraced him, saying he could not sufficiently thank
him; and used every kind expression which could
not fail to make me (he was quoting Nelson) happy."
Brenton further says: "That evening the captain
of the Victory, Sir Robert Calder (Admiral Jervis'
chief of staff), suggested to the admiral that Nelson
had rendered himself liable to a court martial by his
disobedience of the order of battle that day." Con
cerning this incident Mahan says (p. 341) :

"In the evening, while talking over the events of
the day, Calder spoke of Nelson's wearing out of the
line as an authorized departure from the mode
of attack prescribed by the admiral."

' 'It certainly was so,' replied Jervis; 'and if ever
you commit such a breach of your orders, I will for
give you also.' '

It is said that "comparisons are odious"; but con
trasts are instructive.

All generous hearts will regret that the incident of
Jervis' treatment of Commodore Nelson was not-
even in small measure — repeated between Admiral
Sampson and Commodore Schley when the victorious
commodore went on board the flagship New York
after the Battle of Santiago with Cervera. No
cheers from the New York were granted to him, as
were given to Nelson and his gallant officers and men
of the Captain by the Victory and the whole British
fleet.

The dramatis personae were all present : An ad
miral commanding; a gallant, victorious commodore;
a Spanish fleet destroyed; a Spanish rear admiral's
sword; (even an envious chief of staff). Alas, that
there should only have been lacking the generous
spirit that swelled out of the heart of the "fine old
British admiral" as he embraced and thanked Nelson
that day, more than a hundred years ago, on the
quarterdeck of the Victory, on board of which Nelson
was to die at Trafalgar some years later !

330 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

It is a curious fact that Sir Robert Calder, who (as
above related) undertook to criticise Nelson to Ad
miral Jeryis, and had meanwhile been promoted to be
vice admiral, should have been court-martialed, and
deprived of his command of nineteen sail of the line,
for a failure to avail himself, on June 22, 1905, of a
fine opportunity to destroy the combined French and
Spanish fleets under Admiral Villeneuve, which Nel
son destroyed at Trafalgar four months later.

If anyone wishes to read a touching story, let him
read the "Calder incident," as told by Captain
Mahan, on pages 704-07 of the "Life of Nelson."
In reading the last mentioned book the writer has
been much impressed by the similarity between Nel
son's experiences, while in pursuit of the French fleet
before the Battle of the Nile, and Schley's experiences
while in pursuit of Cervera's fleet. Both were greatly
hampered by lack of information as to the where
abouts of the enemy. Nelson sailed eastward to
Alexandria, as Schley did to the neighborhood of
Santiago de Cuba. Nelson learned at Alexandria
that nothing had been seen or was known of the
French, and Schley was similarly informed by the
scouts off Santiago, as to Cervera's fleet.

Nelson, embarrassed by want of water and other
supplies, sailed back to Syracuse, and then — after
procuring them, still without knowledge of the where
abouts of the enemy — sailed away again to the east
in pursuit; and, having found them in Aboukir Bay,
destroyed them in the Battle of the Nile.

Schley, troubled on account of his coal supply and
lack of reliable information as to Cervera, started
back to the westward; but, as soon as opportunity
to coal his vessels offered, he availed himself of it,
and promptly returned to Santiago de Cuba, and
found Cervera's fleet there. But before he could lay
any plan to get at them, he received Sampson's order
to sink the collier Stirling in the narrow channel, but

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 331

before he could do that (if he had wished to do so)
Admiral Sampson arrived, assumed command, and
sent Hobson to sink the Merrimac.

I do not read that Nelson or Schley caused any ship
to be sunk anywhere to keep the French (or Span
iards) in any port. Both were anxious only to get
their enemy out. When he came out the same result
followed, to wit, total destruction in both cases.

It may be said that Schley is not a Nelson. He
never had the opportunity to be; but the writer may
be pardoned the opinion that he makes a very close
second.

Nelson never won a victory more complete and
decisive than that won by Schley and his subordinate
brother officers and men on that 3d day of July, 1898,
over the Spanish fleet commanded by Rear Admiral
Cervera. Every ship of the enemy and man and
officer was captured or destroyed; and through it
crumbled into dust and destruction the power of
Spain, which, for more than four hundred years, had
dominated and oppressed so much of this hemisphere.

The personal attacks upon Commodore Schley be
gan by the publication of a letter in Harper's Weekly,
about ten days after the great victory had been won.
This letter was without signature — anonymous — but
the Weekly vouched for the high character of the
writer. ("High character" of a man who sneaks be
hind an alias! Ugh!) That writer, like all others
who have made insinuations against the admiral, has
remained in the darkness, has never stepped into the
light, and probably never will.

The author hereof had been the personal friend
of Commodore Schley ever since during the Civil
War, and wrote to him, congratulating him upon the
part he had been able to play in the great battle, and
assuring him that he need have no fear that his coun
trymen would fail to give him the credit that was his
just due.

332 SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA

In reply the Commodore wrote the letter which fol
lows, and by which this review can, most appro
priately, be closed.

''FLAGSHIP BROOKLYN,
"OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA,

"July 20, 1898.
"DEAR PARKER:

"Thank you for your letter. I have felt that the
marvelous victory of July 3d was the joint product
of all who were engaged; and I felt no wish to appro
priate the congratulations to myself. The Brooklyn's
luck was to be in that part of the line where the
assault was first felt; and, afterwards, by her speed
and direction to continue in the scrap for some three
hours and a half to the finish. The victory was so
unique in completeness, and so marvelous in its glory,
as to be large enough for all who participated. I
feel no sympathy with the wish expressed to exclude
anyone; and if I had announced the victory, I should
carefully have noted all whose prominence of action
had helped. I think that omission was a mistake
which has created some thoughtless expressions; and
I hope no friend of mine will keep this matter alive,
while the facts, coldly recited, are sufficient. Thank
ing you again, my dear friend

"I am, very sincerely yours,

"W. S. SCHLEY."

The letter shows no erasures or interlineations.
It evidently was not written and copied, because it
lacks capitals, and is somewhat tautological, in the
repetition of the word "victory," instead of using the
pronoun.

The envelope was marked "Personal," and the
letter was not written for publication, but solely for
my own eye. The sentiments expressed are just what

SCHLEY, SAMPSON AND CERVERA 333

flowed spontaneously out of the commodore's heart,
through the nib of his pen, on to the white page;
his words exactly expressed his feelings and convic
tions only twenty days after the battle ; and that, too,
after the anonymous and venemous attacks upon him
had begun.

From the spirit of that letter Commodore Schley
has never deviated, and never will deviate, so long
as he lives to be the frank-hearted and generous
sailor he has always been.

JAMES PARKER.

Perth Amboy, New Jersey,
November i, 1909.

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